Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 00:21:51 -0700
Subject: Re[2]: waiting for Godel


  I think one main point of Penrose's work is to argue that 
  there are certain things we know which we don't know by 
  computational methods, and Penrose appeals in this 
  connection to Godel's theorems.  Hilary Putnam and Penrose 
  have subsequently engaged in quite a polemic over the 
  latter's appeal to Godel's theorems for this purpose.
  It is interesting to note that Searle has sided with 
  Putnam in this set-to, though he agrees with the 
  conclusion which Penrose is trying to defend--i.e. the 
  non-computational nature of at least some of our conscious 
  thoughts.  It is also worth pointing out that whether 
  Penrose is right about *this* point or not does not settle 
  whether consciousness can be explained materialistically.  
  The computational model of the mind is logically 
  independent of materialism about the mind (at least 
  insofar as these terms are given their normal meaning in 
  philosophy).  One could hold that mind is immaterial but 
  also that everything it does is computational in nature, 
  though few people hold both theses.  However, one thing 
  that makes it difficult for Penrose to qualify as a 
  materialist about the mind, is that he is pretty obviously 
  a Platonic realist about mathematical entities, and he 
  offers no theory about how a material mind is supposed to 
  interact with entities so conceived.
  
  Peter
  pburns-AT-lmumail.lmu.edu


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