Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 19:32:27 +0300 (EET DST)
Subject: Peter on pomo phil


Peter,

here's few questions concerning your characterization of
possible postmodern philosophical ideas:

>   1) the epistemological doctrine of anti-foundationalism
>   (roughly, the view that knowledge has and needs no
>   justificatory 'foundations', neither Descartes' 'clear and
>   distinct ideas' nor the deliverances of sensory experience

Do you mean that cartesian 'foundation' were 'clear and
distinct ideas' and not 'cartesian cogito' (usual reference
in several post-discourses)?

>   2) the semantic doctrine of indeterminacy of meaning and
>   reference.  (roughly, a cluster of views, to wit: that
>   there are no metaphysically robust and well-defined
>   entities like 'senses' (i.e. meanings), pace Frege; that
>   reference is a socially constucted, not a metaphysically
>   robust relation

What this would mean in context of Fregean example of
Bedeutung vs. Sinn / Meaning vs. Sense? That planet Venus as
sense could be socially constructed? How would it be
possible? [In this example: sense is 'planet Venus',
meanings are 'morning star' and 'evening star'.] (Or am I
doing translation error - Bedeutung=sense, Sinn=meaning? I
have to check this..)

>    At the time and for decades afterwards,
>   analytic philosophy was dismissed by other disciplines
>   as totally useless mind-numbing lifeless shit.

One remark: It isn't necessarily so simple. After WW2 there
happened drastic changes in social sciences in favour of
(then) logical-analytical philosophy (in Europe, I mean).
Partly because of Niedergang of German culture, partly
because of other reasons (social scientists looked for
empirically more fruitful foundations, or somesuch). There
was a trend towards 'late-Wittgensteinian and Quinean
foundations' althought not necessarily under these banners.
That trend was perhaps particularly strong in Nothern
Europe.

Yours, Jukka



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