Date: Mon, 20 May 1996 15:52:53 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: Re: TREE - reply to Terry's of 4-19, part 2



> 
> TM:  My sole point is that if nothing is really falsifiable, argument
> by  way of proposing and testing falsifiable propositions is nothing
> more  than a rhetorical strategy and not evidence of adherence to a
> scientific method superior to other methods.
> 
> Lisa: Are you impugning my "rhetorical strategy" ? #:)  I admit to a
> scientistic tendency, perhaps, but I thought we were _both_ speaking
> within a "science" paradigm.  Was I wrong?  Do you consider yourself
> a "social scientist", so we're talking about different kinds or
> methods of "science" ?
> 
> I said "assumptions are not falsifiable" with a particular meaning,
> which I mentioned before.  Fundamental but previously supported
> "assumptions" [such as taking evolutionary theory as a basis for
> hypothesis formation], are not themselves being tested, or intended
> to be "tested" during the test of a _specific hypothesis_.  That does
> not invalidate this method of analysis of reality. 
> _I_ do not claim or agree that hypothesis-falsification is a useless
> method for actually figuring anything out and is solely a vehicle for
> struggle for "scientific" power and influence within this society.  I
> hope you don't either.  
> I also don't claim that it is the only way to understand everything.
> I think it is not needed to discuss "science studies" right now, at
> least it won't help me to see the errors of my ways.  Of course I
> think my "method" is "superior" [don't even non-scientists feel the
> same way?] and I'm sure that looks bad and is irritating to some
> people. 
> But, my opinion is based on "making sense", being logically
> compelling and consistent with evidence, connecting to other
> theories/knowledge, etc.  So, this is the kind of stuff that I
> understand and respond to.  Connected with this is the apparently
> logical notion that some things _are_ falsifiable, i.e. able to be
> ruled out by evidence.

I am not impugning your rhetorical strategy.  I am only saying it is 
a rhetorical strategy (with advantages and disadvantages) and not THE 
scientific method to the exclusion of others as is often claimed by 
practicing scientists but much less often supported today by 
philosophers of science.  And yes the Duhem-Quine argument that 
single testable hypotheses cannot be isolated does imply that things 
are often  not really logically falsifiable.

> The capacity for culture is genetic, a result of natural selection. 
> The use of culture is also adaptive, as organisms evolved to invent/
> adopt/ use things that serve their fitness, including cooperation and
> niceness when it's advantageous.

The capacity for culture is certainly genetic, but that does not mean 
that culture evolved as a reproductively optimal strategy.  Culture 
may merely be a side effect of something else which does have 
adaptive origins, like brain size.  This illustrates one difference 
in our approach.  When you observe something in the natural world, 
you assume it _must_ have an adaptive purpose.  I am arguing this is 
hasty and often misleading.

Further many cultural traits don't appear to be reproductively 
optimal, though others do.
  
> 
  Similarly, if "history is the history of class struggle",
> that simply requires that "history" begins with the existence of
> classes.  Again, this is not helpful in addressing non-class
> societies.  [Competition, on the other hand, is _not_ specific only
> to class society.] So, what does marxian materialism have to say
> about that?  I tend toward Marvin Harris' marxian materialist
> anthropology on this point, that people make culture based on
> ordinary, practical, "conditions, needs and activities", such as
> obtaining food, friends, shelter and sex.  This sort of approach is
> more broadly applicable than to class societies only.  [Altho I
> disagree with Harris strongly in some specific ways.]

I would argue that the marxist materialist approach to non-class 
societies would involve an analysis of the reproduction of the 
non-class nature of these societies.  Nevertheless I do think marxism 
is limited to history and not necessarily helpful in pre and post 
historical societies.
> 
> 
> > TM:  Could one go further and say that behavioural and
> morphological
> > characteristics must only be consistent with continued reproductive
> > success given various environmental constraints.  
> 
> Lisa: Nope, not me.  Well, the friendliest reading is that if enough
> of the people have enough RS to prevent a population from shrinking,
> then it will not go extinct.  Yes, there it is.  Perhaps this is how
> you meant "must only"?  But that is hardly relevant to evolution by
> natural selection.  There is nothing in evolution that "must only"
> limit one to [or requires one to meet] population replacement rates
> of RS.  Whatever the size of the group, those within it may have
> unequal RS, and the future population will consist mostly of those
> individuals with more RS than others.  Death of one's descendents is
> rather unpredictable, so the more there are, the better the chance of
> more of them making it.

The punctuated equilibrium point is relevant here.  Species are in 
fact usually stable over time:  i.e. not evolving further 
adaptations.
> 
> TM:  Characteristics are consistent with  reproductive success rather
> than 'the most RS'.  A perhaps banal  example, you have five fingers
> on each hand because of structural  constraints imposed by the
> anatomy of your evolutionary ancestry and  because this is consistent
> with reproductive success.  There is no  reason to suspect that five
> fingers is the most successful possible  configuration.
> 
> Lisa: This is a common but red herring / misunderstanding.  The view
> of adaptation I espouse is hardly panglossian.  Of course each
> lifeform is constrained by its inheritance in the short run, yet in
> the long run everything is changeable.

There are two points here.  Can pigs fly?  Your position is why not 
given a need for flight and enough evolutionary time.  My position is 
no -  pigs are structurally constrained from flying even in the long 
run.  The second point is how long is the long run.  Again punctuated 
equilibrium observes considerable structural stability over the long 
run.  My position is that this is to be expected, yours is that it 
must have a conjunctural explanation.  My position is that five 
fingeredness  is inherited and is not changed because there is no 
compelling reason for it to change.  Natural selection is passively 
letting five fingeredness through.  Yours is that natural selection 
is actively pursuing five fingeredness as an optimal solution.

Terry McDonough



> 


     --- from list marxism2-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---