Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 06:06:02 +0000
Subject: [Fwd: The scandal of obligation]


Thankyou for your thoughts. I would like to question you a little
further on the first couple of lines.   .  


> 


Ariosto Raggo wrote:
> 
> some thoughts with regards to the chapter on obligation and Levinas.
> 
>         Interiority is accomplished in a move that founds the I in the
> position of _you_, of being addressed which is an "event of feeling"( _The
> Differend_ pg. 111).> 

Now as I read p.111 of "the differend" and especially p. 278 of Reading
Lyotard, what you seem to be saying is the complete opposite of what is
said there.  Interiority, as I understand it, is accomplished by the
self - without the need for the prescriptive or ethical moment.   So
perhaps we have to explain what we think by the term "interiority". I
equate this term with that which is described as the impassse of
Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation (D:110).  Namely it is that
situation where the 'I remains enclosed within its domain of
constitution just as the ego is locked within its domain of expereince,
namely, the enjoyment of being and of having". This "interiority" is
defintely not accomplished by the I being placed on the addresse
instance of a prescriptive phrase.  As para 172 points out - the "I"
placed on the "you" instance is an "I" that is deprived of experience -
and by definition (as I understand it) it is an "I" deprived of
interiority.   Thus, what "I" would say, contrary to "you", is that what
is "accomplished" by the prescriptive event is the presentation of an
exteriority.  Interiority is only accomplished by linking onto this
event in such a way that the "I" is placed back on the addressor
instance of a phrase - most commonly a cognititive phrase. 

I think that both Levinas and Lyotard say that transcendental sameness
(interiority) is the necessary condition  for the surprise, marvel etc -
of the other befalling the ego. This is not to say the befalling itself