Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 17:15:48 +0800
Subject: Re: art of gloss



Hi Michael,

> [mP]: when I began, a few posts ago, to play with the notion of 
> glossing as a way of talking about how being can not be talked about 
> (directly) ... I meant it in all its common and not-so-common 
> resonances.

Apologies for butting in like I did, I just had a sudden urge to work 
through my own ethics of writing. But yes, gloss can also mean the 
shiny surface of things, a mere appearance that covers up what lies 
underneath. This has resonances in Heidegger's discussion of the 
manifest phenomenon as opposed to semblance in BT.

> In accepting all the above resonances of glossing (in their 
> differences and hanging-together) it seems to me that glossing is one 
> of the essential structures of language itself, whether 
> common-colloquial or philosophic; Heraclitus' 'being is cryptic' 
> (itself a gloss, in my quippy translation :-)) is something of a guide 
> in this...

Yeh, I'll buy that. To paraphrase myself, if language is textual 
interpretation then in a sense it's always a gloss for something... 
that 'something' which the talk is about. Again this is something of 
the relation between logos and phenomena that constitutes 
'phenomenology' in BT.

> Of course, the discussion was revolving around the business of the 
> hiding/showing of being in the attempt to speak about being (being: a 
> topic) and from being (being: a resource), and, whether being is 
> equally revealed in speaking about beings. My point is that being is 
> glossed in both kinds of attempt to bespeak it and any other 
> being(s)... in this, glossing (hiding, covering, delaying, shining-up, 
> etc) is the very be-ing of being; perhaps being is revealed in/as the 
> glossing of the gloss...?

Well as I see it there are two problems here. One is whether there can 
even be a disclosive 'language of being' that actually 'speaks being'. 
The other is the disclosure of the being of language... inasmuch as 
language and its meaning has a temporal structure that can be 
described, just like practical understanding for instance, as that 
which constantly withdraws as it uncovers. My problem here is that I 
don't think the problem of being is entirely uncovered in the problem 
of language, which again just reflects my personal bias towards the 
more concrete analyses of Heidegger's phenomenology.

So I tend to prefer the more concrete language of Heidegger's early 
works to his later stuff, but that's just a question of style rather 
than content. And I tend to understand and interpret his later style in 
terms of his phenomenology of being, presence and time. The movement of 
language that the language of being points to, and which you outline 
above, is fine by me but I think it can tend to emphasise a 
self-reflexive phenomenology of textuality in much the same way that 
Derrida's writing does, at the expense of an ontology of practice, 
perception and time. It has an epistemological tendency, if you like, 
rather than an ontological one.

We could debate what ontology means in relation to Heidegger's notion 
of ontotheology, and you might try to suggest that ontology is no 
longer viable in light of the 'language of being', but I think we'd 
just end up having to agree to disagree over a difference in style. As 
far as I'm concerned, a non-theological phenomenological ontology is 
entirely possible and can reveal the question of 'being' as coherently 
as any 'speaking of being' can do. So for me there is the way we talk 
about 'being', a talk that can be expressed in many styles, and then 
there is what the talk is about... which is the open question of being.

Please note that in no way am I claiming any pre-eminence for my own 
style over yours - within the finite bounds of our own knowledge and 
understanding all we can do is speak about 'being'. My own style 
doesn't necessarily try to explicitly uncover itself as the movement of 
being, I'm happy to leave that up to those who prefer a more poietic 
style.

> I suppose I (perhaps not Rick) am saying that speaking of being as a 
> topic (subjecting 'it' to the rigours of rational articulate speech, 
> e.g.) -- the attempt of ontology, the entire philosophical enterprise 
> that Heidegger terms 'ontotheology' -- reveals being as hidden; the 
> presencing of what presents (presence) itself is transformed, coded 
> into yet another present being, however omnipresent, overpowering, 
> fundamental, etc; being be-comes beingness. Being is glossed when 
> spoken of (or not!), but, but, it is [underlined] glossed... and is as 
> [underlined] glossed, is glossing... thus revealed as [underlined] 
> hidden (revealed, that is, if attention is focussed rather more upon 
> the glossing itself rather than the gloss {cover-up}).
>
> enough already... [a gloss for tiredness :-)]
>
> michaelP

I don't agree that ontology must necessarily 'reveal being as hidden' 
in simply misinterpreting presencing as mere presence without recourse 
to the subtleties of temporality and openness. I think the 'being 
question' is about something that is entirely mundane and so 
self-evident that it is extremely resistant to language, a resistance 
which perhaps led Heidegger towards his poietic sayings. But again I 
must insist that there is our talk about being, and there is what we're 
talking about... in whatever way we choose to express that.

Regards,

Malcolm



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