File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0303, message 485


Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2003 17:07:19 EST
Subject: Being & Time Part 2



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Content-Language: en



Anthony Crifasi writes:

Alright, I'm going to try with Jud, one more time. (One request Jud, please
keep your answers brief - no offense, but you tend to say in many words what
could be said in a few, and I have limited time). Michael, the way to
convince analytic types like Jud is to show that their position reduces
itself to either self-contradiction or an outright denial that we can know
anything whatsoever about "external reality". For example,

Michael said to Jud:
You seem to be suggesting that the very naming of a being is enough to
linguistically grant it existence status.

Jud:
Let's get things correct first please. It was Michael who said
=E2=80=9Clinguistically=E2=80=9D I said =E2=80=9Csententially.=E2=80=9D But=20I'm not quibbling
over it.
It was unintentional I know - It is just that I am a bit touchy about people
getting it right as far as the words I employ.  :-)


Anthony:
And Jud answers first that the naming itself (e. g., "leaf" in the sentence,
"The leaf is green") does not grant existence status:

Jud: Previously
No, you misunderstand. You have disregarded a whole sentence in which I say:
"once an entity is named it is nominally extant or "sententially extant" for
the purposes of making some comment about it, though that of course does not
mean that it actually exists in the real world as an actual spatial and
temporal object. In other words if we say: "The leaf... is green" we are
introducing the leaf as viable subject of communication, and extantalising it
sententially for the purpose of making a statement about the real or imagined
entity which may or may not exist in the real world as a referent of the word
"leaf."

Anthony:
But in the very next two sentences, Jud says that the word "is" (e. g., "The
leaf IS green") does not signify that the subject exists "BECAUSE THAT HAS
ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED":

Jud: Previously
You can now see that by the a priori nominalisation or referentialisation the
entity which corresponds to the word "leaf" it is existentialised for the
purposes of making the proposition that it "is green." Hence the role of the
"is" can be seen as indicating this modalic information [its greenness] and
not that of existentialising the entity which corresponds or is
referentialised by the word "leaf," because that has already been
accomplished.

Anthony:
Now, if the part of the sentence by which "existentialising the entity ...
has already been accomplished" is not the predicate (viz., "is green"), then
the only part of the sentence left is the subject itself: "The leaf".
Therefore you are now contradicting what you said before - that the simple
naming of "The leaf" does not grant existence in the real world.
--

---------------------------------------------------------------
Jud:
No you are confused I'm afraid. If you re-read the passage carefully you will
see that there is no hint of contradiction.
The word leaf sententionally existentialises the subject, whilst the "is"
attributes the predicational greenness.
Functionally the "is" associates the self existentialised leaf to the
predicational information which it attributes concatenationally.

The sentential or propositional   introduction of the subject [extantal
imbuant] with the employment of the definite article and the word =E2=80=9Cleaf=E2=80=9D
does not necessarily existentialise the leaf in actuality, unless the leaf
truly does have a temporal  referent in the real world or its extantness has
been established and verified  antecedally in the conversation.



The sentence =E2=80=9CThe leaf is green=E2=80=9D may well be a quote from a=20work of fiction.
 If on the other hand we were addressing a real leaf, and you were looking
over my shoulder at a real leaf, and I said:  =E2=80=9CThe leaf is green=E2=80=9D then the
words =E2=80=9CThe leaf=E2=80=9D would actually have a referent in the veridical world and
the sentential existentialisation would be existentially verified, and there
would be a sentential-temporal corroboration.
You are confusing words with their referents - with the things to which they
refer.

If standing by the door at a party I shout:  "Ladies and Gentlemen - Anthony
Crifasi!" then you can see that [even before you come into view] you have
been sententially existentialised without the need of any BE-word or
Exist-word. Of course I could then say: "No - it's OK it's not really him -
you can all relax," in which case there would be a sententional-temporal
mismatch and (much to the disapointment of the party-goers) the sentence
would be false. :-)

In AITist jargon [between ourselves] we describe the subject of a sentence as
being an  =E2=80=9Cextantal imbuant=E2=80=9D as the utterance of the name of a subject
existentialises it sententially NOT in the real world but as the subject of=20a
string of words satisfying the grammatical rules of a language for the
purposes of communication. Extantal imbuants [subjects] may or may not exist
[have referents] in the real world, and extantal reificants [verbal
nominalisations and abstractions] such as: love, =E2=80=9CBeing,=E2=80=9D existence,
freedom, cigarette-card collecting, etc., never exist in the real world, for
of course it goes without saying, that only those that exist exist, and only
those who are free exist, and only cigarette-card collectors exist.
The sentence =E2=80=9CEphraim Scrogferret is in Birmingham.=E2=80=9D Doesn't mean that there
is really a person in the real world that is the referent of the name Ephraim
Scrogferret, there may be such a person and there may not be.  If there is
such a person and he happens to be in Birmingham, then the statement is a
true one, if not it is false. If there is a person who is the referent of the
name Ephraim Scrogferret but he is not in Birmingham, then there is a
sentential-temporal match of the extantal imbuant, but the predicational
proposition as to his existential modality of relative spatial positionality
is false.  A subject may be sententially existentialised, as Heidegger did in
=E2=80=9Cthe Leaf Episode=E2=80=9D for the purpose of constructing a sentence, but that is
quite different matter from an assertion that it has a real referent out
there in the nitty-gritty world.





cheers,



Jud Evans.

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HTML VERSION:

Content-Language: en

Anthony Crifasi writes:

Alright, I'm going to try with Jud, one more time. (One request Jud, please keep your answers brief - no offense, but you tend to say in many words=20what could be said in a few, and I have limited time). Michael, the way to convince analytic types like Jud is to show that their position reduces itself to either self-contradiction or an outright denial that we can know anything whatsoever about "external reality". For example,

Michael said to Jud:
You seem to be suggesting that the very naming of a being is enough to linguistically grant it existence status.

Jud:
Let's get things correct first please. It was Michael who said =E2=80=9Clinguistically=E2=80=9D I said =E2=80=9Csententially.=E2=80=9D=20But I'm not quibbling over it.
It was unintentional I know - It is just that I am a bit touchy about people getting it right as far as the words I employ.  :-)


Anthony:
And Jud answers first that the naming itself (e. g., "leaf" in the sentence, "The leaf is green") does not grant existence status:

Jud: Previously
No, you misunderstand. You have disregarded a whole sentence in which I=20say: "once an entity is named it is nominally extant or "sententially extant" for the purposes of making some comment about it, though that of course does not mean that it actually exists in the real world as an actual spatial and temporal object. In other words if we say: "The leaf... is green" we are=20introducing the leaf as viable subject of communication, and extantalising it sententially for the purpose of making a statement about the real or imagined entity which may or may not exist in the real world as a referent of the word "leaf."

Anthony:
But in the very next two sentences, Jud says that the word "is" (e. g.,=20"The leaf IS green") does not signify that the subject exists "BECAUSE THAT=20HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED":

Jud: Previously
You can now see that by the a priori nominalisation or referentialisation the entity which corresponds to the word "leaf" it is existentialised for=20the purposes of making the proposition that it "is green." Hence the role of the "is" can be seen as indicating this modalic information [its greenness] and not that of existentialising the entity which corresponds or is referentialised by the word "leaf," because that has already been accomplished.

Anthony:
Now, if the part of the sentence by which "existentialising the entity ... has already been accomplished" is not the predicate (viz., "is green"), then the only part of the sentence left is the subject itself: "The leaf". Therefore you are now contradicting what you said before - that the simple naming of "The leaf" does not grant existence in the real world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jud:
No you are confused I'm afraid. If you re-read the passage carefully you will see that there is no hint of contradiction.
The word leaf sententionally existentialises the subject,=20whilst the "is" attributes the predicational greenness.
Functionally the "is" associates the self existentialised leaf to the predicational information which it attributes concatenationally.

The sentential or propositional   introduction of the subject=20[extantal imbuant] with the employment of the definite article and the word=20=E2=80=9Cleaf=E2=80=9D does not necessarily existentialise the leaf in actuality, unless the leaf truly does have a temporal  referent in the real world or its extantness has been established and verified  antecedally in the conversation.

The sentence =E2=80=9CThe leaf is green=E2=80=9D may well be a quote from a work of fiction.  If on the other hand we were addressing a real leaf, and you were looking over my shoulder at a real leaf, and I said:  =E2=80=9CThe leaf is green=E2=80=9D then the words =E2=80=9CThe leaf=E2=80=9D would actually have a referent in the veridical world and the sentential existentialisation would be existentially verified, and there would be a sentential-temporal corroboration.
You are confusing words with their referents - with the things to which=20they refer.

If standing by the door at a party I shout:  "Ladies and Gentlemen - Anthony Crifasi!" then you can see that [even before you come into=20view] you have been sententially existentialised without the need of any BE-word or Exist-word. Of course I could then say: "No - it's OK it's not really him - you can all relax," in which case there would be a sententional-temporal mismatch and (much to the disapointment of the party-goers) the=20sentence would be false. :-)

In AITist jargon [between ourselves] we describe the subject of a sentence as being an  =E2=80=9Cextantal imbuant=E2=80=9D as the utterance of the name of a subject existentialises it sententially NOT in the real world but as the subject of a string of words satisfying the grammatical rules of a language for the purposes of communication. Extantal imbuants [subjects] may or may not exist [have referents] in the real world, and extantal=20reificants [verbal nominalisations and abstractions] such as: love, =E2=80=9CBeing,=E2=80=9D existence, freedom, cigarette-card collecting, etc., never exist in the real world, for of course it goes without saying, that only those that exist exist, and only those who are free exist, and only cigarette-card collectors exist.
The sentence =E2=80=9CEphraim Scrogferret is in Birmingham.=E2=80=9D Doesn't mean that there is really a person in the real world that is=20the referent of the name Ephraim Scrogferret, there may be such a person and there may not be.  If there is such a person and he happens to=20be in Birmingham, then the statement is a true one, if not it is false. If there is a person who is the referent of the name Ephraim Scrogferret=20but he is not in Birmingham, then there is a sentential-temporal match of the extantal imbuant, but the predicational proposition as to his existential=20modality of relative spatial positionality is false.  A subject may be=20sententially existentialised, as Heidegger did in =E2=80=9Cthe Leaf Episode=E2=80=9D for the purpose of constructing a sentence, but that is quite different matter from an assertion that it has a real referent out there in the nitty-gritty world.


cheers,

Jud Evans.
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