Subject: Re: the o/o gulf
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2003 19:52:30 +0000


John Foster wrote:

>Anthony wrote:
>
>So the difference between fear and anxiety is precisely that
>fear shrinks
>back from some entity within-the-world, whereas the
>turning-away of falling
>is NOT from some entity-within-the-world, but rather from
>the very "same
>kind of being as the one that shrinks back: IT IS DASEIN
>ITSELF." Since
>Dasein is not an entity within the world, the turning-away
>from itself that
>is falling cannot be fear, since fear is only of entities
>within-the-world.
>That is what he means when he says that fear is anxiety
>fallen into the
>world - anxiety, like fear, is a turning-away or shrinking
>back, but unlike
>fear, it is not about an entity in the world at all.
>
>
>Well, Anthony, I don't know about that. Fear of the unknown,
>fear of fear itself, are fears about nothing in particular.

First John, DO YOU OR DO YOU NOT GRANT THAT HEIDEGGER EXPLICITLY SAYS THAT 
FEAR IS ALWAYS ABOUT SOME ENTITY IN THE WORLD, AND ANXIETY IS NOT? I have 
thrown text after text in your face in which Heidegger explicitly says the 
above two things (most notably, the text you CUT out from my reply above!). 
DO YOU OR DO YOU NOT GRANT THAT HE EXPLICITLY SAYS THE ABOVE TWO THINGS?

Secondly, there is nothing and then there is NOTHING. Fear of the unknown is 
about SOME SPECIFIC UNKNOWN - i.e., there is something unknown about some 
specific situation, or at least a specific as-yet-unrealized possibility is 
feared. That is different from the UTTER no-thing which is the "object" of 
anxiety - Dasein's pure potentiality for being.

>The uncanny [befindlichkeit] is an awareness of the unknown.
>I am nor clear either on the idea that
>
>"fear is anxiety fallen into the world"
>
>Dasein falls, night falls, anxiety individualizes,
>
>and the metaphor of  the 'fall' means something else. It is
>different from the aversion response of 'turning-away' and
>'shrinking back'. Dasein is made ontologically distinct by
>sense certainty of the factual and by familiarity with
>entities.

What??? Where in the WORLD are you getting that from? He says that Dasein is 
made ontologically distinct through the COLLAPSE of the factical in anxiety, 
not through factical sense certainty!

RENE, this is what you want to defend??? This isn't just some factical 
error, like Heidegger was a ski instructor. This is a misinterpretation of 
fundamental ontology!

>Dasein is an ontological term used inititally by
>Kant for existence, and therefore 'death' has no 'purpose';
>however for Heidegger death is both purposive and
>fundamental to existence and Dasein. Niala has commented
>with eloquence on death and anxiety as relational terms.

And do you remember what else Niala said? About fear and anxiety? Niala 
DISTINGUISHED fear from anxiety because fear is about an entity in the 
world, whereas anxiety is not. Just like I am doing.

>"Holding death for true (death is just one's own) shows
>another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any
>certaintly which relates to entities encountered
>within-the-world, or to formal objects; for it is certain of
>Being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not
>demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but
>demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its
>existence. [BT 309-310]
>
>Remember Dasein is encountered in self, being-in, and world.

Um, note that he says that "Holding death for true ... IS MORE PRIMORDIAL 
THAN ANY CERTAINTY WHICH RELATES TO ENTITIES ENCOUNTERED WITHIN-THE-WORLD, 
OR TO FOMAL OBJECTS; for it is certain of Being-in-the-world." So 
Being-in-the-world is not the same as entities encountered within-the-world, 
but is MORE PRIMORDIAL.

> >Then in the next paragraph we are told that anxiety is
> >'disclosive' and that "a state of mind makes manifest how
> >one is. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny' <Befindlichkeit>."
> >Being-in-the-world therefore is a feeling too, it is a
> >feeling of 'being at home'
>
>Anthony:
>Do you have any idea how utterly absurd it is to
>characterize being-in-the-world as a feeling?
>
>
>Anthony, feeling is an intermediary of logic and emotion.

And do you realize that logic and emotion are FACTICAL distinctions!

>For me, being-in-the-world is 'feeling', a state of mind.
>Here is what I suppose: All feelings are states of mind, and
>thus, according to Heidegger, anxiety is a state of mind,
>fear is a mode of state of mind, and thus clearly one
>expression of 'being-in-the-world' is to have feeling (a
>state of mind).

FEELINGS come and go. But he says that anxiety is a CONSTITUTIVE 
state-of-mind. WHAT IS ONTOLOGICALLY CONSTITUTIVE DOES NOT COME AND GO! That 
would be like saying that Being-in-the-world comes and goes! That is why no 
constitutive state-of-mind can be a feeling!

>No sympathy or love can exist unless I am a
>being in the world. A worldless being cannot have feeling,
>nor can a being without a self which cannot feel.

Saying that a constitutive state-of-mind is necessary in order to have 
feelings is different from saying that a constitutive state-of-mind IS a 
feeling!

>What you are asking your audience to now agree to is
>'mindless states of mind' or 'no-mind' states; or mindless
>miming, mimes, or positively a 'zen-like' no mine (but I
>doubt that).

John, what is Dasein? A mind? No, that's a factical existent. A soul? No, 
same problem. A brain? No, definitely factical. Heidegger says that Dasein's 
essence is EXISTENCE JOHN, not an existent, like a mind, or soul, or body. 
So when Heidegger talks about a state-of-mind, you cannot interpret this as 
a factical state of a facical mind! You must understand state-of-mind 
ontologically, as constitive of Dasein, not as some factical existent!

>Of course you have not proved that there are no minds, just
>made us wonder.
>
>Care, as solicitude is love, but love is said to be an act
>rather than a feeling (I wonder?)
>
>Care is 'already-being-in' for Heidegger. Your answer should
>have elaborated on where the self is in the phrase
>'being-in-the-world.'

In inauthentic being-in-the-world, the "self" is not a self, but the They. 
That's what he means when he speaks of a They-self. In anxiety, Dasein 
CANNOT interpret itself in terms of the They, because all involvement with 
entities collapses, forcing Dasein to face its DISTINCTIVE (individualized) 
pure potentiality for being. This is distinctive and individualized 
precisely because Dasein is distinguished FROM ENTITIES in that it is NOT an 
entity. THAT is what he means by individualization through anxiety.

Anthony Crifasi

>No self is required to 'feel' as you
>know, but Dasein is individualized through anxiety (this is
>the difficult point because of the fact that a world cannot
>'feel' anxiety, nor can 'being-in' (being at home, residing
>alongside, et cetera) as feeling be pure of environment,
>world, or self always.


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