Subject: Re: the o/o gulf (1)
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2003 11:57:15 -0800




Rene, you can't insist on this distinction between the truth
of rightness
and the truth of openness while at the same time insisting
on the ambiguity
of the o/o distinction. After all, the truth of rightness is
factical,
whereas the truth of openness is ontological. So the very
distinction you
are making between these two kinds of truths presupposes the
very
distinction that you are trying to say is ambiguous in the
first place! So
if you don't want to spoil your reading of John Foster with
the "rigidity"
of the o/o distinction, then you also can't spoil your
reading of ME with
the very same "rigidity" of the
truth-as-rightness/truth-as-openness
distinction.

Anthony Crifasi

Anthony, not necessarily. If you are assuming that
'rightness' has only a factical component, this might not
stand in terms of ideation, and in concepts. Mathematics is
an 'operation' dependent on synthesis, math is a synthetic
process of ideation; placing concepts in agreement.
Facticity in formal logic has very little correspondence
with entities in the world, and with phenomenon. The
designation of a quantum is dependent on 'sense certainty'
and on a relational 'agreement' in an object-subject field.

Truth as H noted has a universal definition and that is that
'truth is the revelatory essence of being'; and if we extend
the meaning of being to all entities what-so-ever such as
abstract entities with few or a sole quality, then
'rightness' is dependent on what is revealed of entities. Of
course in symbolic knowledge, essences revealed about
entities are not exhausted by what is disclosed as
phenomenon (ie. to human perception). So there is a limit to
what is revealed for understanding. This is why existential
anxiety and its modes of state of mind can be described as
'fear' and the 'uncanny' et cetera since what these
'feelings' disclose is something 'indefinite' and
undetermined, but also what is factical. As far as the
positive sciences are concerned, as Wittgenstein claimed,
'science wants to know nothing about nothing.' Likewise the
assertion that the 'truth of openess' is 'ontological' is
distinct from 'truth of rightness' is ontical  is based on a
metaphorical analogy between the two claims. This is like
saying that the ontological is 'descriptive' and the ontical
is 'interpretative' only. That is to say that the
ontological is now reversed in intentionally as that which
'shows' but cannot be 'intrepreted'. An opening thus if I am
correct as you claim is what 'shows' as in 'phenomenon' and
conversely
what is 'right' is descriptive and not subject to
intepretation ; however as H demonstrates there are
ontological phenomenon (however primordial) which show and
are subject to discussion; only the ontical are not
'interpretative'. A light remains a light until proven
otherwise, and once it is proven not to be light, it is no
longer a light, but a source of darkness, for example.
Ontology refers to 'how one is' but not to 'what one is'
necessarily.

While I can agree that there is a plausible distinction
between a 'phenomenal ontology' and 'judgements -being
right, truth claimes in general, validity, inferential
wisdom), I think that the 'reverse' is more likely to be
true,
which is that 'openess' is not 'ontological' but rather
belongs to those entities which are factical. There is a
'categorical error' made by stipulating that....And that for
me is confusing.

The 'open' is a true metaphor for those attributes and their
entities which 'show' from time to time, but 'rightness' is
not a matter of description but entirely 'interpretative'
(cf. Sextus Empiricus). All propositions are false to some
degree, and it is not entirely resolved if there is a
general consensus on the validity of any propositions used
to 'prove' truth. Truth is an 'axiological' value. The
metaphor used for describing what
appears or shows itself (in relation to those modes of
closeness, etc.), the opening, has no requirement to be
interpreted. For instance Aristotle relates about the
perception of a light in the distance, which all agree is a
fire, but on closer inspection it turns out to be a
lighthouse (In De Anima - I cannot remember). The opening,
the light as a fact does not change, but the cause of the
light, the source of the light does change.

Likewise the ontical is not subject to 'interpretation' it
simply IS, and the ontological is 'open' for
'interpretation' 'reflection' and 'analysis'.

(cf. Paleontology vrs Archeology)

 In ecology
there are 2 fundamental branches: one is 'interpretative'
and the other is 'descriptive', or in other words 'applied'
and 'theoretical'.

Onto-theology is speculative ontology, tends to be dogmatic,
but critical ontology is discursive; whereas "Dasein is
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (which
implies an ambiguous reference to all our discussions
formerly). [BT 12]

Which means that existenz is enacted discursively, open for
interpretation and questioning; ontology is a logos, a
logical discussion about what is primordial using new
'categories' of the soul, or self, world and
being-in-the-world. The categories are unique in that they
are of a spatial and temporal nature (remoteness,
ready-to-hand, et cetera, factual) and also of a existential
nature (remorse, guilt, anxiety, care, joy, etc).

jf



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