Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2003 05:48:30 +0800
Subject: Re: gulf



On Thursday, March 20, 2003, at 03:46  AM, Anthony Crifasi wrote:

> Rene de Bakker wrote:
>> Are authenticity and non-authenticity in your view not ontological
>> ways of being-in-the-world, because 'BOTH' are ways of
>> being-in-the-world?
>
> Yes both are ways of being-in-the-world. Is your point that this shows 
> an ontological "preference" for one way over the other, even though 
> both are ways of being-in-the-world? This kind of "preference" is not 
> ethical in any way. All authenticity means is the integration of our 
> discovered existential structure into ontic being-in-the-world, 
> thereby making existence our "own".

How do you integrate an authentic existential phenomenological method 
for the disclosure of the temporality of Dasein into 'ontic 
being-in-the-world'? I can understand this in an existentialist sense, 
as in Dreyfus' notion of authenticity, but I would argue that an 
existentialist interpretation precludes any fundamental ontology, 
Heidegger certainly thought so.

> But this can be applied to ANY way of being-in-the-world. A Nazi can 
> be authentic.

I guess Heidegger would agree with this since he was in fact a Nazi  :0

> So can a Communist. Or a liberal democrat. So this kind of preference 
> is not anything which can "decide" between two ontic sides. That would 
> be an "ontic" preference.
>
> Anthony Crifasi

I'm not sure that this question of ethics and ontology is at all clear, 
especially in regards to notions of authenticity, existentialist or 
otherwise. I also don't really understand your ontological/ontic 
distinctions, but I disagree with your notion of ontology so I guess 
that's no surprise.

Cheers,

Malcolm



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