Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2001 01:08:03 +0100
Subject: Re: Ge-lassen-heit


Thanks Rene,

this is becoming interesting, and i'll have to reread your post
to comment some deeper, but there's one thing that struck me
immediately, you wrote:

>It counts even for myself: if I want to know myself, I must perform this
>transcendental act, which is necessary for every thing, to become an
>object for me. Real knowledge is only empirically possible, and this
>requires imagination as reference to time.

but what do we mean (and try to communicate) when we say
"I know myself", or "I want to know myself" and how do we
know that somebody is telling the truth (or making sense) when
s/he says to possess (or lack) "self-knowledge" ?

---

let's try to substitute the notion "I know myself/self-knowledge" with
that of "colour-blindness" and read the following Wittgenstein:

     "120. Or: Do normally sighted people and colour-blind people
     have the same concept of colour-blindness ?
         And yet the colour-blind person understands the statement
     "I am colour-blind", as its negation as well.
         A colour-blind person yet merely can't learn to use our colour
     words, he can't learn to use the word "colour-blind" exactly as a
     normal person does. He cannot for example always determine
     colour-blindness in cases where the normal-sighted can.

     121. And to whom can I describe all the things _we_ normal
     (-sighted) people can learn ?
         Understanding the description itself already presupposes that
     he has learned something." [Remarks on Colour,III]

Does Kant's TA comes close to what Wittgenstein here is saying
viz. that 'understanding a description presupposes a learning
process condition' ? or more generally is Kant's TA of linguistic or
pre-linguistic nature ?

viva vista,
jan




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