Date: 23 Apr 2001 17:02:29 -0000
Subject: Re:


On Mon, 23 Apr 2001 02:50:33 -0400 (EDT) Gary Moore <gottlos45-AT-mail.com> wrote:
>PART 6b:
>
>It should be self-evident at this point the phenomenological is ontic and
>existentiell as comportment which, by definition, necessarily means bodily
>orientation even though one does not use the word body and the body as
>physiological object is not involved. But it should also be somewhat evident
>that, in investigating mineness, there is nothing objective or scientific
>about this phenomenal body that is only mine. Habitual relationships can be
>observed, but only as a pointing toward . . . Pointing toward what? Da-sein
>is a being whose existence itself is an issue. Or rather, To be or not to
>be is its essence, the relation in the question itself, and therefore its
>essence is its existence  as - its concern as to whether it lives or dies.
>Thereupon one can immediately see the difference between Husserls
>intentionality which is defined by the project of discovering the scientific
>truth of nature, and therefore human nature, versus the intentionality of
>Heidegger that actually goes back to the ground of all and every
>intentionality, where it makes no sense to seek a further grounding. What
>is Da-sein? The answer is Care pure and simple and one, not as a
>solipsistic inclosing sphere (inclosing from what? leaving what outside?)
>but simply as the totality of all you perceive and know, i.e., the totality
>of the whole of beings. Care is whether you choose to live or die, from
>which only then can questions of the natures of truth and validity even
>begin to be raised. The necessary ground then of any theoretical
>transparency of . . . ontological structure, of any ontological
>possibility at all, is in an attestation of existence regardless of
>factical choice. Therefore even suicide becomes an attestation of life
>since suicide must also, as thematically connected to the phenomenon of
>time  come out of the continuing development of the ontological guideline
>itself, that is, with the hermeneutics of the logos. (B&T, S 20, 22/M&R 45,
>47/SuZ 23,25) What is it exactly one wants to destroy with suicide since
>it is the self that judges the Situation and the self which holds to the
>resolve? Does that indicate that it is something else one wants to destroy
>by means of the authentic self? And is it possible that the corresponding
>destruction of the ontologically authentic self was actually never
>intended or even shown to itself?
>
>
>
>We are looking for an authentic potentiality-for-being of Da-sein that is
>attested by Da-sein itself in its existentiell possibility. First of all we
>have to find this attestation itself [*(1) What attests as such. (2) What is
>attested by it.]. If it is to give Da-sein to understand itself in its
>possible authentic existence, it will have its roots in the being of
>Da-sein. The phenomenal demonstration of such an attestation thus contains
>the evidence of its origin from the constitution of being of Da-sein. The
>attestation is to give us to understand an authentic
>potentiality-of-being-ones-self. With the expression self, we answered
>the question of the who of Da-sein. The self-hood of Da-sein was defined
>formally as a way of existing, that is, not as a being objectively present.
>I myself am not for the most part the who of Da-sein, but the they-self is.
>Authentic being-a-self shows itself to be an existentiell modification of
>the they which is to be defined existentially. What does this modification
>imply, and what are the ontological conditions of its possibility? . . .
>When Da-sein thus brings itself back from the they, the they-self is
>modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic
>being-ones-self. Thus must be accomplished by making up for not choosing.
>But making up for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice 
>deciding for a potentiality-of-being, and making this decision from ones
>own self. In choosing to make this choice, Da-sein makes possible, first and
>foremost, its authentic potentiality-of-being [* a taking place of being 
>philosophy, freedom]. But because Da-sein is lost in the they, it must
>first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be shown to
>itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Da-sein is
>already a potentiality-for-being-its-self, but it needs to have this
>potentiality attested . . . Conscience will be taken as something we have in
>advance thematically, and it will be investigated [ More radically now in
>terms of the essence of philosophizing.] in a purely existential manner,
>with fundamental ontology as our aim. (B&T, S 247-248 inclusive of marginal
>comments/M&R 312-313/SuZ267-268)
>
>
>
>Conscience will be taken as something we have in advance thematically . .
>. If Heidegger had left out the word thematically, then the words in
>advance would simply mean a priori. But if it is thematic, it is not
>just ongoing, it is primarily meant to apprehend the future as being
>thematic which means maintaining a continuous, unbroken theme. The call
>of conscience, that is, conscience itself, has its ontological possibility
>in the fact that Da-sein is care in the ground of its being. (S 256/M&R
>322-323/SuZ 278) The call of conscience in Heidegger is a purely
>self-centered thing. But instead of being selfish, involved purely with
>the present-at-hand which in this context becomes utterly meaningless in the
>face of death, it is the issue of life or death that constructs the
>authentic self. So, in a sense, if not always directly, the destructive
>embodiment of literally holding to the decision of suicide projects in
>reversal  just as torture does  the creation of the authentic self. And
>therefore suicide always, even at its most authentic, treads on the edge of
>self-contradiction. Calling the self authentic is a redundancy when the
>self is defined by holding oneself toward ones own death. In anticipating
>the indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself to a constant threat
>arising from its own there. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this
>very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate
>the indefiniteness of the certainty. (S 245/M&R 310/Suz 265) The logically
>self-contradictory indefinite certainty of death is not an incidental
>addition to the present-at-hand knowledge of death, it is the reality of
>death itself, the only reality it has. And it becomes an ideal just like the
>ideal in Kierkegaards Repetition. Da-sein, then, is a being of acts and
>decisions and holding for true, a passion of self-concern not as to
>whether it owns anything else but as to whether it owns itself. It is a
>being only of potentiality, never actuality. And this potentially is not
>ontological but is existentiell in self-attestation by phenomenal
>demonstration. In order to find itself at all, it must be shown itself .
>. . And the only way it can be shown itself is in the act of embodiment
>of holding oneself together in the threat of death where the issue of
>Da-seins existence, the relation of its existence to its existing,
>literally and completely is its existence. So the entire reality of
>Da-sein is thrown toward a purpose that is never present, i.e., not as a
>being objectively present. It is just a way of existing. The only
>substantial reality of the I is in the They self from which the
>authentic self must be constructed. Except it does have the ability to
>attest itself and to take its ownmost Place, i.e., a taking place of being
> philosophy, freedom where philosophy and freedom are the same. But this
>is existentiell and ontic, not existential and ontological.
>
>
>
>Ontology by its very nature then would have no place for such a distinct I
>even though it is the pre-ontological understanding that fundamentally
>defines the Situation where that I could make such a decision. And yet if
>there is to be a genuine authenticity, that ontic and distinct I must make
>a decision to open itself, the decision itself becoming the boundary, a
>dispersion contradictorily defining the whole of beings, in one sense
>utterly dispersing that I in being-in-the-world, and yet in another sense
>it must hold that whole together as one through decision which would
>logically entail embodying it by making it into the total context around one
>Place, the only Place that is not relative. Even sojourning is defined and
>made real by the ontic I.
>
>
>
>If authentic resoluteness tends toward the mode defined by anticipation, and
>anticipation constitutes the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of
>Da-sein then an authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein is also
>attested in resoluteness existentially attested. The question of the
>potentiality-of-being-a-whole is a factical, existentiell one. It is
>answered by Da-sein as resolute. The question of
>potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein has now completely cast off the
>character which we initially (SuZ cf. section 45) pointed out when we
>treated it as if it were a theoretical, methodological question of the
>analytic of Da-sein, arising from the attempt to have the whole of Da-sein
>completely given. The question of the totality of Da-sein, initially
>discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but
>only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontic
>possibility of Da-sein. Our clarification of the connection between
>anticipation and resoluteness in the sense of a possible modalization of
>resoluteness by anticipation, turned into the phenomenal demonstration of an
>authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein. If with this phenomenon
>a mode of being of Da-sein has been grasped in which it brings itself to and
>before itself, it must remain ontically and ontologically unintelligible to
>the everyday, commonsense interpretation of Da-sein by the they. It would be
>a misunderstanding to put this existentiell possibility aside as being
>unproven or to want to prove it theoretically . . . Anticipatory
>resoluteness is not a way out fabricated for the purpose of overcoming
>death, but it is rather the understanding that follows the call of
>conscience and that frees for death the possibility of gaining power over
>the existence of Da-sein and of basically dispersing every fugitive
>self-covering-over . . . Together with the sober Angst that brings us before
>our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this
>possibility. In it Da-sein becomes free of the entertaining incidentals
>that busy curiosity provides for itself, primarily in terms of events of the
>world. However, the analysis of these fundamental moods goes beyond the
>limits drawn for our present inquiry by aiming toward fundamental ontology.
>(B&T, S 286/M&R 357-358/SuZ 309-310)
>
>
>
>The potentiality-of-being-a-whole is ontic because, as here and now, it
>can only be potential, i.e., unreal other than as anticipation and
>preparation. It is not theoretical or methodological because it is what
>and how you are in act in every second of your existence. The question of
>the totality of Da-sein . . . goes back to an ontic possibility of Da-sein.
>Resoluteness is the only solidity of anticipation which is Da-sein turned
>into the phenomenal demonstration that has been grasped in which it brings
>itself to and before itself. It is not theoretical: you are it. And, as a
>being that is primarily futural, you are defined by the issue of your
>existence which is your indeterminate certainty of death. Nothing, then,
>can have an irresistable hold on you.
>
>
>
>Anticipation makes evident the fact that this being has been thrown into the
>indefiniteness of its borderline situation, when, resolved upon the later,
>Da-sein gains its authentic potentiality-of-being-as-a-whole. The
>indefiniteness of death discloses itself primordially in Angst. But this
>primordial Angst strives to expect resoluteness of itself. It clears away
>every covering over of the fact that Da-sein is left to itself. The
>nothingness before which Angst brings us reveals the nullity that determines
>Da-sein in its ground, which itself is as throwness into death. (B&T, S
>285/M&R 356/SuZ 308)
>
>
>
>Death is the ownmost possibility of Da-sein. Being toward it discloses to
>Da-sein its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the
>being of Da-sein absolutely. Here, the fact can become evident to Da-sein
>that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they,
>that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the
>they. The understanding of this ability, however, first reveals its
>factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self. The ownmost
>possibility is nonrelational. Anticipation lets Da-sein understandthat it
>has to take over solely from itself the potentiality of being in which it is
>concerned absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just belong
>in an undifferentiated way to ones own Da-sein, but it lays claim on it as
>something individual. The nonrelational character of death understood in
>anticipation individualizes Da-sein down to itself. This individualizing is
>a way in which the there is disclosed for existence. It reveals the fact
>that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the
>others fails when ones ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake. Da-sein
>can authentically be itself only when it makes that possible of its own
>accord. But if taking care of things and being concerned fail us, this does
>not, however, mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been cut off from
>its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of
>Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in
>general. Da-sein is authentically itself only if it projects itself, as
>being-together with things taken care of and concernful being with . . .,
>primarily because of its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the
>possibility of the they-self. Anticipation of its nonrelational possibility
>forces the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking over its
>ownmost being of its own accord. The ownmost nonrelational possibility is
>not to be bypassed. Being toward this possibility lets Da-sein understand
>that the most extreme possibility of existence is imminent, that of giving
>itself up. Becoming free for ones own death in anticipation frees one from
>ones lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that
>the factical possibilities lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed
>can be first authentically understood and chosen. Anticipation discloses to
>existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself up and
>thus shatters all ones clinging to whatever existence one has reached . . .
>Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed also disclosed
>all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the
>possibility of taking the whole of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell
>way, that is, the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-of-being .
>. . Holding oneself in this truth, that is, being certain of what has been
>disclosed, lays claim all the more upon anticipation . . . If being-certain
>in relation to death does not have [the indifference of apodictic evidence
>lost in pure objectivity] character, that does not mean it is of a lower
>grade, but that it does not belong at all to the order of degrees of
>evidence about things objectively present. Holding death for true (death is
>always just ones own) shows a different kind of certainty, and is more
>primordial than any certainty related to beings encountered in the world or
>to formal objects, for it is certain of being-in-the-world . . .  Thus the
>evidence of the immediate givenness of experiences, of the ego or of
>consciousness, necessarily has to lag behind the certainty contained in
>anticipation . . . The ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed
>is indefinite with regard to its certainty . . . In anticipating the
>indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself up to a constant threat
>arising from its own there. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this
>very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate
>the indefiniteness of the certainty . . . Mood brings Da-sein before the
>throwness of that-it-is-there. But the attunement which is able to hold
>open the constant and absolute threat to itself arising from the ownmost
>individualized being of Da-sein is Angst. In Angst, Da-sein finds itself
>faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of existence . . .
>to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the
>illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself. (B&T, S 243-245/M&R
>308-311/SuZ 263-266)
>
>
>
>This conception of death has absolutely nothing to do with doom and
>depression or death worship, but is purely an existential structure of
>negating what is negatable, a tool for discovering what is not necessary and
>is ontologically bogus.  If something can be shown to be unnecessary in the
>face of death, then it was never of authoritative necessity to begin with.
>Like the political suicides Camus mentions in The Myth of Sisyphus, the
>authorities may laugh at such an impotent gesture towards them while they
>completely misunderstand the power of such an unrestricted gesture when it
>is expressed instead like Colonel Kurtzs verbal recommendation to the joint
>chiefs of staff, from the movie Apocalypse Now, on how to win the war in
>Viet Nam: Use the bomb. Kill them all. That is the active aspect of
>Sigourney Weavers passive threat in Aliens: If one of those things get
>loose on earth, just one, you can kiss all this bullshit you think is so
>important goodbye. If you are dead there are no questions to be answered,
>no responsibilities to be upheld. If something in the face of death is
>negatable, then it is always already negated. It is the nothingness of the
>possibility of the impossibility of existence. It cuts one down to nothing.
>It has all the freedom of If God does not exist, then everything is
>permitted. But even so you are still stuck with death that makes this now
>permitted everything a pile of discards absolutely worthless. It is
>joyful, it is liberating, but it is also utterly trivial and profoundly
>boring. You possess the Being of the whole of beings and it is worthless
>because of death. Death individualizes Da-sein not only down to itself but
>also down to nothing because becoming free for ones own death means you
>have to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty, you have to imagine
>your death and all its implications. But that is actually a logical
>procedure: If you die, then such and such must follow inevitably from that
>fact. Death is the nonrelational possibility that cannot be bypassed at
>all, ever,  under any circumstances. You must become your death as it is a
>constant threat arising from its own there, you must hold [yourself] in
>this threat and cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty. You become
>the whole potentiality-of-being so that the only way you can act, amidst
>all of your possibilities, is like a child playing draughts.
>
>
>
>. . . We think being and ground/reason, being qua abyss in terms of the
>nature of play and indeed of the play which engages us mortals who are who
>we are only insofar as we live in the proximity to death, which as the most
>radical possibility of existence is capable of bringing what is most
>elevated to the clearing and lighting of being  and its truth. Death is the
>as yet unthought standard of measure of the unfathomable, which means, of
>the most elevated play in which humans are engaged in on earth, a play in
>which they are at stake . . . The principle of reason in another tonality .
>. . required us to ask: to what extent are being and ground/reason the
>same? The answer offered itself up to us on the path returning to the
>commencement of the Geschick of being . . . What does Heraclitus say about
>αỉών? [The word is difficult to translate. One says:
>world-time. It is the world that worlds and temporalizes in that, as
>κόσμος, it brings the jointure of being to a
>glowing sparkle (Natalia Rudychev, I thought you would like that.) ]
>Fragment 52 runs: αỉών πα962;
>έστι παιζων,
>πεσσεύων
>παιδος η
>βασιληίη. The Geschick of being, a
>child that plays, shifting the pawns: the royalty of a child  that means,
>the άρχή, that which governs by instituting grounds, the
>being of beings. The Geschick of being: a child that plays. In addition,
>there are also great children. By the gentleness of its play, the greatest
>royal child is that mystery of the play in which humans are engaged
>throughout their life, that play in which their essence is at stake. Why
>does it play, the great child of the world-play Heraclitus brought into view
>in the αỉών? It plays, because it plays. The because
>withers away in the play. The play is without why. It plays since it
>plays. It simply remains a play: the most elevated and the most profound.
>But this simply is everything, the one, the only . . . Being, as what
>grounds, has no ground; as the abyss it plays the play that, as Geschick,
>passes being and ground/reason to us. The question remains whether and how
>we, hearing the movements of this play, play along and accommodate ourselves
>to the play. (Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald
>Lilly, Indiana Unviersity Press, 1991, Der Satz vom Grund, Verlag Gunther
>Neske, 1957, Lilly pp. 112-113/German 186-188)
>
>
>
>Here we see the thorough accord of early Heidegger and very late Heidegger.
>He is very definitely speaking of arbitrariness that establishes rules.
>And when he speaks of the child, he is not using a symbol or metaphor as
>should be blatantly obvious from the text. He means child, any and every
>child, and that child is royal precisely because that is the true beginning
>of primordiality, and nothing whatsoever grandiose and mystical. And the
>child is also royal because it is truly individual, though not knowingly
>so  what exactly does a child know about death? Would we be able to
>understand it? -   yet does know it possesses the whole
>potentiality-of-being. This is the most elevated. Also, the hints at
>music, tonality of reason, the movements of play are definitely meant to
>refer directly to music which, in the earlier part of the book, he makes
>quite clear. Igor Stravinsky, when once asked about the language of music,
>replied, Music has no meaning. Music is the most powerful and terrifying
>of the arts because it says nothing, nothing whatsoever. It is the most
>nihilistic of the arts.
>
>
>........................................................ 
>iWon.com       http://www.iwon.com     why wouldn't you? 
>........................................................
>
>
>
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