Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2001 02:50:33 -0400 (EDT)


PART 6b:

It should be self-evident at this point the phenomenological is ontic and
existentiell as comportment which, by definition, necessarily means bodily
orientation even though one does not use the word “body” and the body as
physiological object is not involved. But it should also be somewhat evident
that, in investigating “mineness”, there is nothing objective or scientific
about this phenomenal body that is only mine. Habitual relationships can be
observed, but only as a pointing toward . . . Pointing toward what? Da-sein
is a being whose existence itself is an issue. Or rather, “To be or not to
be” is its essence, the relation in the question itself, and therefore its
essence is its existence – as - its concern as to whether it lives or dies.
Thereupon one can immediately see the difference between Husserl’s
intentionality which is defined by the project of discovering the scientific
truth of nature, and therefore human nature, versus the intentionality of
Heidegger that actually goes back to the ground of all and every
intentionality, where it makes no sense to seek a further grounding. “What
is Da-sein?” The answer is “Care” pure and simple and one, not as a
solipsistic inclosing sphere (inclosing from what? leaving what outside?)
but simply as the totality of all you perceive and know, i.e., the totality
of the whole of beings. “Care” is whether you choose to live or die, from
which only then can questions of the natures of truth and validity even
begin to be raised. The necessary ground then of any “theoretical
transparency of . . . ontological structure”, of any “ontological
possibility” at all, is in an “attestation” of existence regardless of
factical choice. Therefore even suicide becomes an “attestation” of life
since suicide must also, as “thematically connected to the phenomenon of
time”  come out of “the continuing development of the ontological guideline
itself, that is, with the hermeneutics of the logos.’ (B&T, S 20, 22/M&R 45,
47/SuZ 23,25) What is it exactly one wants to destroy with ‘suicide’ since
it is the self that judges the Situation and the self which holds to the
resolve? Does that indicate that it is ‘something else’ one wants to destroy
by means of the ‘authentic’ self? And is it possible that the corresponding
destruction of the ontologically ‘authentic’ self was actually never
intended or even shown to itself?



We are looking for an authentic potentiality-for-being of Da-sein that is
attested by Da-sein itself in its existentiell possibility. First of all we
have to find this attestation itself [*(1) What attests as such. (2) What is
attested by it.]. If it is to “give Da-sein to understand” itself in its
possible authentic existence, it will have its roots in the being of
Da-sein. The phenomenal demonstration of such an attestation thus contains
the evidence of its origin from the constitution of being of Da-sein. The
attestation is to give us to understand an authentic
potentiality-of-being-one’s-self. With the expression “self,” we answered
the question of the who of Da-sein. The self-hood of Da-sein was defined
formally as a way of existing, that is, not as a being objectively present.
I myself am not for the most part the who of Da-sein, but the they-self is.
Authentic being-a-self shows itself to be an existentiell modification of
the they which is to be defined existentially. What does this modification
imply, and what are the ontological conditions of its possibility? . . .
When Da-sein thus brings itself back from the they, the they-self is
modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic
being-one’s-self. Thus must be accomplished by making up for not choosing.
But making up for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice –
deciding for a potentiality-of-being, and making this decision from one’s
own self. In choosing to make this choice, Da-sein makes possible, first and
foremost, its authentic potentiality-of-being [* a taking place of being –
philosophy, freedom]. But because Da-sein is lost in the “they,” it must
first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be “shown” to
itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Da-sein is
already a potentiality-for-being-its-self, but it needs to have this
potentiality attested . . . Conscience will be taken as something we have in
advance thematically, and it will be investigated [† More radically now in
terms of the essence of philosophizing.] in a purely existential manner,
with fundamental ontology as our aim. (B&T, S 247-248 inclusive of marginal
comments/M&R 312-313/SuZ267-268)



“Conscience will be taken as something we have in advance thematically . .
.” If Heidegger had left out the word “thematically”, then the words “in
advance” would simply mean “a priori.” But if it is ‘thematic’, it is not
just ongoing, it is primarily meant to apprehend the future as being
“thematic’ which means maintaining a continuous, unbroken theme. “The call
of conscience, that is, conscience itself, has its ontological possibility
in the fact that Da-sein is care in the ground of its being.” (S 256/M&R
322-323/SuZ 278) The call of conscience in Heidegger is a purely
‘self-centered’ thing. But instead of being ‘selfish’, involved purely with
the present-at-hand which in this context becomes utterly meaningless in the
face of death, it is the issue of life or death that ‘constructs’ the
authentic self. So, in a sense, if not always directly, the destructive
embodiment of literally holding to the decision of suicide projects in
reversal – just as torture does – the creation of the ‘authentic’ self. And
therefore suicide always, even at its most authentic, treads on the edge of
self-contradiction. Calling the “self” “authentic” is a redundancy when the
self is defined by holding oneself toward one’s own death. “In anticipating
the indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself to a constant threat
arising from its own there. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this
very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate
the indefiniteness of the certainty.” (S 245/M&R 310/Suz 265) The logically
self-contradictory “indefinite certainty of death” is not an incidental
addition to the present-at-hand knowledge of death, it is the ‘reality’ of
death itself, the only reality it has. And it becomes an ideal just like the
ideal in Kierkegaard’s Repetition. Da-sein, then, is a being of acts and
decisions and ‘holding for true,’ a passion of self-concern not as to
whether it owns anything else but as to whether it owns itself. It is a
being only of potentiality, never actuality. And this potentially is not
ontological but is existentiell in self-attestation by “phenomenal
demonstration.” “In order to find itself at all, it must be ‘shown’ itself .
. .” And the only way it can be “shown” itself is in the act of embodiment
of holding oneself together in the threat of death where the issue of
Da-sein’s existence, the relation of its existence to its existing,
literally and completely is its existence. So the entire ‘reality’ of
Da-sein is thrown toward a purpose that is never present, i.e., “not as a
being objectively present.” It is just a “way of existing.” The only
substantial reality of the “I” is in the ‘They’ self from which the
authentic self must be constructed. Except it does have the ability to
attest itself and to take its ownmost Place, i.e., “a taking place of being
– philosophy, freedom” where philosophy and freedom are the same. But this
is existentiell and ontic, not existential and ontological.



Ontology by its very nature then would have no place for such a distinct “I”
even though it is the pre-ontological understanding that fundamentally
defines the Situation where that “I” could make such a decision. And yet if
there is to be a genuine authenticity, that ontic and distinct “I” must make
a decision to open itself, the decision itself becoming the ‘boundary’, a
dispersion contradictorily defining the whole of beings, in one sense
utterly dispersing that “I” in being-in-the-world, and yet in another sense
it must hold that “whole” together as one through decision which would
logically entail embodying it by making it into the total context around one
Place, the only Place that is not relative. Even “sojourning” is defined and
made ‘real’ by the ontic “I.”



If authentic resoluteness tends toward the mode defined by anticipation, and
anticipation constitutes the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of
Da-sein then an authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein is also
attested in resoluteness existentially attested. The question of the
potentiality-of-being-a-whole is a factical, existentiell one. It is
answered by Da-sein as resolute. The question of
potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein has now completely cast off the
character which we initially (SuZ cf. section 45) pointed out when we
treated it as if it were a theoretical, methodological question of the
analytic of Da-sein, arising from the attempt to have the whole of Da-sein
completely “given.” The question of the totality of Da-sein, initially
discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but
only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontic
possibility of Da-sein. Our clarification of the “connection” between
anticipation and resoluteness in the sense of a possible modalization of
resoluteness by anticipation, turned into the phenomenal demonstration of an
authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of Da-sein. If with this phenomenon
a mode of being of Da-sein has been grasped in which it brings itself to and
before itself, it must remain ontically and ontologically unintelligible to
the everyday, commonsense interpretation of Da-sein by the they. It would be
a misunderstanding to put this existentiell possibility aside as being
“unproven” or to want to “prove” it theoretically . . . Anticipatory
resoluteness is not a way out fabricated for the purpose of “overcoming”
death, but it is rather the understanding that follows the call of
conscience and that frees for death the possibility of gaining power over
the existence of Da-sein and of basically dispersing every fugitive
self-covering-over . . . Together with the sober Angst that brings us before
our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this
possibility. In it Da-sein becomes free of the entertaining “incidentals”
that busy curiosity provides for itself, primarily in terms of events of the
world. However, the analysis of these fundamental moods goes beyond the
limits drawn for our present inquiry by aiming toward fundamental ontology.
(B&T, S 286/M&R 357-358/SuZ 309-310)



“The potentiality-of-being-a-whole” is ontic because, as here and now, it
can only be potential, i.e., unreal other than as anticipation and
preparation. It is not “theoretical” or “methodological” because it is what
and how you are in act in every second of your existence. “The question of
the totality of Da-sein . . . goes back to an ontic possibility of Da-sein.”
Resoluteness is the only ‘solidity’ of anticipation which is Da-sein “turned
into the phenomenal demonstration” that “has been grasped in which it brings
itself to and before itself.” It is not theoretical: you are ‘it.’ And, as a
being that is primarily futural, you are defined by the issue of your
existence which is your “indeterminate certainty of death.” Nothing, then,
can have an irresistable hold on you.



Anticipation makes evident the fact that this being has been thrown into the
indefiniteness of its “borderline situation,” when, resolved upon the later,
Da-sein gains its authentic potentiality-of-being-as-a-whole. The
indefiniteness of death discloses itself primordially in Angst. But this
primordial Angst strives to expect resoluteness of itself. It clears away
every covering over of the fact that Da-sein is left to itself. The
nothingness before which Angst brings us reveals the nullity that determines
Da-sein in its ground, which itself is as throwness into death. (B&T, S
285/M&R 356/SuZ 308)



Death is the ownmost possibility of Da-sein. Being toward it discloses to
Da-sein its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the
being of Da-sein absolutely. Here, the fact can become evident to Da-sein
that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they,
that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the
they. The understanding of this “ability,” however, first reveals its
factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self. The ownmost
possibility is nonrelational. Anticipation lets Da-sein understandthat it
has to take over solely from itself the potentiality of being in which it is
concerned absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just “belong”
in an undifferentiated way to one’s own Da-sein, but it lays claim on it as
something individual. The nonrelational character of death understood in
anticipation individualizes Da-sein down to itself. This individualizing is
a way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence. It reveals the fact
that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the
others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake. Da-sein
can authentically be itself only when it makes that possible of its own
accord. But if taking care of things and being concerned fail us, this does
not, however, mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been cut off from
its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of
Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in
general. Da-sein is authentically itself only if it projects itself, as
being-together with things taken care of and concernful being with . . .,
primarily because of its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the
possibility of the they-self. Anticipation of its nonrelational possibility
forces the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking over its
ownmost being of its own accord. The ownmost nonrelational possibility is
not to be bypassed. Being toward this possibility lets Da-sein understand
that the most extreme possibility of existence is imminent, that of giving
itself up. Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from
one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that
the factical possibilities lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed
can be first authentically understood and chosen. Anticipation discloses to
existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself up and
thus shatters all one’s clinging to whatever existence one has reached . . .
Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed also disclosed
all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the
possibility of taking the whole of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell
way, that is, the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-of-being .
. . Holding oneself in this truth, that is, being certain of what has been
disclosed, lays claim all the more upon anticipation . . . If being-certain
in relation to death does not have [the indifference of apodictic evidence
lost in pure objectivity] character, that does not mean it is of a lower
grade, but that it does not belong at all to the order of degrees of
evidence about things objectively present. Holding death for true (death is
always just one’s own) shows a different kind of certainty, and is more
primordial than any certainty related to beings encountered in the world or
to formal objects, for it is certain of being-in-the-world . . .  Thus the
evidence of the immediate givenness of experiences, of the ego or of
consciousness, necessarily has to lag behind the certainty contained in
anticipation . . . The ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed
is indefinite with regard to its certainty . . . In anticipating the
indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself up to a constant threat
arising from its own there. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this
very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate
the indefiniteness of the certainty . . . Mood brings Da-sein before the
throwness of “that-it-is-there.” But the attunement which is able to hold
open the constant and absolute threat to itself arising from the ownmost
individualized being of Da-sein is Angst. In Angst, Da-sein finds itself
faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of existence . . .
to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the
illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself. (B&T, S 243-245/M&R
308-311/SuZ 263-266)



This conception of death has absolutely nothing to do with doom and
depression or death worship, but is purely an existential structure of
negating what is negatable, a tool for discovering what is not necessary and
is ontologically bogus.  If something can be shown to be unnecessary in the
face of death, then it was never of authoritative necessity to begin with.
Like the political suicides Camus mentions in The Myth of Sisyphus, the
authorities may laugh at such an impotent gesture towards them while they
completely misunderstand the power of such an unrestricted gesture when it
is expressed instead like Colonel Kurtz’s verbal recommendation to the joint
chiefs of staff, from the movie Apocalypse Now, on how to win the war in
Viet Nam: “Use the bomb. Kill them all.” That is the active aspect of
Sigourney Weavers’ passive threat in Aliens: “If one of those things get
loose on earth, just one, you can kiss all this bullshit you think is so
important goodbye.” If you are dead there are no questions to be answered,
no responsibilities to be upheld. If something in the face of death is
negatable, then it is always already negated. It is the “nothingness of the
possibility of the impossibility of existence.” It cuts one down to nothing.
It has all the freedom of “If God does not exist, then everything is
permitted.” But even so you are still stuck with death that makes this now
permitted “everything” a pile of discards absolutely worthless. It is
joyful, it is liberating, but it is also utterly trivial and profoundly
boring. You possess the Being of the whole of beings and it is worthless
because of death. Death individualizes Da-sein not only “down to itself” but
also down to nothing because “becoming free for one’s own death” means you
have “to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty,” you have to imagine
your death and all its implications. But that is actually a logical
procedure: “If you die, then such and such must follow inevitably from that
fact.” Death is the nonrelational possibility that cannot be bypassed at
all, ever,  under any circumstances. You must become your death as it is “a
constant threat arising from its own there,” you must “hold [yourself] in
this threat” and “cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty.” You become
the “whole potentiality-of-being” so that the only way you can act, amidst
all of your possibilities, is like a child playing draughts.



. . . We think being and ground/reason, being qua abyss in terms of the
nature of play and indeed of the play which engages us mortals who are who
we are only insofar as we live in the proximity to death, which as the most
radical possibility of existence is capable of bringing what is most
elevated to the clearing and lighting of being  and its truth. Death is the
as yet unthought standard of measure of the unfathomable, which means, of
the most elevated play in which humans are engaged in on earth, a play in
which they are at stake . . . The principle of reason in another tonality .
. . required us to ask: to what extent “are” being and ground/reason the
same? The answer offered itself up to us on the path returning to the
commencement of the Geschick of being . . . What does Heraclitus say about
αỉών? [The word is difficult to translate. One says:
“world-time.” It is the world that worlds and temporalizes in that, as
κόσμος, it brings the jointure of being to a
glowing sparkle (Natalia Rudychev, I thought you would like that.) ]
Fragment 52 runs: αỉών πα962;
έστι παιζων,
πεσσεύων
παιδος η
βασιληίη. The Geschick of being, a
child that plays, shifting the pawns: the royalty of a child – that means,
the άρχή, that which governs by instituting grounds, the
being of beings. The Geschick of being: a child that plays. In addition,
there are also great children. By the gentleness of its play, the greatest
royal child is that mystery of the play in which humans are engaged
throughout their life, that play in which their essence is at stake. Why
does it play, the great child of the world-play Heraclitus brought into view
in the αỉών? It plays, because it plays. The “because”
withers away in the play. The play is without “why.” It plays since it
plays. It simply remains a play: the most elevated and the most profound.
But this “simply” is everything, the one, the only . . . Being, as what
grounds, has no ground; as the abyss it plays the play that, as Geschick,
passes being and ground/reason to us. The question remains whether and how
we, hearing the movements of this play, play along and accommodate ourselves
to the play. (Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald
Lilly, Indiana Unviersity Press, 1991, Der Satz vom Grund, Verlag Gunther
Neske, 1957, Lilly pp. 112-113/German 186-188)



Here we see the thorough accord of early Heidegger and very late Heidegger.
He is very definitely speaking of arbitrariness that ‘establishes’ rules.
And when he speaks of the child, he is not using a symbol or metaphor as
should be blatantly obvious from the text. He means child, any and every
child, and that child is royal precisely because that is the true beginning
of primordiality, and nothing whatsoever grandiose and mystical. And the
child is also royal because it is truly individual, though not ‘knowingly’
so – what exactly does a child know about death? Would we be able to
understand it? -   yet does know it possesses the “whole
potentiality-of-being.” This is the “most elevated.” Also, the hints at
music, “tonality of reason,” “the movements of play” are definitely meant to
refer directly to music which, in the earlier part of the book, he makes
quite clear. Igor Stravinsky, when once asked about the language of music,
replied, “Music has no meaning.” Music is the most powerful and terrifying
of the arts because it says nothing, nothing whatsoever. It is the most
nihilistic of the arts.


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