Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2001 02:48:57 -0400 (EDT)


----- Original Message -----
From: Gary C Moore
To: being-and-time-dialognet-AT-egroups.com
Sent: Sunday, April 22, 2001 12:56 PM
Subject: HEIDEGGER, THE BODY, AND THE FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS, Part 6


PART 6a:
A cautionary note from Jon Neivens’ “The Profane and the Sacred”, an
unpublished 1998 essay:



Therefore Da-sein, as an absorbed involvement with things and other people
that is dispersed amid worldly situations, always manifests itself through
the body. But it is manifested through the body without, strictly speaking,
having originated there. However essential the body is, Da-sein is not a
function of the body; the human body alone, taken in isolation from the
world, is never what is meant by the term Da-sein.



“Without, strictly speaking, having originated there” I take to refer to
Heidegger’s meaning of phenomenological primordiality, i.e., what is first
experience bracketing out interpretation, which is one of the prime issues
with the French philosophers. “Da-sein” as the “mineness” of perception is
inclusive of the body “proximally and for the most part” which is nothing
distinct  whatsoever to the point of erasure. “Da-sein is not a function of
the body, the human body alone, taken in isolation from the world,” i.e.,
‘outside’ being-in-the-world. But body, or rather “bodily” as adverb, i.e.,
one does something in a ‘bodily’ or ‘embodied’ manner, as it is the
necessary form of expression of the way of existence, becomes rather an
existential of fundamental ontology. Everything about the possibilities of
and the factical state of ‘authenticity’ of Da-sein, both ontically and
ontologically, is formed, not from the physiology of the body, but by the
comportment of, the moods of, the purposive action of, and the anxiety for
and threats to what is bodily or embodied as held together, as “holding as
true,” as resolve. In other words, it is the phenomenal body only as verb
and adverb, as something always toward the future and therefore always
personal and therefore mine and unique that is at issue here.  Perception,
as totality of sensual and emotional being, is formed by understanding as
well as intuition to the point where none of the three in experience can
ever be distinct. And concepts like “as a totality,’ “as a person,” “as
one,” are all concepts from the fundamental faculty of the imagination. This
is the way you are ‘now’, and what you ‘were’ in the past, especially as any
‘beginning’ origination can only be deduced from what you are now which is
“always already” interpreting, once again, that beginning. And what you are
now, as ‘mind’, is abstractions derived from the everyday world of the
‘They’ self even if a highly sophisticated academic one, or even if you are
a day laborer with an elementary school education. The structures of ‘mind’
are the same – that is why you can communicate at all! It is the ultimate
form of the ‘They’ self. It is how there can even be a ‘They.’ The immediate
and most obvious difference is merely the amount and type of ‘stuff’ in
them. The actual processes that make thinking arise and become effective is
exactly the same, except the day laborer has by far the greater advantage of
seeing thinking become actually creative and hardened in the functional
world of ‘other people.’ Unfortunately the day laborer is not taught to
think of their act in that fashion. “But if the structures of mind are the
same, and how could one really know this, why is everybody different?”
“Well, are they really different? Are you different?” Both miss the point.
There is one world defined by one experience. And yet the suffocating
‘sameness’ of ‘Others’ lives and breathes as (your)self. You cannot define
yourself by making your self different because everybody already knows they
are different but turn that into a triviality by fleeing from its true
meaning defined by death. You can only define your true self by making it
honest, which means discovering what it “always already” is. Would that not
be the very simplest and easiest of things? But would this not be a ‘kind’
of in-difference?



However, this cannot mean that Da-sein is to be construed in terms of a
concrete possible idea of existence. At the beginning of the analysis,
Da-sein is precisely not to be interpreted in the differentiation of a
particular existence; rather, to be uncovered in the indifferent way in
which it is initially and for the most part. The indifference of the
everydayness of Da-sein is not nothing; but rather, a positive phenomenal
characteristic. All existing is how it is out of this kind of being, and
back into it. We call this everyday indifference of Da-sein averageness. And
because average everydayness constitutes the ontic immediacy of this being,
it was and will be passed over again and again in the explication of
Da-sein. What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically the
farthest, unrecognized and constantly overlooked in its ontological
significance . . . This holds true not only for the ontic and preontological
opacity of Da-sein, but to a still higher degree for the ontological task of
not only not failing to see this being in its phenomenally nearest kind of
being, but of making it accessible in its positive characteristics . . .The
explication of Da-sein in its average everydayness, however, does not just
give average structures in the sense of a vague indeterminacy. What is
ontically in the way of being average can very well be understood
ontologically in terms of pregnant structures which are not structurally
different from the ontological determinations of an authentic being of
Da-sein. (B&T, S 41-42/M&R 69-70/SuZ 43-44)



We discover ourselves as average. It must “be uncovered in the indifferent
way it is initially and for the most part.” It is only at specific moments
one can be otherwise as well as average at the same time.  It is the
beginning and end of all our efforts (“All existing is how it is out of this
being and back into it.”) because that is the only ‘place’ real reward or
goal can exist. “The indifference of the everydayness of Da-sein is not
nothing, but rather, a positive phenomenal characteristic.” It is the
‘place’ where real and effective ‘things’ happen (“average everydayness
constitutes the ontic immediacy of this being”). Yet it is also at the same
moment where one becomes an object amongst other objects, more than equal in
self-valuation, and yet even that value of self-valuation is comes only from
‘Others.’ You seem to be concrete because your self-value is the same as the
‘They’ self which is substantial and present-at-hand and mutually
reassuring. “The explication of Da-sein in its average everydayness . . .
does . . . give average structures” in the self “of a vague indeterminacy,”
but ontologically these structures portend the same structures “modified” in
‘authentic’ Da-sein.



But Da-sein “always already” is not “concrete” in any sense whatsoever,
therefore it cannot be experienced in any fashion except as “the being of
acts” as Heidegger states repetitively in The History of the Concept of
Consciousness. Only acts objective to one’s self and others can be
‘studied.’ Yet where the acts arise from, as Heidegger also says repeatedly
in B&T, is not real in any sense whatsoever. Therefore these objective acts
are nonetheless grounded on unreality, in “nullity.” Though the temptation
is to believe that real acts arise from ‘somewhere’, that somewhere in that
‘somewhere’ is something ‘real’ that can cause ‘real’ causation must be
completely dropped because all Da-sein is is a “being of acts” whose
“existence is its essence.” The primary temporal mode of Da-sein is always
the future. But we determine ‘reality’ always by necessity in and as the
present, which means the past is “always already” fundamentally brought into
question: “That was then, this is now.” And the future, in the face of the
reality of the present, seems to be literally an absurdity because any
realistic determination of the future would be prediction of the same nature
as time machines and tarot cards. And yet this “fantastic” way of thinking
nonetheless is Da-sein. All thought is constantly being ‘re-made’ in the
image of an ideal whose nature is such that when it becomes explicit, it
degrades and destroys itself by becoming ‘real’ and present-at-hand. This is
what Kierkegaard’s “Repetition” is all about and deliberately wants to
escape. The grandest thoughts and the grandest passions desire something
kept intentionally vague because when explicitly defined, it becomes an
object, and as object ceases to be futural and therefore alive. This ideal
‘structure’ that is given ontically as “a vague indeterminacy” is indeed
made ‘explicit’ when “understood ontologically” but in terms of “pregnant
structures” in the process of being born and therefore never ontically
explicit. Ontological explicitness is about existential structures which are
always structures for . . . and toward . . . As ontological, they are by
definition incomplete. Whereas ontic explicitness is the here and now
at-hand. Therefore ontological comportment is towards an end which is a
“nullity.” The point is, and Heidegger clearly and literally makes this
point again and again, Da-sein is not real! Its ground is nothingness.



With reference to, “What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically
the farthest,” Heidegger quotes Augustine as saying, “But what is closer to
me than myself? Assuredly I labor here and I labor within myself: I have
become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat.” This is
illustrative of “the ontic and preontological opacity of Da-sein” and “the
ontological task of” seeing “this being in its phenomenally nearest kind of
being” and “making it accessible in its positive characteristics.” This is
the Stambaugh translation. On the other hand, Macquarrie and Robinson have,
“but even more to see the ontological task which lies ahead; for not only
must this entity not be missed in that kind of Being in which it is
phenomenally closest, but it must be made accessible by a positive
characterization.” Though obviously derived from the same source, these
translations say different things. Unusually, the Stambaugh is awkward and
confusing here, whereas the M&R seems much more explicit and ‘in tune’ with
Heidegger. Where Stambaugh is static, M&R are concerned with “the
ontological task which lies ahead” and, as ontological, must always lie
ahead. And instead of “positive characteristics” as with a psychologist’s
experiment, you have “must be made accessible by a positive
characterization” where “positive” is applied to a process of the
imagination, “characterization.” M&R’s translation, then, goes much better
with the concept of “pregnant structures” birthing into the future.
Kierkegaard’s “Repetition,” renewing and reforming the past in the future,
is precisely and exclusively a process of the imagination which itself, as
pure possibility, is the very structure of Da-sein. The whole process of
imagination takes what you already know of the past and the present and
throws it as a new form into the future where it will come back to you as an
ideal that conceptually seems incomplete, even inexplicable and irrational,
but satisfies emotion as if complete. And since emotion is the reason why
you conceptualize in the first place, it is the absolute ground of
conceptualization; and therein we begin dealing with “fundamental ontology.”



The ‘mind’ itself is a mere universal of the ‘They’ self. The ‘mind’ is
language altogether given to you by others. It contains an inescapable logic
that reduces language to nonsense when violated. And yet, though given, it
immediately changes its whole nature on being received, and becomes one of
the first words ever spoken: “mine.” It becomes the very essence of
“mineness” and the compass Place for the entire linguistic map. Though
language is given to you, and even though language speaks the ontic ‘you’
rather than you it, it is still the center Place of self-identity and
subjectivity. Language approaches you from the future, becoming fixed in act
and judgment in the present afterwards, which, of course, causes one to
stumble while speaking when you make a mistake, when in the immediate
present you realize it and correct it while disturbing the flow of speech.
Language as spoken and written inherently contains an absolute opposition to
the everyday ‘They’ self even when in the process of conforming to it if,
for no other reason, than the fact it must conform actively, constantly
comparing itself to see if it is correct, because it always tends to stray.
It conforms to the everyday because it knows that is where any reward or
goal is to be achieved, but it strays because it “always already” knows,
because of its “indefinite certainty of death,” that none of those rewards
or goals can be finally important. That it does stray means there is a
‘point’ “always already” set in opposition to the ‘They’ self. So
“primordiality” refers to both the universalism of the ‘They’ self and to
the fact that, somewhere, somehow, at some time you were individualized “if
only in the way of fleeing from it and of forgetting it” (Ibid.).



The difference between phenomenal body and Da-sein is crucial because they
are not at all two different entities in any sense whatsoever. The
phenomenal body cannot be an entity because it cannot be observed. The
phenomenal as such necessarily means pure relation with relation, i.e., not
one thing-in-itself ‘related’ (How can they ‘relate’ in any sense if they
are things-in-themselves?) to another thing-in-itself. The relation is not
an ‘intersubjectivity’ of intermingling objective presence: Relation IS
confrontation per se or they would become literally be the same thing.
Relation is bodily as such, as becoming oriented within the bodily
environment, not “body” as present-at-hand object. As such, it cannot be
observed, though at first this seems to fly in the face of common sense,
because it is wholly mine, as my bodiliness, not as an abstract ‘wholeness’
as in bad philosophy or fuzzy mysticism but as personal. “Hey! That hurts!
That’s me you’re sticking that damn thing into!” It is not an abstract
object of a human arm the hypodermic needle goes into, it is me. Even if you
are having your arm worked on with extensive surgery completely numbed by
local block, and you “feel as if it isn’t your arm”, without sedatives,
anxiety with the situation still eventually overcomes a person’s
self-control. Only a threat far greater than the sense of personal violation
can keep you still on your own. The crux comes down to the thrust of
decision, of the “To be or not to be” of SuZ 12. “Existence is decided only
by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such
possibilities. We come to terms with the question of existence always only
through existence itself. We shall call this kind of understanding of itself
existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an ontic ‘affair’
of Da-sein. For this the theoretical transparency of the ontological
structure of existence is not necessary.” Literally, whether one decides to
live or die then is an ontic decision based on existentiell understanding in
the present, and literally therefore “the theoretical transparency of the
ontological structure” takes a decided second place in importance to that
ontic decision.



What even the pre-ontological pre-forms in Da-sein has only and exclusively
to do with the future: fundamental ontology is primarily and foremost
anticipation itself, that “its essence is its existence” is its only
‘reality.’ Ontology does not define anything that is literally
present-at-hand. But it does define what the present-at-hand is for . . .
The ontic involves “What I do now,” a suffocatingly limited sphere of
understanding, which always directly and necessarily involves the body. Yet
if you stop and ‘observe’ your body, nothing can happen unless a separate
process independent of consciousness that has seized part or all of your
body and consciousness such as extreme hunger or a full bladder or
‘appendicitis.’ To act you must release yourself, throw yourself out, to act
just as in speaking you cannot precisely define and limit beforehand what
you will say but must let yourself go to speak, or you will be stuttering,
double-checking and reassessing every word while in the process of coming
out. And you do not release your body while your mind stands by and coolly
observes and guides. What the one does the other does, not because they are
reflections of each other but that both are the same ‘thing.’ You do not say
“What my body is going to do” but always refer to “I”. Your body is not and
cannot be referred to futurally as ontic, but it can be referred to as an
‘ideal,’ though it is the body that will perform the act. You can have an
ideal of your body that you form yourself into. Yet in going to the doctor
to have him check your stomach pains, you are deliberately making yourself
helpless and defenseless as an object to be reformed by the physician.



Making a decision regarding a fundamental belief is nothing but words until
you do something with the body that brings that decision out into the public
world in a present, even if one is by oneself, and not only open to
challenge but, this is always understood but not spoken, also open to pain.
Commitment is a bodily gesture. Even within the ‘innermost’ self, commitment
is a matter of holding something together. And even then it can fall apart
with the greatest of ease until you have made it a physical gesture, and
even more, a public physical gesture, as this text is, where you at least
imagine the eyes of ‘Others’ observing your gesture and its meaning even
when the real response is to hit the “Delete” key.  As long as the
‘decision’ stays in your mind, it is a mere abstraction. If you say it, you
check to see if others heard. If you write it down, it becomes an object to
hide as publicly covered over, or to give to others in public disclosure.
Like any other abstraction as abstraction it can be changed or forgotten and
erased by mood in the bare flick of changing intention, which is exactly
what happens in contradictory statements. There you have put aside for the
moment your resolve, forgetting any true resolve effects everything.
Abstractions do not exist – only interpretations coming into the present
from the future exist – which is why, interpreting something like 2+2=4 a
thousand times, and now in the midst of the thousand and first, you can
suddenly ‘see’ something NEW about it. Da-sein IS imagination. And if it
‘really’ is imagination per se then it is unreal by definition.



To make a firm decision yet keep it secret would involve the strength to
embody the decision such as the firm decision to commit suicide which one
would have to keep secret. And then everything you do is interpreted both in
the light of holding that resolve together and covering it over from the
public light. That is, one would literally have to hold it together
objectively with one’s whole being until its completion in the future
because the second you loosen that hold it will disperse into a mere
abstract and indefinite thought without a point in impending time that
becomes no decision at all. It then becomes like the “Everybody dies” that
everybody knows, but which is not now nor is it soon: it is hidden within
the indefinite future. Therefore the resolve to choose to run ahead towards
death as your ownmost possibility has elements in common with suicide. And
yet, “by and for the most part,” suicide is usually thoroughly inauthentic
and ungenuine. It is an ontic act that is caused by an impending factical
situation, or it becomes indefinite and arbitrary  in motivation as is the
imagined ‘threat.’



The existential project in which anticipation has been delimited, has made
visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell, authentic
being-toward-death. But with this, the possibility then appears of an
authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole – but only as an ontological
possibility . . . And yet this existentially “possible” being-toward-death
remains, after all, existentially a fantastical demand. The ontological
possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of Da-sein means
nothing as long as the corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not
been shown in terms of Da-sein itself. Does da-sein ever project itself
factically into such a being-toward-death? Does it even demand, on the basis
of it ownmost being, an authentic potentiality of being which is determined
by anticipation? . . . We must investigate to what extent at all and in what
way Da-sein bears witness to a possible authenticity of its existence from
its ownmost potentiality-of-being, in such a way that it not only makes this
known as existentially as possible, but demands it of itself. The question
hovering over us of an authentic wholeness of Da-sein and its existential
constitution can be placed on a viable, phenomenal basis only if that
question can hold fast to a possible authenticity of its being attested by
Da-sein itself. If we succeed in discovering phenomenologically such an
attestation and what is attested to in it, the problem arises again of
whether the anticipation of death projected up to now only in its
ontological possibility has an essential connection with that authentic
potentiality-of-being attested to. (B&T, S 246/M&R 311/Suz 266-267)


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