Date: Wed, 8 Jul 1998 11:21:28 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Re:  In dubium revocari


>Steven E. Callihan wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that one of the issues here is whether certainty (certitude)
>> is possible at all in the sense sought by Aristotle or Descartes. They both
>> sought, in other words, to ground discourse in what Nietzsche termed an
>> "immediate certainty," i.e., in something that must be taken as being
>> indubitably true (indubitably certain). It really doesn't matter, it seems
>> to me, whether one locates what is indubitably true in a direct perception
>> of what is "out there" (the object) or in a conceptual intuition of what is
>> "in here" (the subject). The opposition occurs in either case. However, if
>> one dispenses with the notion of an immediate certainty (of the indubitably
>> true), then what appears most certain to us need not be either certain or
>> immediate. The appearance (phenomenon) of certainty, in other words, would
>> be contingent on other appearances (which would be contingent on still other
>> appearances). Rather, certainty (or uncertainty) is a judgment we make of
>> appearances based on their behavior in concert, as belonging to each other,
>> as forming a constellation or continuum.
>
>The problem I have with this is that if certainty is based only on
"behavior in
>concert," then that of which we are certain could in principle be
otherwise. But
>essence of the very phenomenon of certainty is that something cannot be
>otherwise. For example, not only is it difficult for me to conceive of any
>instance of 2+2 not equalling 4; it is absolutely inconceivable to me that
this
>could possibly ever be otherwise. This is precisely what it means to be
certain
>of something. So there must be more to the phenomenon of certainty than just
>"behavior in concert." This problem remains as long as we try to ground
>certainty on a "judgment," as in a "judgment we make of appearances based
>on their behavior in concert." So the solution must be to ground certainty
upon
>non-judgment, which is precisely what Heidegger does. The above objection
>would no longer apply, since the very concepts of "can be otherwise" and
>"cannot be otherwise" are themselves judgmental in nature.
>
>Anthony Crifasi

Hi Anthony,

Actually, I have argued your side of the argument previously--my flipping
coin argument. If we flip a coin, and on the first flip a head turns up and
on the second flip a tail turns up, we can be as certain as we can possibly
be, it seems to me, that the coin has a head on one side and a tail on the
other. But what convinces us of this? Simply that appearances that we dub as
real tend to possess the quality of either remaining stable (not changing)
over time or changing in a pedictable manner. It is our experience that
coins do not just all of a sudden change fromm having a head and a tail to
having two heads or two tails, unless someone has switched the coins.

The "truths" of mathematics (2+2=4) would rest on the same sort of
assumption. I would suggest that mathematics rests on assumptions that we
can hardly doubt without tossing mathematics out of the window. That is
different, I think, than saying that those assumptions are immediately
certain. Ultimately, it seems to me, assertions as to the truth of
mathematics rest on the truth of logic. Is logic an immediate certainty?
Once again, I cannot help but think that it is a case of being compelled to
affirm the truth of logic under the penalty otherwise of having to dispense
with all truth.

Another problem is that every assertion of truth is subject to the question
"why?" In answering such a question, we must either enlist other purported
truths as reasons why this particular truth must be taken indubitably as
being true or we must simply refer back to the consequences of not accepting
the assertion, which necessarily brings other assertions of truth into play.
The point, it seems to me, is simply that there are no isolated truths, no
truths that do not appear on the stage already fully supported by a whole
train of other truths (things which we do not doubt). As such, there is no
one immediately certain truth from which all other truths might follow, in
that there is no truth that does not depend on other truths (even 2+2=4
depends on the affirmation that 1=1).

Peirce, in "The Fixation of Belief," dispenses with this problem by simply
stating that there is an abundance of things which we would hardly conceive
of doubting. Ultimately, we believe that certain things are indubitably
true, because to believe otherwise would be to see all the cards fall to the
ground. To doubt everything would mean to also doubt doubt, a clear
impossibility.

Best,

Steve C.






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=A6 Steven E. Callihan            =A6 "It is the stillest words that bring  =A6
=A6                               =A6 on the storm. Thoughts that come on   =A6
=A6                               =A6 doves' feet guide the world."         =A6
=A6 URL: http://www.callihan.com/ =A6 -F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra,=A6
=A6 E-Mail: callihan-AT-callihan.com =A6 II, "The Stillest Hour"               =A6
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