Date: Wed, 8 Jul 1998 07:34:21 -0500
Subject: Re:  In dubium revocari


Steven E. Callihan wrote:

> It seems to me that one of the issues here is whether certainty (certitude)
> is possible at all in the sense sought by Aristotle or Descartes. They both
> sought, in other words, to ground discourse in what Nietzsche termed an
> "immediate certainty," i.e., in something that must be taken as being
> indubitably true (indubitably certain). It really doesn't matter, it seems
> to me, whether one locates what is indubitably true in a direct perception
> of what is "out there" (the object) or in a conceptual intuition of what is
> "in here" (the subject). The opposition occurs in either case. However, if
> one dispenses with the notion of an immediate certainty (of the indubitably
> true), then what appears most certain to us need not be either certain or
> immediate. The appearance (phenomenon) of certainty, in other words, would
> be contingent on other appearances (which would be contingent on still other
> appearances). Rather, certainty (or uncertainty) is a judgment we make of
> appearances based on their behavior in concert, as belonging to each other,
> as forming a constellation or continuum.

The problem I have with this is that if certainty is based only on "behavior in 
concert," then that of which we are certain could in principle be otherwise. But 
essence of the very phenomenon of certainty is that something cannot be 
otherwise. For example, not only is it difficult for me to conceive of any 
instance of 2+2 not equalling 4; it is absolutely inconceivable to me that this 
could possibly ever be otherwise. This is precisely what it means to be certain 
of something. So there must be more to the phenomenon of certainty than just 
"behavior in concert." This problem remains as long as we try to ground 
certainty on a "judgment," as in a "judgment we make of appearances based 
on their behavior in concert." So the solution must be to ground certainty upon 
non-judgment, which is precisely what Heidegger does. The above objection 
would no longer apply, since the very concepts of "can be otherwise" and 
"cannot be otherwise" are themselves judgmental in nature.

Anthony Crifasi


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