Date: Fri, 3 Jul 1998 18:50:54 +0000
Subject: Re:   In dubium revocari


Michael Eldred wrote:

> But perhaps there is a way forward. Aristotle's consideration was the difficulty 
> (_aporia_) in distinguishing (_krinein_) between the observations of the sick 
> and the healthy, and between the states of being awake and dreaming. There is in 
> fact no access (no _poros_) to this latter difference, no _kriterion_, and 
> neither Aristotle nor Descartes offer one.

Since Descartes' point in the First Meditation is precisely to 
eliminate any such difference, then it is natural that he does not 
offer one. Aristotle's discussion of the problem, however, does imply 
such a criterion, since he considers the difference to be known in 
the way of a primary principle. For example, Aristotle also does not 
"explicitly provide" a criterion for distinguishing primary 
sensibles, such as red from blue, not because he thinks we cannot be 
absolutely certain of a difference between them, but rather because 
primary sensibles are perceived so primordially that there can be 
nothing more primary which can serve as an "identifiable 
difference" between them. The differences between them are simply 
revealed with absolute evidence and certitude in the very perception 
itself. The case is the same for anything known primordially, and not 
through anything else. But Aristotle describes the difference between 
dreaming and waking in precisely this way - as a starting point of 
demonstration, which therefore does not itself require anything prior 
in order to establish its certitude (at least that is how he replies 
in the Metaphysics to those who put forth the dream argument in his 
time). So although Aristotle does not explicitly "put forth" any 
specific difference, what he says about the dream argument indicates 
that he believes there is such a difference, and that it is so 
absolutely evident that it is simply "seen," just as the difference 
between red and blue is simply "seen" through the common sense.

> Kant dispenses with all such considerations by drawing a critical line for what 
> is knowable, namely, intuited appearances (directly) and the (indirect) 
> conceptually ordered representations of direct intuition. The appearances of the 
> objects are the objects themselves -- and that is the limit to knowledge for any 
> finite consciousness. It does not seem to makes any difference whether the 
> intuitions are given in a waking or sleeping state, for the subject can only 
> ever look on, i.e. intuit, what is given to it. 

But this is not the result of "dispensing" with considerations such 
as the one between Aristotle and Descartes regarding dreams. Rather, 
Kant has taken a side in that consideration - the side of Descartes, 
in that he has rejected any primordially perceived difference or 
criterion which would immediately distinguish what we experience 
while awake as "things in themselves." If that difference were 
primordially intuited (as Aristotle thought), then it would indeed 
make a difference "whether the intuitions are given in a waking or 
sleeping state," as Aristotle held. In other words, part of "what is 
given" to the subject would be the "reality" or "external 
objectivity" of what is intuited. How this occurs would be a further 
question. So Kant is simply following Descartes in the rejection of 
any such perceptible difference.

Anthony Crifasi


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