Date:          Thu, 2 Jul 1998 8:21:31 EST
Subject:       re:  mood as color



> Henry:  
> it would be naive to think that there were no relation
> between moods and being-in-the-world as a whole.  Yes!

(TMB:  Who is saying that??)


Henry:
B&T, Macquarrie, p176 (H137) section 29, 9th paragraph:
"The mood has already disclosed, in every case, 
Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it 
possible first of all to directoneself towards something."



[TMB:  
Dasein finds itself in the mood that it has. This does not mean that we
*look at thrownness*, which, from the existentialy-ontological point of
view, is made manifest when mood is *thought* as such.]

Henry:
B&T, Macquarrie, p175 (H 136) section 29 paragraph 7 (quoted earlier):
 "Only we must not be misled by this
into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial
kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed 
to itself *prior to* all cognition and volition, and 
*beyond* their range of disclosure."

"Prior to cognition"  doesn't that mean prior to *thought*?


[TMB:  There is a
confusion. On the hand, moods disclose the world: One is angry, one sees
things *because* one is angry ("You never put the cap back on the
toothpaste!"). On the other hand, the *fact* of moods discloses throwness. 
In the former case, mood can be likend to "color" easily enough, and it is
ok to say that: One's understanding of the world is colored by this or
that mood, so that what one notices, gets involved in, etc., arises in
that "color". I won't push the point to far, but you are working so hard
to avoid psychologism, you seem to be missing that you can simply
characterize moods (as "color", state of mind, even as *emotional*, and as
involving feelings) without this meaning that you are missing the
ontoogical-existential import of moods.]

Henry:
I don't understand any of this pertaining to the B&T discussion.
We're trying to read B&T, right?  Try using angst & joy as your
'concrete demonstrations' as they are the ones heidegger uses.


[TMB:
 According to Heidegger, moods do
not necessary and do not usually, at least for most people, disclose
*existence* and *being in the world as such*. They might on rare
occasions, but again, this is *as per Heidegger's examples and general
characterization*, which I think is much too limited, but also very good
and even brilliant.]

Henry:  
show me the text where heidegger says 
"moods do not necessary and do not usually, 
at least for most people, disclose
*existence* and *being in the world as such*"

I just quoted above from B&T where he does say mood
discloses being-in-the -world as a whole.



[TMB:  
Generally speaking, it still appears to me that mood is *one
existentiale*, and relates to others in a specific way, which can be
likened, here I go again, to a kind of color. This does not infect or
render impure any sort of existential-ontological understanding of "what
mood discloses". ]

maybe it does and maybe it doesn't infect, i dunno.  
but the color metaphor is diffinitely opaque to me.


[TMB:  
Look at this of Heidegger: "Phenomenally, we would wholly
fail to recognize, both *what* mood discloses and *how* it discloses, if
that which is disclosed were to be compared with what Dasein is acquainted
with, knows, and believe 'at the same time' when it has such a mood....the
mood brings Dasein before the 'that-it-is' of its 'there', which, as such,
stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma." (135-136 M and
R, German numbering). ]

Henry:
That passage follows and supports heidegger's thinking about mood 
as the structure of dasein's existence that primarily discloses "thrownness,
situatedness, the "there" of dasein's being; and, it contextualizes 
the important insight that moods are also dasein's primary way 
of fleeing its own existence by turning away form its being.

to contemplate the the cognitions that accompany the mood, says
heidegger in your quote, does not recognize the 
existential-ontological nature of mood.  this contradicts 
your earlier statement about *thought.*  
(look way up there; this post is just too long)



[TMB:  
He adds that we *deal* with, master, cope in, etc. moods and that if we
fail to reflect on them, they can all the more easily disintegrate into
*bad moods*, etc. But the wording is not quite clear. Does Dasein always
*face* its enigma of its moodedness? Heidegger seems to suggest tha that
is not the case, yet, likewise, "the mood" brings (when? sometimes?
always) Dasein face to face with the enigma of existence. ]


Henry:  
stop a minute:  what do you understand to be your claim about
mood and thought (reflection)?  
first mood is contingent on *thought*; 
then it is not understood by way of what 
is known 'at the same time'; now, you're saying
that reflection masters moods, disintegrates moods 
 and i don't know what all ...

which is it?


[TMB:  
He might have added that being subject to 
violence can put people in bad
moods, but this was not really a concern for Heidegger. ]


Henry:
he might have added that being chronically hungry,
or continually neglected affects people's moods, etc.
but i think he is thinking about moodedness not
moods.  his few demonstrations of moods are
presented for specific reasons.  he is not and i don't think
he would want to, or would think that it would be helpful 
for anyone to present an array of moods and psycho-logize 
them as types under causations.  i think he's trying to get 
away from that.



[TMB:  
In any event, that paragraph is lead off by the word "phenomenally". I
think he is talking about the *phenomenon* of moodedness, and is
suggesting that for the most part moods, the fact of them, the fact of
thrownness, is something that eludes people (ostensibly). To call a mood a
color is not so much a problem, if one realizes that, to carry the
metaphor further, one is always *one color or another*. That's all that's
about. It is important not to lose the actual character of this or that
when avoiding psychologism. You can go ahead and characterize things in
many an "ordinary" way, even while understanding that the significance of
what is characterized on an ontological-existential level is very
different. ]

Henry:
i dont follow the above real well.  i think there is some distinction
about the heideggerian existentiale/existentiell distinction that 
you are trying to make, but i dont follow.


[TMB:
Anyhow, we're left with: is mood a *situation*? I think it is taking mood
too far to call it a situation. And further, my concern is that the
existential-ontological approach might have some serious problems and
limitations when it comes to, as it were, the *toothpaste cap*...Ok, now
*that* obscure, but I'll have to leave off here.]


Henry:  
if all you have been saying is that you 
disagree with heidegger that moodedness 
situates dasein (thrownness, the disclosure 
of being-in-the-world as a whole, the encounter 
with "something," the fleeing from its own existence,
 and on and on)--  well, okay, you disagree with Being & Time.

you have a very-round-about way of disagreeing!

kindest regards,
henry



     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---