Date: Wed, 1 Jul 1998 17:47:44 -0500
Subject: Re:  In dubium revocari


Michael Eldred wrote:

> Anthony, we seem to have come somewhat adrift of the starting point of this 
> discussion, which was the subject/object distinction.

If I remember correctly, you were arguing that Descartes is indeed the true 
origin of subject/object metaphysics because the very crux of truth changed 
from the adequacy of statement to thing for Aristotle, to certitude for Descartes, 
and that it was this change which made it possible for the dream argument to 
have force. I argued that according to the line of argument presented by both 
Aristotle and Descartes themselves in the Metaphysics and the Meditations, 
the "switch" is what depends upon the dream argument, not the reverse. So 
although this point seems "somewhat adrift" of our starting point, the latter 
actually depends on this point we are arguing now. After all, the very reason 
that the crux of truth for Descartes cannot be the "adequacy of statement to 
thing" is that his dream argument throws into suspense the very existence of 
things in the first place. So all he has left is his pure experience, of which he is 
certain. Aristotle, on the other hand, held that the existence of things is 
indubitable (according to the text I cited from the Metaphysics), so that for him, 
our certitude includes things themselves from the beginning.

> The above formulation 
> concerning the =93thing out there=94 which you cite repeatedly does indeed point to 
> the issue we are discussing. I agree with you that Aristotle is concerned with 
> necessary truths, so the issue becomes how to interpret Descartes=92 
> radicalization of doubt to the point where the only certainty left is the 
> cogitating subject itself, the =93fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum=94 of =93cogito 
> me cogitare=94. This subject now underlies (_hypokeimesthai_) all knowledge, and 
> the subject can only be certain of its own representations in consciousness. Not 
> only the *appearances* of things which lie before us (_hypokeimenon_) in the 
> world can be deceiving, but the very lying-before-us of the _hypokeimenon_ 
> itself is now put into doubt.

But again, the reason explicitly given by Descartes for this doubt is the dream 
argument. So I am not sure why you wish to interpret the dream argument as 
dependent on the switch in question, instead of the other way around. I think 
Descartes himself would vehemently resist that interpretation, according to the 
order of his argument from the First Meditation to the Second. Only if the 
dream argument (and also the evil genius argument) has force can the Cogito 
then be the ONLY certainty left at the beginning of the Second Meditation. And 
since Aristotle rejected the force of the dream argument, then for him, we can 
be certain of things themselves. So it seems to me that the pivot point is the 
dream argument itself.

> Kant=92s transcendental philosophy approaches this problem by demonstrating that 
> pure subjective reason itself is capable (hat das Vermoegen) of constituting the 
> object apriori in its objectivity. What was lying-before-us as the 
> _hypokeimenon_ for Aristotle now becomes what is standing over against 
> (Gegen-Stand) the conscious subject as an achievement of pure reason. This shift 
> is what Heidegger characterizes as the shift in the historical essencing of 
> truth from the adequacy of the statement (_logos_) to the things themselves 
> (_onta kath=92auto_), to the certitude for the subject of the object in its 
> objectivity. 

We are in agreement that this shift occurred. Our point of disagreement, if I 
understand you correctly, is whether this shift is what made possible the more 
"particular" arguments (such as the dream argument, Hume's arguments 
against metaphysical causality, etc.), or whether it was those more particular 
arguments upon which the shift depended in the first place.

I should point out that I don't think that our dispute here in any way threatens 
Heidegger's analytic. Whether subject/object metaphysics began with 
Descartes or with Aristotle, Heidegger's shift to a non-metaphysical "ground" 
remains what it is - a departure from subject/object metaphysics, and therefore 
a way out of the transcendental solipsism of Husserl's theory.

Anthony Crifasi


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