Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1998 18:01:57 +0200
Subject: Re: truth


Cologne, 28 July 1998

Anthony Crifasi schrieb:
> Actually the translation I used was "conviction," if I remember correctly. I
>  did 
> suggest an inverse relation between the knower's "conviction" in a belief and 
> what Descartes would call the knower's degree of doubt in a belief (ie, the
>  more 
> conviction, the less doubt, and the closer to knowledge).
>
> > This way of proceeding cannot be taken seriously for (i) the 
> > essence of truth is a metaphysical question dealt with in metaphysics, not
>  in a 
> > consideration of ontic science 
>
> I don't see how the interpretation I am defending would imply that the
>  essence 
> of truth would be "dealt with" in an ontic science. I am arguing that all the
>  ontic 
> disputes between Aristotle and Descartes already assume Aristotle's ground of 
> science.
>
> > and (ii) the Greek verb _pisteuô_ does not carry 
> > the weight of certitude; it means “to have trust”, to “believe”. “_Pistis_
>  is 
> > for Plato the lowest kind of knowledge, i.e. mere belief, and also means
>  “faith” 
> > in the Christian tradition. 
>
> Then I will use your translation - "trust." At 1139b33, Aristotle uses
>  _pisteuaei_ 
> to refer to the "trust" we have in the first principles of knowledge, which
>  trust is 
> necessary if there is to be any knowledge following from them at all. Thus,
>  trust 
> is an essential element of knowledge for Aristotle; and "trust" can only be
>  an 
> accident of the knower, not the known. So the difference between Descartes 
> and Aristotle does not lie in the issue of whether or not the knower's
>  "trust" is a 
> necessary element of knowledge; rather, the difference between them lies in 
> *what specific items can be trusted* (ie, sensations vs. dreams, etc.). The 
> Cartesian shift to the self-certitude of the knower is therefore a DIStrust
>  of 
> sensation as a truthful experience of what is other than the knower. And the 
> reason for the prevalence of this distrust of sensation was precisely the 
> conclusions of the new science regarding the subjectivization of sensation
>  (as 
> merely an internal "reaction" to stimuli), which coincided with the
>  conclusion of 
> the dream argument regarding same. This is absolutely clear in the Sixth 
> Meditation, where Descartes simply assumes without question the conclusions 
> of the new science regarding the mind receiving sensations not from the whole 
> body, but only from one internal organ (the brain), and that the same
>  sensation 
> is felt not because it is in the same part of the body (eg, the foot), but
>  because 
> the same part of the brain is being stimulated by the same affected nerve.
>  The 
> implications regarding the subjectivization of sensation are clear.

For Descartes the locus of truth is the consciousness of the ego-subject. 
Because truth is localized there all these considerations of sensations being 
received make sense. I agree that trusting in postulates is an aspect of truth 
for both Descartes and Aristotle. It would be strange indeed if there were no 
points of comparison at all. But what has happened to the essence of truth in 
Aristotelian metaphysics, viz. _homoiôsis_? Aristotle writes with regard to 
falsity: “false _logos_:  the _logos_ of non-being is insofar false” (Met. Delta 
29 1024b26), whereas the true _logos_ adapts to the being of what it refers to; 
thus “not because we truly opine that you are white are you white, but because 
you are white, we say the truth when we say this” (Met. Theta 10 1051b8). This 
relation between _logos_ and being as self-presencing is surrendered in 
Cartesian metaphysics in favour of self-certainty, for everything which _is_ is 
referred back to that which I can be _certain_ of. 

But with the dissolution of _ousia_ as the primary understanding of being, 
Aristotle’s metaphysics loses its subject of investigation. The “primary being” 
is “what something is, which designates the substance (_ousia_)”. (Met. Zeta 1 
1028a14) And with the dissolution of “what something is”, all the other 
categories also lose their sense, since they all refer back to “_ti estin_”. 
Moreover, the saying of the being of beings according to _dynamis_ and 
_energeia_ is retracted in the Cartesian determination of the essence of natural 
beings as _res extensa_. And the fourth way in which being is said, namely, 
_kata symbebaekos_ is not and cannot be subject for _theôria_ (Met. E 2 1026b4) 

Instead of claiming that Descartes’ meditations coincide with conclusions drawn 
by the new science it has to be asked: On what ontology are the “conclusions of 
the new science” based? What is a being for the new science? 

> So the difference between Descartes 
> and Aristotle does not lie in the issue of whether or not the knower's
>  "trust" is a 
> necessary element of knowledge; rather, the difference between them lies in 
> *what specific items can be trusted* (ie, sensations vs. dreams, etc.). 

Again “knowledge” is taken here in an undifferentiated way as _epistaemae_, not 
as ontological (metaphysical) knowing. The understanding of dreams depends 
entirely on the fundamental historical understanding of being. On dreams and 
dreaming cf. e.g. GA52 _Hoelderlins Hymne ‘Andenken’_, Sections 36-39 and 
_Zollikoner Seminare_ 02/March/1972 pp.288ff. 


> If the possibility of knowledge (for Aristotle) depends on both the object
>  AND 
> the "trust" of the knower, then the rejection of the former does not
>  immediately 
> imply the rejection of the latter. If the texts I have cited do indeed
>  indicate that 
> Aristotle himself recognized the distinction between the "trust" of the
>  knower 
> and the object of knowledge as two necessary elements of knowledge, then 
> there is the possibility of a dialogue between Aristotle and Descartes on
>  that 
> point and on the same ground.

And this ground is removed from the ground of Aristotelian metaphysics. The 
dialogue could concern only formal aspects of theory-building in natural 
science. For, even if there is an economy of principles in the definition of the 
regional ontology of nature in both Aristotle and Descartes, these principles 
deal with essentially different contents. The first principle of Aristotelian 
ontology of nature is that “natural beings have within themselves a principle of 
movement and rest” (Phys. 192b13). If there is no “trust” placed in this first 
principle by Cartesian metaphysics, from where else is a dialogue going to be 
able to take its starting point? Having such a principle within itself is what 
makes a natural being _as such_ i.e. its _ousia_ consists in having such an 
immanent principle. Doesn’t such a possible “dialogue” come to a halt before it 
even starts? The “ground” on which it could take place is entirely formal, 
concerning first principles, axioms, their self-evidence, logical consistency, 
etc. The chasm of difference is thereby glossed over. 

What goes under in efforts at such a formal comparison is the new world that is 
opened up by the retraction of the metaphysics of _ousia_, namely, the 
possibility of drafting the being of beings (by way of a “model” -- a word which 
you like using) that enables the domination of nature by the subject which 
interrogates nature according to mathematical principles. The method of thinking 
in terms of “models” is a modern way of thinking which denies the substance of 
beings in favour of representations in the consciousness of a thinking subject 
in order to achieve the greatest economy of explanation and thus the greatest 
possible degree of domination over objectivity by a subject. For such models, 
their “truth” is not a matter of adequacy of the theory to the beings themselves 
in their Selbstand (self-standing) but of explanatory power (for consciousness, 
for reason), and that ultimately for the sake of effectiveness. 

The gulf between Aristotelian and Cartesian metaphysics is not simply a matter 
of the latter dispensing with unnecessary postulates, thereby becoming more 
economical, nor is it only a matter of two different theoretical models of the 
world which can be compared and contrasted in various respects from a superior 
standpoint. The fundamental shift between the ancient and the modern world is 
that, whereas for the Greeks, being was experienced as the self-presencing of 
what is present (_ousia_), for modernity, beings are representations for a 
subject which first and foremost presents itself to itself (cogito me cogitare). 
Only for this reason (the deprivation of beings’ substance and self-presencing) 
is the talk of “theoretical models”, “explanatory power”, etc. natural _for us_. 
Such latter elements can be read out of Aristotelian philosophy as well in a 
formal way, but to claim that “essential” elements of truth or ontology are 
preserved, as you do, is not only untenable but also continues the tradition of 
plastering over the historical Greek experience of being with later historical 
experiences in which the beginning of the overwhelming opening of beyng has been 
lost. 

“Der fundamentale Unterschied liegt darin, dass die eine Erfahrung, die 
fruehere, das Seiende als von sich her anwesend versteht. Fuer die neuzeitliche 
Erfahrung ist etwas nur seiend, insofern es von mir vorgestellt wird. Die 
neuzeitliche Wissenschaft beruht auf diesem _Wandel in der Erfahrung der 
Anwesenheit_ des Seienden zur Gegenstaendlichkeit.” (_Zollikoner Seminare_ 
p.129)

“The fundamental difference lies in the circumstance that the one experience, 
the earlier one, understands beings as presencing of themselves. For experience 
in modernity, something is only a being insofar as it is represented by me (mir 
vor-gestellt =made to stand before me). Modern science rests on this 
_transformation in the experience of the presence_ of being to objectivity.”

Michael
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