Date: Mon, 27 Jul 1998 08:45:03 -0500
Subject: Re:  truth


Michael Eldred:

> To be sure, certitude is certainly not the essence of truth for Aristotle, 
> which, if it is to be captured at all in a single word, is _homoi=F4sis_. You 
> cited a passage a couple of posts ago from the Nic. Eth. on _epistaemae_ where 
> the word =93_pisteuaei_=94 occurs (1139b33) and proceeded to interpret this as 
> =93certitude=94. 

Actually the translation I used was "conviction," if I remember correctly. I did 
suggest an inverse relation between the knower's "conviction" in a belief and 
what Descartes would call the knower's degree of doubt in a belief (ie, the more 
conviction, the less doubt, and the closer to knowledge).

> This way of proceeding cannot be taken seriously for (i) the 
> essence of truth is a metaphysical question dealt with in metaphysics, not in a 
> consideration of ontic science 

I don't see how the interpretation I am defending would imply that the essence 
of truth would be "dealt with" in an ontic science. I am arguing that all the ontic 
disputes between Aristotle and Descartes already assume Aristotle's ground of 
science.

> and (ii) the Greek verb _pisteu=F4_ does not carry 
> the weight of certitude; it means =93to have trust=94, to =93believe=94. =93_Pistis_ is 
> for Plato the lowest kind of knowledge, i.e. mere belief, and also means =93faith=94 
> in the Christian tradition. 

Then I will use your translation - "trust." At 1139b33, Aristotle uses _pisteuaei_ 
to refer to the "trust" we have in the first principles of knowledge, which trust is 
necessary if there is to be any knowledge following from them at all. Thus, trust 
is an essential element of knowledge for Aristotle; and "trust" can only be an 
accident of the knower, not the known. So the difference between Descartes 
and Aristotle does not lie in the issue of whether or not the knower's "trust" is a 
necessary element of knowledge; rather, the difference between them lies in 
*what specific items can be trusted* (ie, sensations vs. dreams, etc.). The 
Cartesian shift to the self-certitude of the knower is therefore a DIStrust of 
sensation as a truthful experience of what is other than the knower. And the 
reason for the prevalence of this distrust of sensation was precisely the 
conclusions of the new science regarding the subjectivization of sensation (as 
merely an internal "reaction" to stimuli), which coincided with the conclusion of 
the dream argument regarding same. This is absolutely clear in the Sixth 
Meditation, where Descartes simply assumes without question the conclusions 
of the new science regarding the mind receiving sensations not from the whole 
body, but only from one internal organ (the brain), and that the same sensation 
is felt not because it is in the same part of the body (eg, the foot), but because 
the same part of the brain is being stimulated by the same affected nerve. The 
implications regarding the subjectivization of sensation are clear.

> > And that is precisely what I am arguing. When I say that Newtonian science 
> > "rejected" Aristotle, I mean that it rejected Aristotle *on the ground of
> >  Aristotle's 
> > own philosophy,* which means that it rejected Aristotle's more "specific" 
> > scientific claims (natural place, etc.) while implicitly keeping Aristotle's
> >  own grounds for science and truth.
> 
> Then you have to tackle the core metaphysical texts in Aristotle concerning 
> _alaetheia_, which are embedded in the Greek casting of being as a whole> =93Aristotle's own grounds for science and truth=94 are his metaphysics, i.e. 
> _ousia_, but that is precisely what you want to and have to get rid of to 
> achieve any compatibility with modern metaphysics. 

If the possibility of knowledge (for Aristotle) depends on both the object AND 
the "trust" of the knower, then the rejection of the former does not immediately 
imply the rejection of the latter. If the texts I have cited do indeed indicate that 
Aristotle himself recognized the distinction between the "trust" of the knower 
and the object of knowledge as two necessary elements of knowledge, then 
there is the possibility of a dialogue between Aristotle and Descartes on that 
point and on the same ground.

> > The specific line to which I was referring was 208b22. I cited the entire
> >  passage 
> > from 10-22 only for context. Unless the translations I have are all wrong,
> >  there 
> > Aristotle states explicitly that places differ "not only in position but also
> >  in power."
> 
> I found the passage you have in mind -- the translation is OK after all. Both 
> passages have to be read together then i.e. (208b10) and (208b22). This does not 
> alter the point I was making, viz. that if you dispense with _dynamis_, you 
> dispense also with _ousia_ and Aristotelian metaphysics in toto. There is no 
> room for piecemeal tinkering. 

The last statement is precisely what is in question. I have cited a passage in 
which Aristotle explicitly recognizes both position and power as attributes of 
place. I have also cited a passage in which Aristotle explicitly endorses the 
"economy of principles," and I argued that the modern argument against the 
natural "power" of place proceeds precisely according to the "economy of 
principles." Thus, the Newtonian idea of place as "pure position" replaced 
Aristotle on his own grounds, and therefore implicitly accepts Aristotle's 
grounds for "truth" and "science." This is not mere "tinkering." It is an alternate 
interpretation which does not require a SHIFT in the essencing of truth itself 
(though an essencing of truth is still of course necessary in order for "facts" 
and "discoveries" to appear as such at all). It is true that Aristotelian 
metaphysics is "dispensed" in that ousia comes to be rejected. But essential 
elements of his model of scientific deduction (eg., the economy of principles) 
are kept, and are indeed the very basis of the modern rejection of Aristotle in 
the first place.

> It is no coincidence that, in his dispute with Cartesian metaphysics and its 
> positing of natural beings as _res extensa_, Leibniz recurs precisely to 
> _dynamis_ (vis) as the more originary determination of essence of natural 
> beings. Leibniz=92 dispute with Descartes is not based on scientific discoveries, 
> but is a metaphysical dispute that draws on simple observations of physical 
> bodies (e.g. their inertia). 

Even so, it is still drawn from "simple observations," such as the fact that pure 
extension cannot explain how a body can be something which acts and reacts 
to other bodies at all (ie, how a body would be different from the pure extension 
of empty space). Thus, Descartes'  theory of body as essentially pure 
extension does not account for all the phenomena, which falls perfectly under 
the same line of argumentation between Aristotle and Descartes (which was 
that a theory must first account for all the phenomena, and of these theories, 
the one which assumes the least is the best).

Anthony Crifasi


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