File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9807, message 187


Date: Sun, 26 Jul 1998 23:50:47 +0200
Subject: Re:  truth


Cologne, 26 July 1998

Anthony Crifasi schrieb:
> But to argue that "the shift from the subject as hypokeimenon to subject as I 
> think" is as fundamental an "element" as certitude is to already assume that 
> certitude was not the essence of truth for Aristotle, which is precisely the
>  point 
> in question between us at the moment. 

To be sure, certitude is certainly not the essence of truth for Aristotle, 
which, if it is to be captured at all in a single word, is _homoiôsis_. You 
cited a passage a couple of posts ago from the Nic. Eth. on _epistaemae_ where 
the word “_pisteuaei_” occurs (1139b33) and proceeded to interpret this as 
“certitude”. This way of proceeding cannot be taken seriously for (i) the 
essence of truth is a metaphysical question dealt with in metaphysics, not in a 
consideration of ontic science and (ii) the Greek verb _pisteuô_ does not carry 
the weight of certitude; it means “to have trust”, to “believe”. “_Pistis_ is 
for Plato the lowest kind of knowledge, i.e. mere belief, and also means “faith” 
in the Christian tradition. 

Descartes’ metaphysical starting point in “I think” is a “fundamentum absolutum 
et inconcussum”. The absoluteness of this foundation excludes any relation to 
something external, and thus any _homoiôsis_, which is a kind of relation 
(between _logos_ and _onta_).

> > The modern world would be 
> > Aristotle’s metaphysics “merely” and “simply” modified slightly in the
> > light of new scientific discoveries. 
>
> And that is precisely what I am arguing. When I say that Newtonian science 
> "rejected" Aristotle, I mean that it rejected Aristotle *on the ground of
>  Aristotle's 
> own philosophy,* which means that it rejected Aristotle's more "specific" 
> scientific claims (natural place, etc.) while implicitly keeping Aristotle's
>  own 
> grounds for science and truth.

Then you have to tackle the core metaphysical texts in Aristotle concerning 
_alaetheia_, which are embedded in the Greek casting of being as a whole. 
“Aristotle's own grounds for science and truth” are his metaphysics, i.e. 
_ousia_, but that is precisely what you want to and have to get rid of to 
achieve any compatibility with modern metaphysics. Your project is a 
contradictio in adjecto. 

> > This is a mistranslation. The relevant passage reads:
> > 
> > _...ou monon daelousin hoti esti ti ho topos, all’ hoti kai echei tina
>  dynamin_ 
> > (208b10)
> > “[the courses (phorai) of the simple physical bodies] not only make it
>  clear 
> > that place is something but also that it has a power”
>
> The specific line to which I was referring was 208b22. I cited the entire
>  passage 
> from 10-22 only for context. Unless the translations I have are all wrong,
>  there 
> Aristotle states explicitly that places differ "not only in position but also
>  in 
> power."

I found the passage you have in mind -- the translation is OK after all. Both 
passages have to be read together then i.e. (208b10) and (208b22). This does not 
alter the point I was making, viz. that if you dispense with _dynamis_, you 
dispense also with _ousia_ and Aristotelian metaphysics in toto. There is no 
room for piecemeal tinkering. 

It is no coincidence that, in his dispute with Cartesian metaphysics and its 
positing of natural beings as _res extensa_, Leibniz recurs precisely to 
_dynamis_ (vis) as the more originary determination of essence of natural 
beings. Leibniz’ dispute with Descartes is not based on scientific discoveries, 
but is a metaphysical dispute that draws on simple observations of physical 
bodies (e.g. their inertia). Leibniz rehabilitates elements of Aristotelian 
metaphysics (substance and dynamis) but in a way consistent with the 
mathematical casting of the being of natural beings (which admits application of 
infinitesimal calculus i.e. the mathematical interrogation of nature). For more 
on this cf. GA33:95-99.

My translation of “kai” in the above passage could even be made starker, thus:
“[the courses (phorai) of the simple physical bodies] make it clear not only 
that place is something but that this being something also means that it has a 
power.”

Michael
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