Date: Fri, 24 Jul 1998 12:40:35 -0500
Subject: Re:  truth


Michael Eldred wrote:

> Sounds like a very good dissertation topic, Anthony. Of course, you will have to 
> work with the original languages since it is often necessary to translate 
> against the grain of accepted translations, no matter how good they are. Your 
> question places me once again in an _aporia_. Is there a way forward out of this 
> embarrassment? What do you mean by =93Heidegger's analytic itself=94? 

For example, would my interpretation of the shift from Aristotle to Descartes 
imply that Dasein's essence is not existence, or that knowing is not a derived 
mode?

> To compare two explanations of natural observations, i.e. of facts, and claim 
> that, for one reason or another, one explanation is more successful than 
> another, presupposes at the very least that the facts acts as a common, shared 
> basis for the comparison of theoretical explanations. Within which fundamental 
> ontology are these facts to be understood? Does it matter? You seem to suggest 
> that it doesn=92t, and the ontology of nature certainly plays no part in your many 
> examples. 

Again, I am not arguing that "facts" are independent of fundamental ontology, 
as the traditional interpretation of "scientific advancement" said. Nor am I 
saying that "which fundamental ontology" doesn't matter. Rather, I am arguing 
(from Aristotelian texts) that the same "fundamental ontology" which applies in 
the case of Descartes and Enlightenment science also applied in Aristotelian 
science. In other words, facts are not independent of ontology, but there is no 
need to posit a shift in fundamental ontology in the first place. The "shift" in this 
case (from Aristotle to Enlightenment science) is rather a change within the 
same fundamental ontology - that of certitude (not necessarily SELF-certitude) 
throughout. 

> Aristotle arrives at a determination of the being of natural beings in Book II 
> Chapter 1 of his _Physics_, after having discussed at length the conceptions of 
> other philosophers about natural beings. All these predecessors provide an 
> ontological understanding of natural being based on =93principles=94 (_archas_): 
> =93_pantes gar ta stoicheia kai tas hyp=92 aut=F4n kaloumenas archas_=94 =93...for all 
> [previous thinkers posit] elements and what they call principles=94 (188b29) and 
> he adds =93_h=F4sper hyp=92 authaes taes alaetheias anankasthentes_=94 =93as though truth 
> necessitated it despite themselves=94 (188b29). Aristotle too, then, posits 
> principles of natural beings. 
> 
> =93Namely, natural beings all seem to have within themselves a principle of 
> movement and rest -- some with respect to location, others with respect to 
> growth and decay, and others with respect to change (becoming other)=94 

If the specifically Aristotelian analysis of change is interpreted as beginning at 
Phys. II.1, then the absolutely vital distinction between accidental and 
substantial change in Phys. I.7 is missed, which is at the very heart of the 
modern rejection of Aristotle. Phys I.7 is where Aristotle lays out his own 
version of the "principles," which are form, matter, and (accidentally) privation. 
Now, one of the vital premises in Aristotle's argument for the distinction 
between substantial form and first matter in Phys. I.7 is the distinction between 
substantial change and accidental change. It is this distinction which is at the 
heart of the modern rejection of Aristotle, since the Newtonian model contends 
precisely (as did Democritus) that there is no substantial change, because all 
changes can be explained merely in terms of accidental changes in constituent 
parts (changes in their relative position, movements, etc.). When this is applied 
to the human body (which is what Enlightenment science did with its new 
findings in biology), the direct consequence is the dissolution of the substantial 
union of the body. The body becomes a "heap" of different substances 
connected like a machine, which is precisely how Descartes described it. But if 
the body is a mere heap of common "dead" matter, then sensations and 
perceptions are not "in" the body; rather, the body is a mere mechanism for 
"transmitting signals" to the conscious soul, again just as Descartes 
concludes in the Sixth Meditation. This is how the conclusions of the new 
science concerning the subjectivization of sensation coincided with those of the 
old dream argument. This coincidence (not in the sense of "chance" but in the 
sense of coinciding) with the conclusions of the powerful and enormously 
"successful" new science is what bolstered the success of the dream 
argument, whereas the same argument had failed to become convincing beforeThus, there is no need to posit a change in the "ontological casting of being" in 
order to explain the Cartesian turn. We need only refer to the findings of a 
powerful new science within the same "ontological casting of being."

> Care has to be taken here not to slap the label =93teleology=94 onto Aristotle=92s 
> views too carelessly, since in these passages he talks for the most part of _to 
> heneka tou_, i.e. =93for the sake of something=94, not =93telos=94 (end). It should be 
> noted, to start with, that Empedocles too posits inner principles of natural 
> beings. Aristotle rightly points out against the view (is it really Empedocles=92 
> view?) 

Empedocles fragment 61 is cited by Hippocrates G. Apostle in his commentary 
on Aristotle's Phys. II.8.

> that natural beings come about =93automatically=94 (_apo tou automatou_ 
> 198b30), i.e. here =93by coincidence=94, that =93all natural beings come about either 
> always or in most cases the same way=94 (198b36). This, of course, leaves room for 
> natural variation. But Aristotle=92s fundamental argument against accidental 
> generation is given at 199b15-16:
> 
> =93On the whole then, what is said does away with natural beings, that is, with 
> nature; natural things, namely, are those which on the basis of some principle 
> within themselves move continuously to arrive at an end.=94 
> 
> That is, it is the ontological casting of natural beings which prevents ideas 
> about accidental generation gaining a foothold, but this does not mean that 
> accidents cannot occur, since the ontological casting is not an ontic assertion. 
> Nor does this ontological casting fly in the face of empirical facts and at the 
> moment I do not see why even ideas about natural selection would be incompatible 
> with an inner nature of physical beings. 

Natural selection *as presented by Empedocles* is incompatible with an inner 
nature of physical beings simply because what occurs "by coincidence" does 
not recur always or for the most part, while physical beings move and develop 
in ways that recur always or for the most part. Therefore, if modern science can 
replace that "coincidence" with something non-coincidental (eg., the newly 
discovered "laws of physics," which is precisely what the new science does), 
then Aristotle's objection to natural selection is solved. Thus, there is no need 
to posit a change in the "ontological casting" of being; all that is needed is new 
"discoveries" within one and the same "ontological casting."

> > Secondly, regarding the change to "res extensa in uniform time and space," 
> > the reason for this change was simply that the very same phenomena which 
> > Aristotle's theory of NON-uniform space (ie, natural place) was meant to 
> > explain could be explained equally well without this presupposition, thereby 
> > leaving (by negation) a space which UN-differentiated.
> 
> This is an argument from economy of presuppositions concerning ontic 
> explanations. Such economy is indeed in line with modern metaphysics with its 
> will to know and its will to power. 

I remember a text in which Aristotle himself explicitly endorses argument from 
"economy of presuppositions" (not Post. An. I.25 or Met. I.2), but I cannot 
remember the citation. I will find it.

> To move from a 
> conception of space as a multitude of places to space as a homogenous dimension 
> of points is not a matter of economy involving merely dropping the =93non-=94 from 
> =93non-uniform=94 to obtain =93uniform=94 (especially since the Greeks do not think of 
> space under the form of such a negation), but requires a momentous shift in the 
> fundamental ontological understanding of the world. 

At Phys. 208b10-22, Aristotle argues that places differ from one another "not 
only in position but also in power." Thus, up and down differ "not only in 
position but also" in that they are the places to which fire and earth naturally 
tend, respectively. So if this idea of the power of place is rejected, then place 
will differ "only in position, not also in power," which is essentially the notion 
which emerged from the Newtonian revolution.

> > Many people are absolutely shocked (as I was) to learn that Aristotle himself 
> > specifically addresses Newton's first law of motion, at Phys. 215a19-22. More 
> > interesting, however, is that there he specifically opposes this view to
> >  natural place. Aristotle argues that since an absolute void implies no
> >  differentiation 
> > between one place and another, then if there were such a void, there would be 
> > no reason for a moving body to stop in one place rather than any other, so
> >  that it would continue to move forever until obstructed by something else. Since
> >  this is never observed to occur, Aristotle presents this as an argument against
> >  the existence of voids. So the very idea of such motion is not the result of a
> >  new "essencing of truth;" rather, as Aristotle himself recognized, it would be
> >  the direct consequence of the rejection of natural place (ie, the rejection of 
> > differentiated place is UN-differentiated place).
> 
> Again, to claim a =93direct consequence=94 is making things far too easy> Aristotle=92s basic argument here is not an empirical one, as you suggest, but 
> ontological in nature, namely, that =93every motion is either by force or natural=94 
> (215a1), and natural beings, being differentiated also have differentiated 
> motions, which is impossible in a complete void. 
> Modern metaphysics first has to 
> eliminate and expunge all difference in natural beings, i.e. to think of them as 
> pure _res extensa_ in order for Newton=92s laws to become possible. 

As I argued earlier from Phys. 208b10-22, the notion of place as "pure position" 
is reached simply by removing the element of "power" from it, and the latter 
was done precisely through new discoveries which offered alternate 
explanations of the behavior of bodies without resorting to "different tendencies 
towards different natural places." For example (a la Pascal), air is above earth 
not because air and earth have different tendencies (up and down); rather, both 
air and earth are heavy, but earth is simply heavier, and therefore settles lower. 
Thus, there is no need to posit an "ontological" shift; rather, an empirical shift 
within the same ontological casting suffices.

Anthony Crifasi


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