Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1998 18:11:47 +0200
Subject: Re:  truth


Cologne, 22 July 1998

Anthony Crifasi schrieb:
> I had thought that our dispute here really does not threaten Heidegger's
>  analytic 
> itself. But you appear to be saying that there is much more at stake, so 
> perhaps I am missing something. Do you think that this dispute bears upon 
> Heidegger's analytic itself? If so, I would be very interested in this, since
>  I am 
> thinking about making all of this the subject of my dissertation.

Sounds like a very good dissertation topic, Anthony. Of course, you will have to 
work with the original languages since it is often necessary to translate 
against the grain of accepted translations, no matter how good they are. Your 
question places me once again in an _aporia_. Is there a way forward out of this 
embarrassment? What do you mean by “Heidegger's analytic itself”? I ask, because 
the term “analytic” is pretty much restricted to SuZ. Our dispute has been 
involved more with the aspects of Heidegger’s thinking which go under the 
heading of “the history of being”, _Seinsgeschichte_, although it has to be said 
that you pay scant attention to the ontological difference, which is the alpha 
and omega of understanding Heidegger's thinking at all.

The issue between us seems to be the difference between epistemology on the one 
hand and ontology on the other, and more specifically the question: How 
fundamental is fundamental ontology? An epistemological problematic cannot reach 
into the depths of fundamental ontology. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is a 
prime example of his endeavours to rescue philosophy, and Kant in particular, 
from the grip of epistemology and to show that Kant’s questioning is 
ontological, i.e. deeper than any epistemology. 

One can characterize the shift in the essencing of truth between Aristotle and 
Descartes in terms of the two words “homoiosis” and “certitudo”, where the 
latter has to be understood as the self-certainty of “I think”, “ego cogito”, 
and the former as a kind of ‘adaptation’ (Angleichung) of the _logos_ 
(proposition) to the thing itself. But this characterization has to be embedded 
within an understanding of the shift in the entire understanding of being 
(_Seinsverstaendnis_) which separates the ancient from the modern world. The 
understanding of truth is part and parcel, i.e. eine Wesensbestimmung, of an 
understanding of being. Being for Aristotle means presence in the sense of the 
things lying there in front of us open to view as the subject-ive bearers of 
attributes. Things are brought to stand as such within the categories, the first 
of which is _ousia_. For Kant, by contrast, who wrote the second fundamental 
book of modern metaphysics, _Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, beings only come 
to stand as such for the subject by virtue of pure reason, which constitutes the 
objectivity of the objects given to consciousness. Although for Kant Anschauung 
(intuition, looking-at) is primary, objectivity itself is achieved by pure 
reason in bringing intuitions to stand as objects. Heidegger then attempts to 
show that it is basically the pure power of imagination that, within Kantian 
metaphysics, constitutes objectivity, and not pure reason. And the power of 
imagination is interpreted as the horizon of time. 

If there has been this momentous shift in the understanding of being, including 
the essencing of truth, since ancient times, this cannot leave the regional 
ontology of a particular branch of knowledge such as natural science untouched. 
The many examples you provide seem to suggest, however, that ‘advances’ in 
modern science over Aristotelian conceptions can be accounted for purely in 
terms of competing explanations of facts, i.e. natural phenomena, that were open 
to observation for Aristotle as well as for all those who heralded in the modern 
age. This would mean that the fundamental shift in the understanding of being 
which can be uncovered through an interpretation and comparison of, say, 
Aristotelian and Cartesian metaphysical texts has no bearing on the shift from 
ancient to modern natural science, and that, in fact, Aristotle’s conceptions 
were shown to be inadequate in the light of a more careful consideration of the 
facts, which yielded more satisfactory explanations. This, in any case, is the 
way you have been arguing, and very cogently at that. 

But what is to be made of this apparent hiatus between ontology and 
epistemology? 

To compare two explanations of natural observations, i.e. of facts, and claim 
that, for one reason or another, one explanation is more successful than 
another, presupposes at the very least that the facts acts as a common, shared 
basis for the comparison of theoretical explanations. Within which fundamental 
ontology are these facts to be understood? Does it matter? You seem to suggest 
that it doesn’t, and the ontology of nature certainly plays no part in your many 
examples. You argue in terms of observations of facts and explanations, 
satisfactory or otherwise, of these facts. 

But what is a fact? This has to be a metaphysical, i.e. ontological question, 
not a question of epistemology. In the case of Aristotle, his physics is based 
on an explicit regional ontology of natural beings, and this can only be ignored 
at your own peril. 

Aristotle arrives at a determination of the being of natural beings in Book II 
Chapter 1 of his _Physics_, after having discussed at length the conceptions of 
other philosophers about natural beings. All these predecessors provide an 
ontological understanding of natural being based on “principles” (_archas_): 
“_pantes gar ta stoicheia kai tas hyp’ autôn kaloumenas archas_” “...for all 
[previous thinkers posit] elements and what they call principles” (188b29) and 
he adds “_hôsper hyp’ authaes taes alaetheias anankasthentes_” “as though truth 
necessitated it despite themselves” (188b29). Aristotle too, then, posits 
principles of natural beings. He writes at the beginning of Book II Chapter 1: 

“Among beings, some of them are by nature, others however are by virtue of some 
other cause” (192b8) 

And then follows his ontological definition of natural beings:

“_ta men gar physei onta panta phainetai echonta en heautois archaen kinaeseôs 
kai staseôs -- ta men kata topon, ta de kat auxaesin kai phthisin, ta de kat’ 
alloiôsin_” (192b13-16)
“Namely, natural beings all seem to have within themselves a principle of 
movement and rest -- some with respect to location, others with respect to 
growth and decay, and others with respect to change (becoming other)” 

This ontology of natural being is contrasted with the being of things made by 
_technae_, which have the principle of their being in something other than 
themselves. 

All the facts of nature which can be observed are thus facts regarding natural 
beings, i.e. beings having the principle (_archae_) of their movement within 
themselves. 

> Aristotle explicitly opposes his teleology to the "survival of the fittest"
>  view of 
> nature, put forth in his time by Empedocles (Phys. 198b29-33). The two views 
> are rivals because both seek to explain the same natural phenomenon - the 
> fact that beings are naturally generated with characteristics and tendencies
>  fit 
> for their survival and benefit; but Aristotle explains this by positing a
>  specific 
> natural tendency towards a specific good, while the other explains this
>  simply 
> by the non-survival (and therefore the disappearance) of all beings which
>  were 
> generated without survival characteristics. Now, Aristotle's response to the 
> latter view (198b33-199a1) is that although it can explain why most beings at 
> present have survival characteristics (ie, the ones that didn't have died
>  out), it 
> cannot explain why such characteristics for the most part continue to appear, 
> since such characteristics supposedly appear purely by chance. This is where 
> new "facts" become important. 

Care has to be taken here not to slap the label “teleology” onto Aristotle’s 
views too carelessly, since in these passages he talks for the most part of _to 
heneka tou_, i.e. “for the sake of something”, not “telos” (end). It should be 
noted, to start with, that Empedocles too posits inner principles of natural 
beings. Aristotle rightly points out against the view (is it really Empedocles’ 
view?) that natural beings come about “automatically” (_apo tou automatou_ 
198b30), i.e. here “by coincidence”, that “all natural beings come about either 
always or in most cases the same way” (198b36). This, of course, leaves room for 
natural variation. But Aristotle’s fundamental argument against accidental 
generation is given at 199b15-16:

“_Holôs d’ anairei ho houtô legôn ta physei te kai physin; physei gar, hosa apo 
tinos en autois archaes synechôs kinoumena aphikneitai eis to telos_”
“On the whole then, what is said does away with natural beings, that is, with 
nature; natural things, namely, are those which on the basis of some principle 
within themselves move continuously to arrive at an end.” 

That is, it is the ontological casting of natural beings which prevents ideas 
about accidental generation gaining a foothold, but this does not mean that 
accidents cannot occur, since the ontological casting is not an ontic assertion. 
Nor does this ontological casting fly in the face of empirical facts and at the 
moment I do not see why even ideas about natural selection would be incompatible 
with an inner nature of physical beings. Rather, one has to investigate the 
ontological level and the differences which pertain between the ancient and the 
modern ontology of natural beings, not the epistemological level of ontic 
explanations in terms of some theory or other. 

> It is true that "what is necessary" by itself has to do with the nature of
>  beings, 
> but KNOWLEDGE OF what is necessary also implies conviction on the part of 
> the knower, as Aristotle says at Nic. Eth. 1139b32-35. Although it is not
>  "the 
> consciousness of a subject convincing himself" (since for Aristotle, more is 
> originally certain than just the consciousness of the subject), nevertheless 
> conviction is still a necessary element for scientific knowledge. 

The same comment as above applies: truth is a matter for ontology, not 
epistemology. The passage you cite concerns only ontic knowledge (epistaemae), 
not ontological knowledge (metaphysics). The “conviction” you refer to is 
_pisteuô_ in Greek, which means “to trust”, again something different from 
certainty. 

> Secondly, regarding the change to "res extensa in uniform time and space," 
> the reason for this change was simply that the very same phenomena which 
> Aristotle's theory of NON-uniform space (ie, natural place) was meant to 
> explain could be explained equally well without this presupposition, thereby 
> leaving (by negation) a space which UN-differentiated.

This is an argument from economy of presuppositions concerning ontic 
explanations. Such economy is indeed in line with modern metaphysics with its 
will to know and its will to power. Moreover, negation is not such a simple 
matter. As Hegel knew, there are many kinds of “determinate negations”, so 
“homogenous space” does not result simply from a neat negation. The Greeks do 
not have a concept of space as we know it at all, but think instead in terms of 
_topos_ (place) and _chôra_ which can mean “open space”, but also “surface”, 
“interstice” and “place” (and “status” and the “country”). To move from a 
conception of space as a multitude of places to space as a homogenous dimension 
of points is not a matter of economy involving merely dropping the “non-” from 
“non-uniform” to obtain “uniform” (especially since the Greeks do not think of 
space under the form of such a negation), but requires a momentous shift in the 
fundamental ontological understanding of the world. The uniformity or 
homogeneity of space comes from the radical positing of “I think” as the 
starting point for all knowledge, both ontological and ontic, for homogenity 
allows a tighter grip of the subject’s will on the external world, i.e. the 
physical world becomes amenable to certain mathematical penetration based on a 
few, compact first principles. A centering of the world on the conscious subject 
is taking place in the opening of the modern world by a new metaphysics. 

> Many 
> people are absolutely shocked (as I was) to learn that Aristotle himself 
> specifically addresses Newton's first law of motion, at Phys. 215a19-22. More 
> interesting, however, is that there he specifically opposes this view to
>  natural 
> place. Aristotle argues that since an absolute void implies no
>  differentiation 
> between one place and another, then if there were such a void, there would be 
> no reason for a moving body to stop in one place rather than any other, so
>  that 
> it would continue to move forever until obstructed by something else. Since
>  this 
> is never observed to occur, Aristotle presents this as an argument against
>  the 
> existence of voids. So the very idea of such motion is not the result of a
>  new 
> "essencing of truth;" rather, as Aristotle himself recognized, it would be
>  the 
> direct consequence of the rejection of natural place (ie, the rejection of 
> differentiated place is UN-differentiated place).

Again, to claim a “direct consequence” is making things far too easy. 
Aristotle’s basic argument here is not an empirical one, as you suggest, but 
ontological in nature, namely, that “every motion is either by force or natural” 
(215a1), and natural beings, being differentiated also have differentiated 
motions, which is impossible in a complete void. Modern metaphysics first has to 
eliminate and expunge all difference in natural beings, i.e. to think of them as 
pure _res extensa_ in order for Newton’s laws to become possible. 

Michael 
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