Date: Tue, 14 Jul 1998 23:04:45 -0500
Subject: Re:   truth


I think that the point I have been arguing can also be made through Heidegger's 
relation to Husserlian phenomenology. The latter begins with the 
phenomenological reduction, the first step of which is the suspension of all 
claims concerning metaphysical existence. The argument Husserl explicitly 
uses in support of this step is the dream argument. Thus, Husserl must 
explicitly reject Aristotle's reply to the dream argument - that it is a violation of 
a necessary and absolutely certain starting point of human knowledge. Husserl 
categorizes the assumption of metaphysical existence as a "prejudice," which 
is eliminated by the phenomenological reduction in order to attain the objective 
and "disinterested" attitude proper for true science.

Now, how does Heidegger respond to this? Not by arguing that the assumption 
of metaphysical existence is indeed an absolutely certain starting point of 
demonstration and science, contra Husserl. Rather, Heidegger transcends 
science and "knowledge" altogether, arguing that the primary route to the world 
is discovered through an "interested" attitude rather than a scientific 
"disinterested" one. Thus, Heidegger is implicitly assuming that the Aristotelian 
response to the dream argument is inadequate, since he does not respond to 
the phenomenological reduction by defending the status of metaphysical 
existence as a necessary first principle of philosophy. If the Aristotelian 
response to the dream argument were enough, then there would be no need to 
"transcend" knowledge and science at all, since knowledge by itself would be a 
sufficient ground for the discovery of beings. Only if knowledge turns out to be 
an insufficient ground on its own for the discovery of beings is something else 
needed at all. 

Anthony Crifasi


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