Date: Sun, 12 Jul 1998 11:11:45 -0500
Subject: Re: In dubium revocari


Steve Callihan wrote:

> Well, let's say that you have two oranges and two bananas and one of the
> bananas morphs into a cucumber. Then 2 + 2 would equal what? No longer four
> fruits, in other words, but four something else (four vegetables?). 

Yes, or four things. If I were to conceive of one of the things simply 
disappearing as I add them, then this would not be 2+2, but 2+2-1.

> The
> point is that some kind of identity must maintain itself over time (A=A),
> otherwise there is nothing to count. The same with the flipping coin -- we
> assume that the flipping coin will never morph simply because it never has.
> The certitude of knowing that the coin has a head and a tail rests on this
> maintenance of identity (and on the honesty of the person flipping the
> coin). We assume, in other words, that a coin with a tail and a head
> remains a coin with a tail and a head. The same with whatever you are
> counting -- an apple remains an apple, etc., otherwise there is nothing to
> count.
> 
> It seems to me that this maintenance of identity (or change according to
> law, or cause and effect) signifies the very difference between reality and
> a dream.  It is in the dream that apples are liable to morph into
> cucumbers, and 2 + 2 may suddenly add up to 5. 

On the contrary, as Descartes himself points out, I cannot conceive of 2+2 
resulting in anything other than 4 even in a dream. I can, however, conceive of 
apples morphing into cucumbers in dreams. That is why Descartes uses the 
evil genius argument, not the dream argument, to inject doubt into 
mathematics. There is a clear conceptual difference for me between the 
example of the coin and that of 2+2. It is true that I "assume that the flipping 
coint will never morph simply because it never has," but I never said that this 
was absolutely certain, and indeed I would deny this. I feel no qualms about 
admitting to the possibility that one day, coins may morph, even though "it 
never has." With 2+2, however, I cannot at all conceive of 2+2 resulting in 
anything other than 4, now or ever.

> A first principle is by definition not an inference that rests upon a prior
> premiss. The question would be, then, whether first principles can be known
> to be true, or whether they are simply believed to be true. I suspect the
> latter. 

I would rather go with Heidegger's analysis - that first principles can indeed be 
*known* with all certainty, but knowledge and certainty are themselves not our 
closest encounter with the world. This allows for the possibility of absolute 
certainties, such as 2+2=4, while avoiding the metaphysical problems involved 
in making such certainty and knowledge the origin of our encounter with beings.

> I'm not sure that anything is immediately seen (known). It is not the
> presence of knowledge here, in other words, but the absence of doubt that
> is at issue. Here's what Peirce has to say:
> 
> "The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a
> dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague
> concession that there is some _one_ thing which a proposition should
> represent. Nobody, therefore can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if
> he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction." (_The
> Philosophical Writing of Peirce_, "The Fixation of Belief," Dover, 1955, p.
> 19.)

But I would argue similarly that the ground of belief cannot ultimately the 
maintainance of a worldview, since this could not account for the criticism of 
other worldviews, which is a common occurrence. If the ultimate reason that I 
believe what I believe is that the very fabric of my "worldview" depends on this, 
then there could be no criticism *between* worldviews, since this would 
assume some all-embracing "absolute" worldview by which more particular 
worldviews could be compared against one another. This is why I think that the 
explanation in terms of "worldviews" is philosopically inadequate, despite its 
prevalence in analytical philosophy.

Anthony Crifasi


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