Date: Thu, 13 Jul 1995 23:30:17 -0400
Subject: BT, Section 45


	I applaud David Schenk not only for his efforts to get the close 
reading group going, but also for his genuine attempt to understand 
Heidegger and for his willingness to stop and ask questions when things 
are not clear.  It seems to me that people often rush either to praise 
or to criticize Heidegger, without having first taken the time to 
understand him.  David has set a good example here.
	To understand what Heidegger up to in Section 45, I think it is 
useful to step back a bit from his architectonic pronouncements about 
the need for a more "primordial" intepretation that takes in the "whole" 
of Dasein; to me at least, these seem rather abstract.  We need to 
consider what he is saying from the broader, more strategic perspective 
of where he is headed in Division Two and what he needs to do to get 
there. Here is how I see it:
	Heidegger wants to put forward a view of temporality which in some 
important ways resembles that of his mentor Husserl.  Husserl had 
argued, in his studies of "internal time-consciousness," that 
consciousness is fundamentally and ineradicably temporal.  It's not just 
a matter of having a past that "was" and a future that "will be."  
Rather, temporality is portrayed by Husserl as an integral dimension of 
the present moment of consciousness itself.  The "living present" is a 
complex unity that includes retentions of the past and protentions of 
the future, all working together with the intentional act directed 
toward what is perceptually present.  Heidegger, for his part, wants to 
show that it is not just noetic consciousness that exhibits this 
temporal structure, but everday, pre-theoretical existence as well.  
Even in practical life, before we have made the shift to the detached, 
noetic contemplation of the world which Husserl studied, what is past 
and what is futural nonetheless have a way of being an integral, 
contemporaneous part of the present.
	The treatment of death is intended to show concretely how 
something futural can become a genuine aspect of the present moment of 
existence.  Heidegger refers in BT to the treatment of death in 
Christian theology (note on BT 293), and he had already shown a deep 
interest in the Christian experience of death in his lectures on the 
phenomenology of religion in the early 1920's.  Paul had written "daily 
I die"; "dying, and yet we live"; "we who are living are always being 
given over to death."  The motto for one of Heidegger's courses was 
taken from Luther: "Right from our mother's womb we begin to die."  To 
Heidegger, passages like these seem to have suggested that, at least for 
genuine Christians, one's own death, though futural, is nonetheless an 
integral part of the present moment of existence.
	Death is not the main point of the analysis here; the main point 
is the temporal structure exhibited in the distinctive experience of 
"being-toward-death."  The same temporal structure can be seen, for 
example, in the early Christians' "being-toward-God," in which they 
experienced the Second Coming not as an event in the distant future, but 
rather as something that was actually a part of one's lived experience 
at each and every moment.  Still, not everyone, not even all Christians, 
experienced futural events in this way.  Some distanced themselves from 
what was futural by saying that they "will" occur, only not yet.  Thus 
Heidegger found it necessary to distinguish between an "authentic" form 
of existence, which does exhibit the temporal structures he wants to get 
at, and an inauthentic form, which does not.
	This seems to me to be the underlying reason for the introduction 
of the themes of death and authenticity in Division Two: Heidegger needs 
them to make a concrete case for his view of temporality as a unity of 
what is past and what is futural within the present moment of existence.  
	 In his post, David asks a question about the shift from the 
authentic mode of being to the inauthentic: "What precipitates this 
shift, what allows it to happen?"  The question is a good one, provided 
it is understood in the right way.  What is called for, in a 
phenomenological context, is _not_ a psychological explanation or 
demonstration of the possibility of this shift.  Phenomenology's role is 
simply to point out what is obvious in itself, though not in fact always 
seen.  Heidegger didn't think he "discovered" authenticity.  The term 
comes from Kierkegaard, but the thing itself, Heidegger believed, was 
recognized not only by some Christian thinkers, but also by the ancient 
Greeks (or at least by Aristotle).
	The real question here, as I see it, pertains to possibility of 
inauthenticity and authenticity alike.  Why are we subject to this 
disjunction in the first place?   Is it possible, from Heidegger's 
perspective, to say what this either-or rests on?  I think it is.  The 
answer, I believe, is _discourse_.  It is because we are defined or 
constituted by discourse that we inevitably exist in either the 
authentic or the inauthentic mode.  But perhaps this is not the place 
for me to pursue this thought in greater detail.  I'll save it for a 
more appropriate moment.
	I look forward to reading other comments on David's post and other 
thoughts on what Heidegger is up to in Section 45.
		-- Phil Miller



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