Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 16:43:30 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [HAB:] Philosophy of Truth


The subject line seems pretentious, but I want to mean
something modest. 

It's not *A* theory of truth that one should hope for---or
should I say: that *I* hope for, since it seems
increasingly clear to *me* that one theory of truth may be
appropriate for its kind and another theory for its kind,
such that a "philosophy" of truth is the approach to
appropriateness that pertains to various theories of truth.


A deflationary theory is quite suitable for transposing The
Question of what's true about true statements to the
epistemological domain, in effect annuling the problem of
truth as something any longer compelling in its own terms.

A consensus theory of truth might be suitable for
theorizing what juries do. A coherence theory might be
suitable for ethical thinking. An epistemological theory
for scientific interests. A pragmatic theory for
action-oriented interest. 

This reminds of Michael Lynch's stance: "truth in context"
(He has a book with that name; I haven't read it. And he
edited the wonderful, big anthology titled _The Nature of
Truth_, c2000). 

Maybe I should call what I have in mind an *appropriative*
theory of truth theories. Gary's philosophy of truth:
Appropriative thinking.

Anyway, you might expect that a pragmatic theory of truth
would pertain to action-oriented interest. Habermas,
though, seems to want to confine his pragmatic theory to
*communicative* action (OPC 376 bottom, and this
sociocentrism is evident throughout his account of the
pragmatic perspective in his response to Rorty, as well as
his career generally), as if reaching understanding with
others is what we mainly do (while he gives passing
attention  to the lifeworld's other action orientations). 

Actually, his theory (which has much, much more to do with
a presumed need for justification than with interest in
what truth is) is designed for critical problem-solving
relative to the common engagement we have with action
coordination with each other, desire for accord with each
other, and interest in understanding each other. But the
reader from Mars could easily feel compelled to believe
that Earthlings either coordinate with each other all the
time or act instrumentally. Making a good life, doing art
and science, building things all apparently serve
communicative action, not the converse. 

But that's OK: The theory of communicative action is just
that. It is theory and philosophy in the interest of life
inasmuch as it is social life. 

So, what's needed (to my mind, at least) is a way to see
the complementarity of communicative life with the larger
context of what we do. In particular, I need to understand
(oversimplifying here) how unprecedented change
happens---innovation, creativity, progress, evolution (in
the progressive sense). My frustration with Habermas is
that I want him to be giving more attention to what
interests me, in complement to my intense interest in what
interests him. I look to his work for insight into what
"bothers" me about intertia in human flourishing (given the
social analyses, which leaves me with questions of what is,
in a phrase, capacity for insight and how can it be
fostered, empowered, institutionalized. (But I *am*
oversimplifying.)

The issue has remained: What's a good way to appropriate
Habermas' work (among others) in a more comprehensive
approach to human life, progress, flourishing, and
evolution? It's not a matter of Habermas: yes or no, rather
a matter of how to appropriate his deliberate boundaries
into a more comprehensive view. For example---major
example, for me---what might the complementary attention to
creative individuality (without coarse individualism) look
like and how best to appropriate this with Habermasian work
(and much other work)?

This kind of interest is what I've meant in the past by
talking about moving "beyond" Habermas but in the human
interest (in intimate solidarity with Habermas, I hope).
This requires that I'm really moving on *with* Habermas'
work, not a willful projection of his views (as "my"
Habermas) or using self-serving critique (moving against
Habermas) in order to feel confident about my The Beyond. 

Appropriative thinking requires close reading, while
writing closely can be unbearably tedious: How a
differentiation of view is *justifiable* immanently. What
is truth in reading? I add another kind of theory of truth
to the lot: hermeneutical truth. Yet maybe all the other
theories can be found to gel in *that*, a hermeneutic of
reading. Maybe Gadamer wins after all. 

Gary






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