Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2003 18:36:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [HAB:] Re: success vs. aim; meaning vs. rationality; act vs. scene [Antti]




>Gary, I try to respond to the most pertinent points.

G: Antti, your responses are *so* useful for thinking.
Thanks. 

----------------------------

A>>> But for Habermas, illocutionary success consists in
intersubjective recognition of validity claims (because
that is what the "illocutionary aim" of a speech act is,
according to him). 

G>> I believe that JH has a different view from what you 
represent. In any case, I disagree that illocutionary
success "consists in" etc. 

A> It seems to me that Habermas is unambiguously committed
to what I claimed. For example:

JH: "The illocutionary success of a speech act is
proportionate to the intersubjective recognition accorded
to the validity claim raised with it." (Some Further
Clarifications, 317).

G: So, your claim becomes that you meant by ‘consists’ what
Habermas means by ‘proportionate’.  Yet, to say that S is
proportionate to R is not to say that S consists in R. 

A>and 

JH: "This illocutionary aim, as we will refer to it, is
two-tiered: the speech act is first of all supposed to be
understood by the speaker and then - so far as possible -
accepted." (315)

G: Therefore, the longstanding Habermasian distinction
between that which is understood (which I associated with
‘success’) and Habermasian acceptance (aim) can be referred
to as a “two-tiered” aim. Obviously, one might agree
retrospectively that one aimed to be understood, so a
two-tiered sense of aim is sensible. Oddly, we ordinarily
might think that we’re more interested in being understood
(in an ordinary sense of intersubjective appreciation) than
in merely having what we say accepted (mattering little
either way, as far as validity goes). This would be an
idiomatic reversal of what JH means by the difference. What
we ordinarily mean by being understood, JH presents as a
matter of rationality, while what we ordinarily mean by
acceptance JH presents as a matter of mere understanding.
So, ordinarily speaking, we aim to be understood, we don’t
aim to be merely acceptable. Or, in JH’s reconstructive
terms, we aim for rational acceptance, we don’t merely aim
to be understood. In any case, Habermas’ aim is tiered, not
merely a dyad; one tier of the aim is subservient to the
other. In fact, we usually just aim to be
understood/rationally accepted; only as a matter of
reconstructive inquiry does acceptance/understanding become
a separate aim. What are the successes required for
acceptance/understanding? Formal pragmatics addresses this,
but we’re not going to get into three-tiered aims, are we?
Or, on the other hand, is the illocutionary aim (equated
below with success) part of a two-tiered *communicative*
aim, thereby reverting to singular (one-tiered) aim? In the
final analysis, this is all a matter of pragmatic analysis:
What can distinctions do for us, relative to our interest
in what’s really going on? 

The crux of the matter here, which is important for
reconstructive inquiry, is that one may be successful in
one’s aims or not, such that the difference between aim and
success it important. 

----------------------------

G>> Illocutionary aim can be ideal-typically located in
particular speech acts, but this is ordinarily derivative
of communicative aim (scenic aim) which belongs to the
communicative action which component acts serve. 
Illocutionary success, on the other hand, pertains more to
specific speech acts than to the scene. 

A> Why couldn't we, then, speak of 'communicative aim' in
the wider context and 'illocutionary aim' for the aim
inherent, according to Habermas, in each speech act?

G: So, again, What can distinctions do for us? If
communicative aim belongs basically to the scene, then its
expression in a component of the analytically isolated
speech act would be illocutionary aim, though the latter is
an analytical designation, relative to the communicative
aim, whereby (by the way) one doesn’t deliberate (in the
flow of conversation) about getting illocutionary aims
lined up in order to make a point. In this respect, there
are only illocutionary successes in a communicative aim;
the notion of illocutionary aim is derivative. 

Given the primacy of communicative action’s embodiment in
lifeworld scenes of interaction (which, by the way, may be
not constitutively a linguistic matter, in the
Merleau-Pontian vein of lifeworldliness---and “form of
life” discourse), communicative aim represents something
scenic (communicative action expresses a dramaturgical
modality, as well as representational and normative), and
illocutionary aim is scenically componential, dependent on
its constitutive communicative aim (I hate the Analytical
philosopher’s notion of “parasitic”, but the term’s
function is important. As bio-figuration goes, by the
way---a modality of thinking that interests me a lot---life
is fundamentally symbiotic or, better, symbiogenic). 

----------------------------

G>> I would also distinguish--and believe that JH does, 
too--illocutionary aim from the rationality of the aim. 
When we do things with words, we seek to convey something
for understanding or appreciation. We are not normally in
the mode of *justifying* what we convey, and logically
can’t do so simultaneously with the conveyance of
understanding. 

A>But isn't the central idea of formal pragmatics that we
are always, by a quasi-logical necessity, *committed* to
justifying our linguistic actions with respect to their
truth, rightness, and sincerity, should we be challenged on
any of these counts?

G: Yes, I agree with you. But formal pragmatics is a
metatheory of language; it’s neither a description of
ordinary linguistic practice nor a theory of linguistic
practice (_Theory of Communicative Action_ says little
about formal pragmatics, but a lot about theorizing
linguistic practice). In my comment immediately above, I’m
continuing a differentiation you educed between action
(having an aim) and justification of action---unproblematic
communication vs. problematic communication. The
“quasi-logical necessity” you rightly indicate belongs to
the deep structure of linguistic practices, which provides
a philosophical basis for claiming that reasonability is
implicit to speech. But ordinary speech happens neither in
the hypotheticalized space of idealized speech nor can it
logically bootstrap itself with its ordinary communicative
action. We need, I think, that our theorizing register the
real difference between action and justification of
action---phenomenon and reconstructive analysis of
phenomenon. 

----------------------------

G>> So, the real difference between specific acts and the
scene of activity is indicated in a distinction between
success and aim. 

A>I don't quite follow. Perhaps I am too simplistic, …

G: Obviously not. 

A> …but to me the distinction between success and aim is
that success is what happens when the aim is reached. 

G: So, you, too, might want to insist that Habermas be read
to appreciate this simple difference. 

A> The aim, again, is not any conscious or psychological
goal of the speaker…

G: “again”? Though, obviously, aims may be implicit,
deliberateness is not basically instrumentalist. All
action, Habermas appreciates, has a teleological backdrop
of interests served and projects in process.  We don’t want
non-consciousness about our goals (which might be a
nonsensical notion anyway)---nor, it occurs to me, might we
want to equate aims with goals, since the “telos” of
communication (understanding) is open as to where it goes
(which discussion lists commonly attest!). If you’re going
to (Habermas is going to) theorize aims, then they have to
be in principle specifiable for any particular
communication scene. (By the way, why would you deny that
goals are psychological? Really, only individuals act (just
as, JH attests in “The Development of Normative
Structures,” I think it is---in _CES_---that “only
individuals learn”; social action, social learning is a
discursive construct). 

A> … but [rather, the aim is] the telos inherent in certain
kinds of speech acts as a matter of conceptual necessity
(without the aim, they wouldn't be the kind of acts they
are). I think this should be emphasized - otherwise
Habermas's theory will look hopelessly naive.

G: Aim belongs to speech acts because intentionality
belongs to any action. This kind of point is why Searle,
_Intentionality_, claims that philosophy of language is a
subdiscipline of philosophy of mind. Habermas’ formal
pragmatic inherency of world relations to cognition finds
the “subjective” world relation of any speech act showing
as the intentionality of speech. 

By the way, I doubt that JH anywhere talks/writes about
“the telos inherent in…speech acts.” He writes about
“teleological action” and the “telos of communication.” I
think that it’s uncontroversial that speech acts are
ordinarily part of scenes of communication, such that
meaningful talk about telos belongs to action and
communication, rather than the analytical, componential
speech act. 

----------------------------

A>>> Intuitively, I can inform you of something even if you
do not accept what I say as true. 

G>> Can you? …. 

A>'Inform' is perhaps not the most felicitous example,
[but] ….as long as what I claim is true, I think I can
inform you of the fact….

G: You would use a factual statement (an assertion) to
inform me. But you could use an assertion for another
purpose. 

G>> Or was I just not informed of anything at all? 

A>Which only goes to show that speaker's and hearer's
beliefs and intentions do not determine the kind of speech
act that was made.

G: I agree. But your point earlier was about illocutionary
success/aim (not differentiating the two) independent,
apparently, of my acceptance (which, by the way, could be
read as contrary to your earlier insistence that Habermas
embodies acceptance in success), and I wanted to insist on
the difference between aim and success (tacitly with
respect to Habermas’s distinction between, let’s say,
understanding as construed meaning and understanding as
rational significance). One uses sentences in speech acts
and uses component speech acts in communicative actions.
This “two-tiered”ness is ubiquitous for communicative
action. Using an assertive sentence in a communicative
action of informing me implies a scene of communication
that is more than merely making an assertion validly;
you’re intentionally acting to see that *I* am informed,
not merely asserting that such-and-such. You might assert
that for any number of purposes. 

G>> So, if you assert something for the sake of informing
me, and I do not accept what you say as true, your
illocutionary success (I understand what you're saying) is
not accomplishing your illocutionary aim!

A>This presupposes a non-Habermasian understanding of what
illocutionary success consists in - something, in fact,
that is closer to Searle.

G: I disagree. A “two-tiered” sense of illocutionary aim
implies a distinction that is real, which a pragmatic
distinction between aim and success registers. But the
distinction easily loses its usefulness, relative to the
means-end character of ‘aim’ and the ordinary embeddedness
of actions within scenic aims. Anyway, I’m not
“presuppos[ing] a non-Habermasian understanding,” I
believe. 
----------------------------

A>If I inform you, I tell you something that is true
(that's a tautology). I tell you the road is blocked; you
go that way anyway, because you don't believe me, …but
that's not the same as questioning whether I informed you
in the first place. I did, even if you acted quite
rationally in not believing me.

G: So, it’s unclear what point you wished to make, apart
from begging the question of the difference between action
and reconstructed rationality of that action.

----------------------------

G>> There's a difference between understanding what you say
and believing it. Meaning is not the same as
truth-functionality. …

A>And again, according to Habermas, full illocutionary
success is not achieved when you simply understand what I
said. 

G: I believe that it’s been shown above that JH requires a
distinction in levels of success; you’re not speaking in
accord with (or “according to”) Habermas.” Your implied
distinction between full and non-full success rather
accords with Habermas’ two-tiered aim. 

A> Understanding, too, presupposes an orientation to
validity - a lot is made of this in TCA, as you know.

G: Ultimately, I agree. But the lifeworld surface works
without a *practical* grasp of depth (though depth is
always in principle available reflectively, usually with
further givenness of reconstructive knowledge, i.e.,
educated competence): Given that U presupposes O, it
doesn’t follow that having U is the same as having O. Tacit
is not the same as explicit; competence at the surface
level doesn’t of itself provide the adequate basis for
articulating what’s always already tacit. 

--------------------------------
 

A>>> [I have] sketched three possible senses of 
"illocutionary success": performing a speech act with the
intended illocutionary force,...

G>> Note that illocutionary force is an analytical notion. 
When I talk, I'm not per se performing a speech act; I’m
telling you something. 

A> I don't follow here. Telling me something is the
illocutionary force of the speech act you are performing.

G: Illocutionary force belongs to all three of your senses;
you’re not yet distinguishing anything from your other two
senses. 
 
----------------------------

A>>> ...and [3] getting the hearer to accept the validity
claims raised. 

G>> To do that, you must have a second speech act as the
propositional content of your current one. So here, the
given speech act serves a communicative scene of
justification. 

A>No. You can accept that my utterance is true, normatively
correct, and sincere, even if I never explicitly back up
these validity claims. The *potential* is always there, and
that is essential, but it need not be actualized.

G: But “getting the hearer to accept” is not the same as
the *presumed* acceptability that you’re now indicating.
The presumption of acceptability belongs to any speech act;
you’re not distinguishing a sense of illocutionary success
by indicating this. But you *are* indicating a special kind
of communicative action by intending to “get the hearer to
accept,” which is the kind of scene that Habermas had in
mind with hypotheticalized validity claims. Look at your
own new statement: “You can accept THAT my utterance is
true…” It’s the common argumentative idiom: “It is the case
that…,” which requires that a given statement be the
propositional content of an explicit validity claim. You’re
stipulating a communicative scene beyond the level of a
simple speech act or “sense of illocutionary success.”

----------------------------

G>>Your three possibilities here are: ordinary
communicative action (oriented toward understanding),
instrumental action, and justification. 

A>I disagree. Only the last is a description of success in
communicative action. 

G: I’ll be in Helsinki next week, so we can pursue this
further. No, I’m lying. But I might truly assert that
successfully prior to justifying the assertion. I can
succeed with the communicative action prior to
justification. By lying, I can succeed instrumentally prior
to justification (I was justified in lying for just a
moment because I needed the dramatic example). Possible
success belongs to all communicative action. As Habermas
says, teleological action is a backdrop of all
communicative action.

A>I have to end here - this is getting too long to read.
Still, nice to dig into those Habermas books, it's been a
while.

G: Well, then, I might expect that no one has read this
far. 

Cheers to all,

Gary






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