Subject: Re: [HAB:] success vs. aim; meaning vs. rationality; act vs. scene
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2003 16:24:16 +0300 (EET DST)



Gary,

I try to respond to the most pertinent points.

> A> But for Habermas, illocutionary success consists in
> intersubjective recognition of validity claims (because
> that is what the "illocutionary aim" of a speech act is,
> according to  him). 
> 
> G: I believe that JH has a different view from what you
> represent. In any case, I disagree that illocutionary
> success "consists in" etc. 

It seems to me that Habermas is unambiguously committed to what I
claimed. For example:

"The illocutionary success of a speech act is proportionate to the
intersubjective recognition accorded to the validity claim raised with
it." (Some Further Clarifications, 317).

and 

"This illocutionary aim, as we will refer to it, is two-tiered: the
speech act is first of all supposed to be understood by the speaker and
then - so far as possible - accepted." (315)

> Illocutionary aim can be ideal-typically located in
> particular speech acts, but this is ordinarily derivative
> of communicative aim (scenic aim) which belongs to the
> communicative action which component acts serve.
> Illocutionary success, on the other hand, pertains more to
> specific speech acts than to the scene. 

Why couldn't we, then, speak of 'communicative aim' in the wider context
and 'illocutionary aim' for the aim inherent, according to Habermas, in
each speech act?

> I would also distinguish--and believe that JH does,
> too--illocutionary aim from the rationality of the aim.
> When we do things with words, we seek to convey something
> for understanding or appreciation. We are not normally in
> the mode of *justifying* what we convey, and logically
> can't do so simultaneously with the conveyance of
> understanding. 

But isn't the central idea of formal pragmatics that we are always, by a
quasi-logical necessity, *committed* to justifying our linguistic
actions with respect to their truth, rightness, and sincerity, should we
be challenged on any of these counts?

> So, the real difference between specific acts and the scene
> of activity is indicated in a distinction between success
> and aim. 

I don't quite follow. Perhaps I am too simplistic, but to me the
distinction between success and aim is that success is what happens when
the aim is reached. The aim, again, is not any conscious or
psychological goal of the speaker but the telos inherent in certain
kinds of speech acts as a matter of conceptual necessity (without the
aim, they wouldn't be the kind of acts they are). I think this should be
emphasized - otherwise Habermas's theory will look hopelessly naive.

> A> Intuitively, I can inform you of something even if you
> do not accept what I say as true. 
> 
> G: Can you? Ken MacKendrick a couple of days ago asserted a
> citation as backing for a point he made, but the citation
> didn't exist. Was I informed of anything by his assertion
> until I questioned it? 

'Inform' is perhaps not the most felicitious example, since it involves
truth, but let's stick to it. Ken didn't inform you of anything, because
he made a mistake. But provided I don't (as long as what I claim is true),
I think I can inform you of the fact that the Earth revolves around the Sun
even if you refuse to believe it. Perhaps 'inform' is more of a success
verb than I think, as a non-native speaker, but I'm sure we can find a
suitable replacement to make the same point, in that case.

> Or was I just not informed of
> anything at all? (Presumably, Ken believed that what he
> asserted was true.) 

Which only goes to show that speaker's and hearer's beliefs and
intentions do not determine the kind of speech act that was made.

> So, if you assert something for the sake of informing me,
> and I do not accept what you say as true, your
> illocutionary success (I understand what you're saying) is
> not accomplishing your illocutionary aim!

This presupposes a non-Habermasian understanding of what illocutionary
success consists in - something, in fact, that is closer to Searle.

> A> If you don't believe me and get into trouble, I can
> later say "You have nothing to complain about, you were
> informed".
> 
> G: Someone acting in an official capacity would say that.
> But that presumes that what you say is reliable *because*
> you are participating in a duly authorized scene of fair
> warning or some such. *Normally*, if I get into trouble
> because I didn't believe you, I can indeed complain that I
> had good reason for not regarding your statement as true,
> if not complaining that there was good reason to not regard
> you as reliable, and that you're culpable for that (though,
> before being harmed, I would just let your unreliability go
> uncontested).

If I inform you, I tell you something that is true (that's a tautology).
I tell you the road is blocked; you go that way anyway, because you
don't believe me, and end up losing precious time. It's difficult to 
imagine a context where you could legitimately complain about that 
particular speech act of mine. In contrast, it is relatively easy to
imagine whole contexts where you could complain about my reliability or
some such. Perhaps I made a number of assertions, most of them
completely crazy, during the same encounter where I informed you about
the roadblock, or maybe I'm a known weirdo and smiled in a funny way
when I made the assertion. Well, you can then complain about *these*
things - but that's not the same as questioning whether I informed you
in the first place. I did, even if you acted quite rationally in not
believing me.
 
> In short, speech acts normally participate in scenes of
> communicative action. Success serves an aim; the two are
> not the same. 

I accept all of this, of course.

> A> [For] Habermas .... It is not enough that you come to
> believe what I  said,....
> 
> G: There's a difference between understanding what you say
> and believing it. Meaning is not the same as
> truth-functionality. "I know what you mean, but I haven't
> decided whether or not I believe it. After all, I DO know
> I've never been abducted by extraterrestrials, but I love
> your story!"

And again, according to Habermas, full illocutionary success is not
achieved when you simply understand what I said. Understanding, too,
presupposes an orientation to validity - a lot is made of this in TCA,
as you know.

> However, if I come to believe it, this will be because
> I....
> 
> A> ... recognize the validity claims inherent in my
> utterance.

Yes.
> A> [I have] sketched three possible senses of
> "illocutionary success": performing a speech act with the
> intended illocutionary force, ...
> 
> G: Note that illocutionary force is an analytical notion.
> When I talk, I'm not per se performing a speech act; I'm
> telling you something. 

I don't follow here. Telling me something is the illocutionary force of
the speech act you are performing.

> Analytically, my speaking can be
> classified as a speech act with at least two illocutionary
> components: a performative intent that has a specifiable
> force. But it's not unfair to your first sense to just say
> that there are speech acts. We don't intend illocutionary
> force apart from the performance. 

Still, I don't follow.

> A> ...[2] inducing the corresponding perlocutionary effect
> in the hearer, 
> 
> G: If this is a second possibility, then it's more than
> just any speech act, since all speech acts have a
> perlocutionary component. "Inducing" an effect requires
> that you regard your given speech act as serving a
> communicative intent to get a specific effect. Here the
> speech act is a means within a tactical communicative
> action. 

"Inducing" is the wrong word, I agree. Re-reading Austin, I noted that
he distinguished certain effects on the hearer as part of the
illocutionary act, rather than the perlocutionary. This complicates the
situation here. Even then, though, he includes such acts as convincing
the hearer among the perlocutionary effects; this is surely not
strategic action.
 
> A> ...and [3] getting the hearer accept the validity claims
> raised. 
> 
> G: To do that, you must have a second speech at as the
> propositional content of your current one. So here, the
> given speech act serves a communicative scene of
> justification. 

No. You can accept that my utterance is true, normatively correct,
and sincere, even if I never explicitly back up these validity claims.
The *potential* is always there, and that is essential, but it need not
be actualized.

> Your three possibilities here are: ordinary communicative
> action (oriented toward understanding), instrumental
> action, and justification. 

I disagree. Only the last is a description of success in communicative
action. 

I have to end here - this is getting too long to read. Still, nice to
dig into those Habermas books, it's been a while.

Antti


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