Date: 	Sun, 8 Mar 1998 15:08:11 -0500
Subject: HAB: Performative Contraditions unlimited


>The Performative Contradiction Debate continues...

(Snipped) - On Begging the Question

NB: K's R = the new response.  K and A are simply earlier 
notes.

(K's R) Ok - I understand what you are saying - but it doesn't 
change my point.  I'm not wrong about this I just didn't explain 
the logical flow in enough detail.  Let me restate the matter,
which doesn't change my point.  At some point the statement: 
God produces real effects *needs* to posit the existence of 
God BEFORE the conclusion.  Let us get this straight - The 
purpose of an argument is to lay down a route leading from 
premises to the conclusion, it is clear that one may not use as 
a premise of one's argument the conclusion one is seeking to 
establish (such a manoeuver is the logical equivalent of trying 
to pull oneself up off the ground by tugging on one's own boot 
straps).  The logical fallacy is begging the question (petitio 
principii or petitio)  The problem here is that it violates the 
acceptability requirement of a logical argument (there are
three criteria for the good (informal) logic - relevance, 
sufficiency, and acceptability.  See Ralph Johnson and 
Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense.  At SOME point the 
conclusion, God exists, MUST be used as a premise in order 
to say God produces real effects.  Yes - my little example
didn't go far enough but my point is correct.  In order for 
something to produce an effect that something MUST be 
defined.

(A) No matter how hard I think about it, I can't find in the 
example anything relevant to the discussion about James's 
logic (which is important here because it may reveal 
somebody's, well, extraordinary understanding of logic).

(K's R) So if I say "God (the Personhood - not the human idea - 
the actual Deity) produces real effects" I don't need to have 
the premise "God exists."  So God could resurrect the dead 
without having existed....

>(A) At least some language games have constitutive rules, 
>without which they would not be the games they are. These 
>rules can be extracted from them through hermeneutic 
>reflection and expressed in propositional form.

>(K) You have to assume here that the rules of hermeneutic 
>reflection expressed in propositional form CAN actually yield 
>the criteria for determining the constitutive rules - which
>requires the rules to be true a priori.

(A) I have to assume no such thing. The hermeneutic reflection 
I'm  talking about does not necessarily even have rules. If it 
does, then sure, we can't question them at the same time as 
we use them to discover the constitutive rules of a discourse.

(K's R) EXACTLY!!!!  This is the EXACT problem with 
Habermas's performative contradiction.  There is a parallel 
between hermeneutics and argumentation.  Let me rephrase
what you have said: "An argument (was hermeneutics) does 
not necessarily even have rules.  If it does, then sure, we 
can't question them at the same time as we use them."  
Habermas uses a depth hermeneutic argument (it cannot be 
characterized coherently any other way) to sketch out
the presuppositions of an argument.  He is using an argument 
to prove that arguments have rules (he is using p to conclude 
p).  What he is doing here is using the rules of an argument to 
show that arguments have rules.  Now yes, Habermas thinks 
this is possible - and he understands it as "self-clarification."  
But if what you say is correct here then an argument cannot be 
used to construct itself out of its presuppositions because that 
would logically be begging the question.  In order to prove that 
an argument has rules Habermas *must* do this OUTSIDE of 
an argument - the implications of which I probably don't need 
to spell out.  Can anyone help me out here?  What exactly am 
I missing?

>(K) You have to assume a priori that the distinction 
>between communicative and strategic action here is 
>completely clear cut.  If the two moments are entwined at any 
>point then this falls apart.

(A)  Why would that be? A difference that is not clear-cut is
still a difference.

(K's R) No.  If you cannot distinguish between an apple and an 
orange ahead of time then you
can't use an apple or an orange to prove anything.

>(K) Habermas must assume here that the distinctions 
>between different discourses are valid.  This can only be 
done  in RETROSPECT and not established a priori (as 
Wellmer demonstrates).

(A)  I'm waiting for a quote from Wellmer. Before that, I'm not 
sure what you mean by "a priori". It is an empirical, a 
posteriori fact that different arguments are used in these 
different genres of discourse. Habermas connects these 
distinctions to others, such as those of his action theory. But 
this doesn't make them a priori, in the sense of being before 
all experience (the Kantian sense). 

(K's R) pg. 151-152 of PM indicate the gist.  Wellmer is talking 
about the validity of a moral 'ought.'  He argues that the 
criteria for an 'ought' must be predetermined if (U) is then 
actually going to have anything to say about the rightness of a 
moral norm.  Eg.  is consensus a requirement of truth?  Is that 
all one needs for a statement to be true - consent?  No.  
Consensus on the statement "the earth is flat" has no bearing 
on whether or not the earth is actually flat.  The same
applies to rightness.  (U) is a legal principle - not a moral one. 
 The criteria for what is and what is not moral is not simply 
decided on the basis of consensus...  Now I'm sure I'll get 
charged with advancing too strong a thesis regarding 
impartiality.... but the critique of (U) stands.  (U)
can only test norms - it cannot generate them.  So the 
experience of moral phenomenon is what
determines moral norms - not legislation.

>(K) How does one know that the identification of such 
>presuppositions of argumentation itself isn't a performative 
>contradiction?

(A) Well, which of its own presuppositions it would contradict?
The burden of proof is on the side who accuses the other of
performative contradiction.

(K's R) I've charged Habermas with committing a logical 
fallacy.  If I didn't know better I would say that the charge of a 
performative contradiction is performatively self-contradictory. 

(A) She should care about following these rules exactly to the 
extent that she cares about taking part in the practice they 
enable.

(K's R) ie. She is (morally) commanded to obey these rules to 
the extent that she cares about being rational.

>(K's R) How do you know when argumentation starts and the 
>strategic struggle for recognition ends?

(A) This might be worth another thread, but isn't the whole 
notion of a strategic struggle for recognition self-defeating?

(K's R) You mean like what Habermas is trying to do here?  
Yes - thought is self-defeating.  It defeats itself in a dialectic of 
liberation and emancipation.  Adorno and Horkheimer were 
very sensitive to this.

>(K) What would it take to demonstrate that hermeneutic 
>reflection CANNOT identify these rules?  You *need* to 
specify this in order to proceed empirically.

(A)  Well, it would take an argument that would show that it is a
priori not possible to identify such rules. Don't expect me to
present one, as I don't believe one exists. (Just out of
being pig-headed, I'll make an exception and not answer what
I suppose you're actually trying to ask. You'll have to 
articulate it yourself.)

(K's R) You aren't being pig-headed at all.  I think we both 
know that trying to create an argument out of itself is 
contradictory.  You cannot use reason to prove reason.  You 
just have to assume it is important, valid, or whatever and 
proceed in a contradictory manner.  Reason is a
tool and it won't get anyone anywhere they want to go without 
a sensuous human being using it.
  
>(K).  I don't see it - it is narrowly construed such that, its 
>narrowness, in reality, empties the contents of ethical life (ie. 
>All of those wonderful performative contradictions).

(A)  This is incomprehensible. Discourse is, after all, always 
discourse about something. The fact that as a means of 
solving problems it is not tied to one or any particular content 
doesn't mean it isn't always tied to some particular content. 
What this content is and what happens to it in discourse 
cannot be prescribed in advance, but depends on the 
particular problem. How does a non-coercive discourse
about, say, the rights of refugees "empty the contents of 
ethical life"?

(K's R) Bring it to the (Habermasian) moral level and I will try 
to show you.

>>(K) It is precisely our contradictory identity that we want to 
>hold onto - because these  contradictions make us who we 
>are.  In this sense Kantian noncontradictory 'man' becomes 
>the antithesis of an actual (moral) individual identity.

(A)  I just have to ask: what the hell do you mean by "our 
contradictory identity"? However you understand 
contradiction, it surely implies a relation (between 
propositions, for example). At least, a self-
relation is implied, such as when a proposition is 
self-contradictory.  Earlier you were making more sense, when 
you spoke about contradictions between people, although 
even that is elliptical (ie. I assume you mean that their plans 
or projects or intentions are contradictory).
So what is the ellipsis in "a contradictory man"? The most 
natural reading would be "a man who has contradictory beliefs 
(etc.)". But that's hardly what you mean.

(K's R) No, that is correct.  Human beings hold contradictory 
beliefs, act in contradictory ways, and ground their identities 
in contradictory things, images, expressions etc.  Capitalism 
functions as a coercive force - which forces contradictions 
upon people....

>(K's R) EXACTLY.  MORAL ISSUES ARE LINKED TO OUR 
>IDENTITY INEXPLICABLY.  This is why I think the moral 
>domain in Habermas is a problem.

(A) ("Inextricably", I suppose.)

(K's R) Umm... yeah, sorry.

(A)  All right, moral issues are linked to identity, and identity to 
moral positions. I agree and think that this is a valid insight. 
However, my understanding (and Habermas's)
of the nature of this linkage differs. For example, and this 
should be trivial, we can reach for and come to a mutual 
understanding about a moral issue without thereby becoming 
identical. This isn't so complicated, really. Discourse is a way 
of finding answers.  Habermas claims that we won't find 
answers to questions about identity - who we are, who we 
want to become, who we have been - the same way
we find answers to questions about what is the right thing
to do in a particular situation. This is why I say above that
moral discourse doesn't deal with identity issues, not that 
moral issues are not linked to identity issues, which they are, 
in many ways. I'm even willing to accept that Habermas hasn't 
dealt with this adequately - he has been too busy establishing 
the differences to pay attention to the linkages.

(K's R) Well - then I agree with you - a new thread about moral 
and ethical life should be started.

>(K)  Argumentation is a purified understanding of language 
and reason based upon noncontradictory man.  If the vision of 
noncontradictory man is not a shared vision then there is no 
reason to participate.  Only insofar as one wants to be a clone 
would one want to participate 

(A)  I may be wrong, but it seems to me that you are 
participating in argumentation right now - so whose clone do 
you want to be? ;)

(K's R) Sure sure.  But if I agree with you it will have more to 
do with other factors than just *pure reason.*  I think an 
emphatic understanding of reason is a more plausible - our 
moral values are tied up WITH our reasoning.  The two are 
entwined and cannot be separated without becoming reified.

this is exhausting,
ken




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