Subject: RE: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 15:11:45 -0500


Hi James (is "Gaines" a nickname?),

I now understand better.  By "faith," you do not mean "belief based upon authority," but a "way," "path," or "line of march" (along a mountain ridge).  I will keep this in mind in my comments below:

You wrote:

I find the terms finite particular and infinite universal helpful -- 
and I suppose one could see faith as the belief that these two opposites can be reconciled. If in reality they cannot, wouldn't that be despair? The mention of adolescent terrors (neutralised (?) by "or adult") seems to *reduce* this problem to a psychological one, but it is ontological. That's why I am not fazed by the invoking of psychological theories of "individuation". I prefer a pre-Cartesian approach, as I do in the case of Kohlberg, whose Habermas-endorsed theory is just a psychologisation of the Whig interpretation of history. But of course our being takes place in history, and in a social milieu: *some* "children learning to become individuals really have to balance [if they are lucky] between these 'abysses of despair' ". (How about dementia *precox*; cf. R.D. Laing's interpretation).

I reply:

1.  You seem here to reject the notion of faith as a way or a path, because you call it "the belief" that the "finite particular" and the "infinite universal" can be reconciled.  By calling this belief "faith," are you saying that one can hold it only on the authority of another, that it cannot be the conclusion to an argument?

2.  I am much less comfortable than you seem to be with the notion that there is a clear and distict (Cartesian) distinction between psychological and ontological problems.  It is not that I want to conflate psychology, or any of the social or behavioral sciences, and philosophy.  It is, rather, that I think that the positions one takes in one of these realms is not independent (philosophically or scientifically) for the positions one takes in another.  For example, a commitment to radical behaviorism in psychology implies epistemological, ontological, and ethical assumptions.  You seem to endorse this notion by writing:  "I prefer a pre-Cartesian approach, as I do in the case of Kohlberg, whose Habermas-endorsed theory is just a psychologisation of the Whig interpretation of history."

3.  Regarding Kohlberg, do you think all of the elements of his theories are just a "psychologisation of the Whig interpretation of history."  For example, he makes extensive use of Piaget's understanding of cognitive development as involving both "assimilation" and "accommodation."  I find this to be heuristically very useful -- it raises fruitful questions and supplies clues to the answers.  Am I thereby "psychologising Whig history"?

4.  You come back to the image of a narrow path along a mountain ridge when you say that *some* children have to balance between the twin abysses of despair.  I define abysses of despair in quite different terms.  I understand despair to be a total loss of hope.  Just as we can hope for different things, so also our abysses of despair differ as widely as do the things for which we hope.  For me, neither "finite particular" and "infinite universal" do not refer to anything for which I hope.  Thus it makes little difference to me whether or not I reconcile them.  Perhaps you could elaborate a little on how these terms signify either things or states for which you hope.

On personification, you write:

I take your point that you were not referring to personalisation as a rhetorical device, but what would be the exact status of race, nation, and state, in critical realist terms? I for one don't know, and it would be a difficult question, but worth taking up.

I reply:

No one of the three is a "person," and thus should not be assigned attributes of persons, such as intentions, thoughts, or feelings.  Of the three, "race" is clearly not a collectivity, and thus cannot act, even though representatives and agents.  Either "nation" or "state" can be defined as a collectivity that can act through agents and representatives, but can also be defined more abstractly.  I would contend that it is only when they are defined as collectivities can nations and states be considered to be actors on the "stage" of history.

There is much more to say about these three terms, but even if I were to keep writing about them until I had no more to say, I doubt that all these words would give us the "exact status" of race, nation, and state."   Let me explain why using "race."

"Race" is a social fact, rather than a brute fact.  It does not refer to biologically given essences, but to socially constructed types (taking "type" as a multidimensional category).  The racial terms we use to designate these different types are symbols, with associated meanings, values, and norms ("meanings" for short).  The meanings of racial terms are unstable over time, and spatially decentered.  They are always undergoing change, more or less rapid, through social interactions (not just conflicts).  (I am indebted to Omi and Winant's "Racial Constructions," but have changed some of what they have to say about the matter.)

Now, have I put this in "critical realist" terms?  Since I believe myself to be a critical realist, I would say yes.  But the terms are not particularly "Bhaskerian."  I came to Bhaskar late, after my self-definition as a critical realist had been shaped by such philosophers as Lonergana, Polanyi, and Whitehead.  

Best regards,

Dick 


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