Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:53:50 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: body-cosmic and body-actual


Hi Jamie

My question about quantum mechanics was ironical. Of course it connects 
with the real world, and so does DCR.

I'm intrigued to learn that maths is not abstract. Could that mean that 
DCR and meta-Reality aren't either, providing those connections are 
made...?

Mervyn

jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>boring? no. important yes - how meta-theory connects itself is part of what
>meta-theory is empricially oriented work and meta-theory are not sisters
>they are strands in a coding or DNA of ontology - mathematics is not
>abstract Mervyn - one of the great challenges of matghematics philosophy of
>the 20th century was hopw to produce an abstract of mathematics - proofs of
>mathematical pricnip,es and operations (mathemtical principles are neither
>self-evident nor self-substantiating) - Frege, Godel and a host of others
>tried to produce abstract proofs of mathematics and al highlighted the
>limits of the method by which they did so - how tos ubstantiate a
>mathematical theorem remains a problem of meta-theory for maths.
>
>the meta-tgheory of quantum mechanics does connect with the real world
>quantum mechanics is the most successful predictive theory known to
>science - no sub-molecular process has ever contradicted it - at the same
>time it is limited since it does not unify gravity em and the strong and
>weak nuclear forces - hence the competing string theory account
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 12:31 PM
>Subject: Re: BHA: Re: body-cosmic and body-actual
>
>
>> Hi Jamie
>>
>> >My concern is that most of the argument is conducte din an abstract
>fashion
>> >that fails to substantiate itself
>>
>> I think this is getting to be a pretty boring refrain in CR (it's a
>> putdown of meta-theory, which leads us back to what started this
>> thread...). What would 'substantiating itself' look like for you? Do you
>> say of an abstract mathematical theory that it fails to substantiate
>> itself? Or that there's a problem about it's being abstract? Of course
>> CR philosophy needs to go hand in hand with empirically oriented work,
>> and that needs to be linked with emancipatory movements, but that is
>> precisely what DCR both calls for and seeks to promote and is promoting.
>> What's the problem?
>>
>> >you'll note that there are a number
>> >of analytical ambiguities in the problem as CR poses it.
>>
>> I haven't found what you've had to say about these alleged ambiguities
>> very clear, also I've sought to provide some answers, so perhaps they
>> can't be taken as read. Perhaps part of the problem is that you're
>> applying the logic of stasis to dialectical arguments about process.
>> (Phil's point about truth as concrete, relating to the whole. Whatever
>> happened to the concrete universal as distinct from the abstract one?)
>>
>> >A CR that cannot address context dilemmas and doesnot connect to real
>social
>> >conditions is not concernd with the real world
>>
>> Which CR is that?!? Does the meta-theory informing quantum physics
>> connect with the real world?
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >Hi Phil, there is nothing Rortian in asking what do critical realists
>mean
>> >by 'a condition of' nor is there anything Rortian in suggesting that
>> >decisions are part of ethics - the question really should be reversed -
>what
>> >is it about the human that generates Andrew's comitment to the good of
>being
>> >and how does this good of being become ethical conduct in real situations
>in
>> >real societies - this is a realist concern not a postmodern
>supericiality.
>> >My concern is that most of the argument is conducte din an abstract
>fashion
>> >that fails to substantiate itself - if you refer back tot he points I put
>> >forward in response to Mervyn's question you'll note that there are a
>number
>> >of analytical ambiguities in the problem as CR poses it.
>> >A CR that cannot address context dilemmas and doesnot connect to real
>social
>> >conditions is not concernd with the real world as anything other than a
>> >possibility that cannot be argued from tarnscendence with quite the level
>of
>> >authoirity as a real;ist arguyment for other aspects of reality. I
>wouldn't
>> >suggest that AC or RB are not cocnerned 'about' the real world but your
>> >brief dichtomisation of the issues would tend to makre it seem so.
>> > I fail to see how universal and objective matter in motion sheds any
>light
>> >on the problem of ethics. Please expand.
>> >
>> >Jamie
>> >
>> >----- Original Message -----
>> >From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
>> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >Sent: Monday, November 10, 2003 3:41 PM
>> >Subject: BHA: body-cosmic and body-actual
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hi Jamie, Hi Ruth,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Then where do you both stand on Andrew Collier's distinction between
>the
>> >> body-cosmic and the body-actual?  (First chapter of his IN DEFENCE OF
>> >> OBJECTIVITY, Routledge, 2003).  It would appear that your positions
>> >> entail the view that only the body-actual exists and that the
>> >> body-cosmic is a redundant piece of metaphysics.  For if the ethics of
>> >> freedom is to be about actual context dilemmas and only about that,
>then
>> >> you seem to be somewhere around the position of Richard Rorty
>> >> (PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE) in which he argues that ethics is
>> >> just about decision-procedures.  This is the hegemonic pragmatist
>> >> conception of ethics.  The view that the body-actual is sufficient to
>> >> uphold realism is a version of what Roy Bhaskar has called the
>> >> anthropomorphic fallacy, in that human social activity is defined by a
>> >> human-centredness that denies a meaningful objective relation to the
>> >> wider independent reality of nature and the universe.  (DPF 394
>passim).
>> >> In the book to celebrate Andrew's life that is shortly to appear I have
>> >> a chapter in which I reinterpret the body-cosmic/body-actual
>distinction
>> >> in a dialectical materialist way.  Materialism creates a more credible
>> >> conception of the body-cosmic and body-actual relation because it has
>an
>> >> ontological starting point in the universality and objectivity of
>matter
>> >> in motion.  On this objective basis, it is possible to establish the
>> >> interconnections between the primacy of a non-human body-cosmic and its
>> >> relation to the specificity and dynamism of the body-actual of human
>> >> society.  (Engels, ANTI-DUHRING, Moscow, 1954, section entitled:
>> >> "Natural Philosophy: Cosmogony, Physics, Chemistry).
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Phil
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
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