Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2003 10:50:16 -0000



The whole of nature is our inorganic body linked by causality and dependence
only presupposes mutual flourishing as its condition:

1) If the inroganic body cannot survive without mutual flourishing
2) If aggressive competition and annhilation of parts is incompatible with
that inorganic body persisting
3) If dependence implies resposnibility to sustain other parts rather than
remove them.

The question then entails whether flourishing humans would still engage in
2) and 3) - AC's arguemnt that the good of being is a hierarchy and that
people take precendence over trees allows this - a dialectic of universal
love encodes its own reversals - since no means of addressing on what basis
one meets the challenge of deciion making viz this problem of forms of being
is provided in being and worth the problem at that stage remains open - I
haven't got ACs latest boook yet so I can't comment on how this develops
from there.

I see your point on history and dialectics.

1-3 are not things I necessarily endorse as ethical practices but they are
again assumptions that need to be addressed in the name of supporting the
argument - this is a different bus (you wait a while and several come
together) - the only point I'm making in these exchanges Mervyn is that
there is a lot more to the argument than we seem to be allowing.

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2003 10:19 AM
Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.


> Hi Jamie, Phil,
>
> Thanks for reminding me of Andrew Collier's important article, Phil. If
> the whole of nature is indeed our inorganic body (body-cosmic) and as
> Collier puts it 'the elements of my body cosmic are linked by relations
> of causality and dependence'  then there is a fair presumption that the
> flourishing of the parts are objectively a condition of the flourishing
> of the whole and vice versa which could only be effected by a universal
> ethic of social love and civic responsibility exercised in participatory
> democracy.
>
> I don't feel I fully understand the problems you're raising, Jamie. For
> me, the statement isn't an ethical absolute (could there be such in an
> open world?), it's a summary description of a kind of society towards
> which there is (in your terms) a structurally-actually real tendency in
> history -- Bhaskar's 'tendential directionality', argued for by Marx too
> at a less meta level.
>
> To say that this 'cannot be justified philosophically' is I think to
> take a restricted, non-dialectical view of philosophy (unless
> 'justified' means 'proved' but of course there are only arguments). For
> Bhaskar, as for Hegel and Marx, dialectic just is the process of
> history, and dialectical reasoning the attempt to grasp it in thought.
> This can be attempted at various levels and combinations thereof: 1. the
> level of philosophy (Hegel, Bhaskar); 2. global scientific theory (e.g.
> the materialist conception of history) 3. regional scientific theory of
> a social system; 4. detailed empirical research. 1. informs 2. informs
> 3. informs 4. and vice versa. Of course the philosophical arguments
> aren't everything, but I'd say that they're indispensable, just as are
> the other levels and combinations. Something like Bhaskar's arguments
> informed Marx's thinking at 2. and 3; you can't have a theory without an
> implicit meta-theory. It's no argument against 1. that it doesn't do the
> work of 4. (e.g. that it's 'abstract'), any more than vice versa. It
> must be engaged with largely at its own level. Bhaskar's arguments
> depart basically from 1) our common human nature grounded in biology and
> in our material transactions with nature (not our 'ideal human universal
> essence' as Nick and Alan put it, but our real one) 2) the nature of
> human intentionality (arguments from action and the judgement form) and
> 3) generative separation issuing in the fact of generalized
> master-slave-type relations. What is wrong with them, in detail? By all
> means drive a bus through them, I'm waiting at the stop, but alas no bus
> in sight.
>
> >Alternatively if
> >you want to argue that it is part of a deep reality in terms of human
> >possibility
>
> I don't understand why you say this is alternative to the above.
>
> >one wouldhave to specify the kind of mode of existence to which
> >it pertains
>
> This is actually done in DPF and PE in terms of general principles and
> commented on in my 'Charging at red flags? Blind spots in Geoff
> Hodgson's "Promised Land"'
>
> >but of course the argument itself does not specify the form of
> >society which it completes -
>
> This seems to me plainly untrue of Marx, and I would argue is also
> untrue of DPF which is informed by a theory of capitalism as well as of
> class society as such. Of course more work is needed at 3. Kathryn
> Dean's book, informed by DCR, is an excellent start and could promote
> improvements at 1.
>
> >What do dialectical ethics of freedom look like in actual
> >context dilemmas - how do they move us forward, how do they connect to my
> >freedom as related to yours? Is anyone other than Hugh Lacey (or in
another
> >way Andrew Sayer) working on this?
>
> Why ask me? I believe you've read some Lacey. It basically underlabours
> for the social movements, critiqueing, clarifying and philosophically
> justifying leading assumptions and respecting the unity of theory and
> practice in practice... The movement decides re dilemmas (who else?) and
> if CR helps to sharpen up the thinking so much the better. I expect this
> kind of work to proliferate. It's precisely what DPF both facilitates
> and calls for. I understand Radha is involved. Heikki too, is he not, in
> some of his work? Neil Hockey in Australia is bringing DCR to bear on
> the Aboriginal struggle. Roy himself is involved in promoting
> self-change and at the level of the World Social Forum...
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
>
>
> ideal human universal essence (Nick and Alan)
>
> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> >That's right but why do we call it a condition rather than a desire? Is
it
> >an ethical absolute to say that I cannot be truly free whatever I believe
so
> >long as another is unfree no matter what the relation/knowledge./distance
of
> >the twain? Eudamonia is a good but what interests me about the argument
is
> >how to specify it and its limits as a form of argument. One might argue
that
> >a human conatus of this kind cannot be justified philosophically it must
be
> >identified as structurally-actually real rather than
> >dispositionally-structurally possible (since this requires no proof other
> >than introspection) - is it historical, cultural, genetic, socially
> >imperative, a sense in which we are truly human together. Alternatively
if
> >you want to argue that it is part of a deep reality in terms of human
> >possibility one wouldhave to specify the kind of mode of existence to
which
> >it pertains and which it completes - it then becoems a condition of this
> >form of being which I think is where this is going and of course the DCR
> >argument - but of course the argument itself does not specify the form of
> >society which it completes - which DCR shares  as an incompleteness
perhaps
> >even contradiction int he discursive form by whicht he justification is
> >deployed - with Marxism. This seems to me a dilemma, one that somneone
might
> >drive a metaphorical bus through in terms of counterargument on the basis
of
> >logic. This in turn begs a better defence or fuller articulation that
moves
> >beyond the generalsied grounds of Being and Worth or DPF (but doens't
> >jettison them). What do dialectical ethics of freedom look like in actual
> >context dilemmas - how do they move us forward, how do they connect to my
> >freedom as related to yours? Is anyone other than Hugh Lacey (or in
another
> >way Andrew Sayer) working on this?
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> >Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 6:26 PM
> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
> >
> >
> >> Well, no, I think Bhaskar is arguing in the second half of DPF, and I
> >> agree, that the pulse of (conatus towards) freedom necessarily obtains
> >> at the level of the real, given human nature and intentionality and
> >> generative separation. Of course, like any other tendency it might be
> >> offset, set back, muffled, unactualized etc, but it will still be
there,
> >> beating on.  Mervyn
> >>
> >> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> >> >I don't dispute this reading Mervyn I'm simply noting that this
doesn't
> >make
> >> >it a condition as an ontological imperatiive built into social
reality -
> >the
> >> >human - it makes it somethign far more loose a desirable rather than
> >> >necessary aspect. It is grounded ins ome aspect of ebing human but
this
> >> >doesnn't make freedom a function of (all) others as a deep ontological
> >> >condition. This seems to me a semantic slide in what philosophy
> >justifies -
> >> >and no I'm not endosring a fact-value division or humean guilotine by
> >> >default in thinking that.
> >> >
> >> >jamie
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >----- Original Message -----
> >> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> >> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> >> >Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 9:04 AM
> >> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> Hi Jamie,
> >> >>
> >> >> Seems to me you're taking the free development slogan in a Humean,
> >> >> abstractly universalist way whereas for both Marx and Bhaskar (in
DPF,
> >> >> not just MR) it's in the mode of dialectical universality whose
pulse
> >of
> >> >> freedom moves as a real geo-historical tendency, given generative
> >> >> separation and generalized master-slave-type relations, from the
> >> >> concretely singular towards the concretely universal. A constant
> >> >> conjunction between my flourishing and that of others is not being
> >> >> asserted; any exception to it does not negate the real tendency nor
> >> >> gainsay real progess made towards its actualization, though there is
a
> >> >> sense in which my freedom is not *fully* complete until that of
> >everyone
> >> >> else is known to be (a not in principle impossible condition in an
> >> >> interconnected world).
> >> >>
> >> >> I'm aware that Bhaskar has spoken of himself as working 'from within
> >the
> >> >> analytic tradition'. However, the contrast in the context (entry on
> >> >> ontology in Outhwaite ed. the Dictionary of Modern Social Theory) is
> >> >> with Heidegger and continental philosophy; he's also spoken of all
his
> >> >> early work as 'implicitly dialectical'; and note the 'from' (he
doesn't
> >> >> just say 'within')--'from within' it to a dialectical account, I
would
> >> >> suggest, and this is what is going on in SRHE I think: he explicitly
> >> >> raises the dialectical flag on a number of occasions eg 156 'we need
to
> >> >> be able to think the simultaneity of distinctions and connections'.
> >> >>
> >> >> As for cultural relativism, the short answer is that I reject it.
> >> >> Dialectical universalizability is premised precisely on
non-acceptance
> >> >> of cultural or historico-specific reductionism. The arguments for it
> >> >> take their departure from human intentionality as such, and it
> >> >> recognizes other universal human powers and needs; in virtue of our
> >> >> common biology and our practical, embodied encounter across history
and
> >> >> cultures with the same laws of nature, all people have in common
basic
> >> >> potentials (powers), liabilities and needs (hence rights), including
> >the
> >> >> need  for autonomy and free flourishing, however these get
culturally
> >> >> construed and mediated in myriad ways. That they are necessarily
> >> >> culturally mediated in no way entails that they are not real or only
> >> >> empty abstractions. If this is so, an infinite regress of radical
> >> >> relativism doesn't apply and there's nothing that dialogue informed
by
> >> >> explanatory critique can't in principle resolve. This is not to deny
> >> >> that there are in the world examples of your kind of regress, e.g.
> >women
> >> >> who wear the veil in some Muslim societies experience the veil of
the
> >> >> commodity-form worn by many women in the west as their own
unfreedom,
> >> >> and vice versa. The logic of universalizability would tend to
dispense
> >> >> with both practices as manifestations of oppressive social forms in
> >> >> favour of dress (or non-dress -- the Naked Rambler wouldn't raise an
> >> >> eyebrow)  that expressed our own rich individuality.
> >> >>
> >> >> Mervyn
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> >> >> >The point of the question is the conceptual ambiguity of condition
as
> >> >> >necessity in the theoretical system allowing analytical problems to
> >> >arise -
> >> >> >modalities of (un)known, (non)caused extensions to the notion of
> >> >condition
> >> >> >implying that if it is necessary then freedom may be impossible and
if
> >it
> >> >> >isn't necessary what is its status as ontology:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >a) the possibility that one can never be free because there is
always
> >the
> >> >> >known possibility that there is an unknown entity that is not free
> >> >> >somewhere. This may sound silly but since the original argument for
> >> >ethical
> >> >> >imperatives is made in SRHE in the form of analytical philosophy
and
> >> >> >conditional necessities or imperatives - the very form of argument
> >> >entails
> >> >> >its own counterargument in this form. A problem that is extended by
> >the
> >> >MR
> >> >> >thesis. Call it the permamenent psychic turbulence principle of
> >> >incomplete
> >> >> >knowledge of a complete totality of connections.
> >> >> >b) the possibility that one cannot be free because others do not
> >> >recognize
> >> >> >your concept of freedom but experience themselves as free - since
one
> >> >aspect
> >> >> >of the full argument for ethical imperatives and emancipation is
that
> >> >others
> >> >> >must recognise and work on their own oppression  it becomes
possible
> >that
> >> >> >cultural relativism becomes a significant argument - if some aspect
of
> >> >> >culture y is considered oppresive by culture x but not culture y
> >members
> >> >of
> >> >> >culture x cannot be free whilst members of culture y exist - even
if
> >> >members
> >> >> >of culture y think of themselves as free - you would thus have the
> >> >paradox
> >> >> >of x designating y as unfree and thus experiencing their own
unfreedom
> >at
> >> >> >the same time as y experiences themselves as free if they do not
hold
> >as
> >> >a
> >> >> >conditon of their own freedom the ful flourishing of culture x
(which
> >is
> >> >not
> >> >> >free because it feels Y as unfree) Or if Y also is subject tot he
> >> >unfreedom
> >> >> >condition then Y would simultaneously hold themsleves to be free on
> >the
> >> >> >basis of their own beleif int heir own culture but simultaneously
feel
> >> >> >unferee on the basis that X thinks of Y as unfree and is thus
itself
> >> >unfree
> >> >> >on the basis of that beleif - an infinite regress of mutual sense
of a
> >> >> >cultures own freedom but unfreedom on the basis of other
perspectives.
> >> >This
> >> >> >is possible if ethics can vary yet still all entail flourishing at
the
> >> >same
> >> >> >time as knowledge is partial and from some standpoint - includign
the
> >> >ethics
> >> >> >of ethics. It is resolvable by dialogue but niot necessarily so
since
> >its
> >> >> >perpetuation is conceivable
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Jamie
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >----- Original Message -----
> >> >> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> >> >> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> >> >> >Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 11:43 AM
> >> >> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> Hi Jamie,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Interesting questions, but a little disappointing not to have the
> >whiff
> >> >> >> of an answer.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >Is the free flourishing of all really a CONDITION of the free
> >> >flourishing
> >> >> >of
> >> >> >> >each as an ontological imperative to ethical action conditioned
by
> >the
> >> >> >> >nature of reality?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> I'd say so. The arguments for dialectical universalizability in
DPF
> >> >flow
> >> >> >> from the nature of human intentionality (action and the judgement
> >> >form).
> >> >> >> I can't see anything wrong with them. They of course assume a
core
> >> >> >> universal human nature and are informed by knowledge of the
> >increasing
> >> >> >> objective interconnection of the species globally.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >1. Is it the condition because another's oppression occurs or
> >because
> >> >> >> >another's oppression is known?
> >> >> >> >2. Is it a condition because another's oppression is caused by
the
> >> >> >society
> >> >> >> >in which another who may feel 'free' lives?
> >> >> >> >3. Are 1 & 2 both important (causation and knowledge)?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> It is a condition regardless of whether oppression occurs, but
given
> >> >> >> that it occurs, there is a conatus to inform ourselves about  and
> >> >> >> abolish it.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >4. If MR is RB's current positiion and there is a fundamental
level
> >of
> >> >> >> >connecitivity does MR imply that:
> >> >> >> >a) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of
> >all
> >> >> >> >sentient creatures joined by the 'cosmic envelope'? Am I free if
> >> >martians
> >> >> >> >are bound?
> >> >> >> >b) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of
> >all
> >> >> >> >matter-energy - sticks and stones and bones and bunnies?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >What is the status of a basic ontological drive towards freedom
> >> >expressed
> >> >> >> >beyond the self?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> This is not just a meta-Reality position. Marx spoke of nature as
> >our
> >> >> >> 'inorganic body' and that is a position endorsed in DPF, and must
I
> >> >> >> think be at the heart of any sustainable sustainability. Because
we
> >> >> >> emerged from and are fundamentally dependent upon and connected
to
> >our
> >> >> >> inorganic body (and indeed, as Shakespeare reminds us, 'this
> >sensible
> >> >> >> warm motion' of all of us eventually 'become[s] a kneaded clod'),
> >the
> >> >> >> subsumption of having and getting, dominating and controlling,
under
> >> >> >> being and doing entails an ethic of world care (I got this from
> >Kathryn
> >> >> >> Dean who got it  from Arendt, I think) and a recognition of the
> >value
> >> >of
> >> >> >> Being and a yearning to see it unfold which is at the heart of
the
> >> >> >> spirituality of the later Bhaskar. If there are Martians then a
> >drive
> >> >to
> >> >> >> free flourishing according to their natures obviously applies
there
> >> >too,
> >> >> >> and unless it interferes with our own flourishing could only be a
> >> >source
> >> >> >> of joy and possibly wonder to us.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Is there a 'beyond the self'? Are we not fundamentally connected,
> >from
> >> >> >> quivering strings to self-consciousness, to Totality?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Mervyn
> >> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>
>
>
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>



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