Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2003 10:19:29 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.


Hi Jamie, Phil,

Thanks for reminding me of Andrew Collier's important article, Phil. If 
the whole of nature is indeed our inorganic body (body-cosmic) and as 
Collier puts it 'the elements of my body cosmic are linked by relations 
of causality and dependence'  then there is a fair presumption that the 
flourishing of the parts are objectively a condition of the flourishing 
of the whole and vice versa which could only be effected by a universal 
ethic of social love and civic responsibility exercised in participatory 
democracy.

I don't feel I fully understand the problems you're raising, Jamie. For 
me, the statement isn't an ethical absolute (could there be such in an 
open world?), it's a summary description of a kind of society towards 
which there is (in your terms) a structurally-actually real tendency in 
history -- Bhaskar's 'tendential directionality', argued for by Marx too 
at a less meta level.

To say that this 'cannot be justified philosophically' is I think to 
take a restricted, non-dialectical view of philosophy (unless 
'justified' means 'proved' but of course there are only arguments). For 
Bhaskar, as for Hegel and Marx, dialectic just is the process of 
history, and dialectical reasoning the attempt to grasp it in thought. 
This can be attempted at various levels and combinations thereof: 1. the 
level of philosophy (Hegel, Bhaskar); 2. global scientific theory (e.g. 
the materialist conception of history) 3. regional scientific theory of 
a social system; 4. detailed empirical research. 1. informs 2. informs 
3. informs 4. and vice versa. Of course the philosophical arguments 
aren't everything, but I'd say that they're indispensable, just as are 
the other levels and combinations. Something like Bhaskar's arguments 
informed Marx's thinking at 2. and 3; you can't have a theory without an 
implicit meta-theory. It's no argument against 1. that it doesn't do the 
work of 4. (e.g. that it's 'abstract'), any more than vice versa. It 
must be engaged with largely at its own level. Bhaskar's arguments 
depart basically from 1) our common human nature grounded in biology and 
in our material transactions with nature (not our 'ideal human universal 
essence' as Nick and Alan put it, but our real one) 2) the nature of 
human intentionality (arguments from action and the judgement form) and 
3) generative separation issuing in the fact of generalized 
master-slave-type relations. What is wrong with them, in detail? By all 
means drive a bus through them, I'm waiting at the stop, but alas no bus 
in sight.

>Alternatively if
>you want to argue that it is part of a deep reality in terms of human
>possibility

I don't understand why you say this is alternative to the above.

>one wouldhave to specify the kind of mode of existence to which
>it pertains

This is actually done in DPF and PE in terms of general principles and 
commented on in my 'Charging at red flags? Blind spots in Geoff 
Hodgson's "Promised Land"'

>but of course the argument itself does not specify the form of
>society which it completes -

This seems to me plainly untrue of Marx, and I would argue is also 
untrue of DPF which is informed by a theory of capitalism as well as of 
class society as such. Of course more work is needed at 3. Kathryn 
Dean's book, informed by DCR, is an excellent start and could promote 
improvements at 1.

>What do dialectical ethics of freedom look like in actual
>context dilemmas - how do they move us forward, how do they connect to my
>freedom as related to yours? Is anyone other than Hugh Lacey (or in another
>way Andrew Sayer) working on this?

Why ask me? I believe you've read some Lacey. It basically underlabours 
for the social movements, critiqueing, clarifying and philosophically 
justifying leading assumptions and respecting the unity of theory and 
practice in practice... The movement decides re dilemmas (who else?) and 
if CR helps to sharpen up the thinking so much the better. I expect this 
kind of work to proliferate. It's precisely what DPF both facilitates 
and calls for. I understand Radha is involved. Heikki too, is he not, in 
some of his work? Neil Hockey in Australia is bringing DCR to bear on 
the Aboriginal struggle. Roy himself is involved in promoting 
self-change and at the level of the World Social Forum...

Mervyn





ideal human universal essence (Nick and Alan)

jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>That's right but why do we call it a condition rather than a desire? Is it
>an ethical absolute to say that I cannot be truly free whatever I believe so
>long as another is unfree no matter what the relation/knowledge./distance of
>the twain? Eudamonia is a good but what interests me about the argument is
>how to specify it and its limits as a form of argument. One might argue that
>a human conatus of this kind cannot be justified philosophically it must be
>identified as structurally-actually real rather than
>dispositionally-structurally possible (since this requires no proof other
>than introspection) - is it historical, cultural, genetic, socially
>imperative, a sense in which we are truly human together. Alternatively if
>you want to argue that it is part of a deep reality in terms of human
>possibility one wouldhave to specify the kind of mode of existence to which
>it pertains and which it completes - it then becoems a condition of this
>form of being which I think is where this is going and of course the DCR
>argument - but of course the argument itself does not specify the form of
>society which it completes - which DCR shares  as an incompleteness perhaps
>even contradiction int he discursive form by whicht he justification is
>deployed - with Marxism. This seems to me a dilemma, one that somneone might
>drive a metaphorical bus through in terms of counterargument on the basis of
>logic. This in turn begs a better defence or fuller articulation that moves
>beyond the generalsied grounds of Being and Worth or DPF (but doens't
>jettison them). What do dialectical ethics of freedom look like in actual
>context dilemmas - how do they move us forward, how do they connect to my
>freedom as related to yours? Is anyone other than Hugh Lacey (or in another
>way Andrew Sayer) working on this?
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 6:26 PM
>Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
>
>
>> Well, no, I think Bhaskar is arguing in the second half of DPF, and I
>> agree, that the pulse of (conatus towards) freedom necessarily obtains
>> at the level of the real, given human nature and intentionality and
>> generative separation. Of course, like any other tendency it might be
>> offset, set back, muffled, unactualized etc, but it will still be there,
>> beating on.  Mervyn
>>
>> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >I don't dispute this reading Mervyn I'm simply noting that this doesn't
>make
>> >it a condition as an ontological imperatiive built into social reality -
>the
>> >human - it makes it somethign far more loose a desirable rather than
>> >necessary aspect. It is grounded ins ome aspect of ebing human but this
>> >doesnn't make freedom a function of (all) others as a deep ontological
>> >condition. This seems to me a semantic slide in what philosophy
>justifies -
>> >and no I'm not endosring a fact-value division or humean guilotine by
>> >default in thinking that.
>> >
>> >jamie
>> >
>> >
>> >----- Original Message -----
>> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 9:04 AM
>> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hi Jamie,
>> >>
>> >> Seems to me you're taking the free development slogan in a Humean,
>> >> abstractly universalist way whereas for both Marx and Bhaskar (in DPF,
>> >> not just MR) it's in the mode of dialectical universality whose pulse
>of
>> >> freedom moves as a real geo-historical tendency, given generative
>> >> separation and generalized master-slave-type relations, from the
>> >> concretely singular towards the concretely universal. A constant
>> >> conjunction between my flourishing and that of others is not being
>> >> asserted; any exception to it does not negate the real tendency nor
>> >> gainsay real progess made towards its actualization, though there is a
>> >> sense in which my freedom is not *fully* complete until that of
>everyone
>> >> else is known to be (a not in principle impossible condition in an
>> >> interconnected world).
>> >>
>> >> I'm aware that Bhaskar has spoken of himself as working 'from within
>the
>> >> analytic tradition'. However, the contrast in the context (entry on
>> >> ontology in Outhwaite ed. the Dictionary of Modern Social Theory) is
>> >> with Heidegger and continental philosophy; he's also spoken of all his
>> >> early work as 'implicitly dialectical'; and note the 'from' (he doesn't
>> >> just say 'within')--'from within' it to a dialectical account, I would
>> >> suggest, and this is what is going on in SRHE I think: he explicitly
>> >> raises the dialectical flag on a number of occasions eg 156 'we need to
>> >> be able to think the simultaneity of distinctions and connections'.
>> >>
>> >> As for cultural relativism, the short answer is that I reject it.
>> >> Dialectical universalizability is premised precisely on non-acceptance
>> >> of cultural or historico-specific reductionism. The arguments for it
>> >> take their departure from human intentionality as such, and it
>> >> recognizes other universal human powers and needs; in virtue of our
>> >> common biology and our practical, embodied encounter across history and
>> >> cultures with the same laws of nature, all people have in common basic
>> >> potentials (powers), liabilities and needs (hence rights), including
>the
>> >> need  for autonomy and free flourishing, however these get culturally
>> >> construed and mediated in myriad ways. That they are necessarily
>> >> culturally mediated in no way entails that they are not real or only
>> >> empty abstractions. If this is so, an infinite regress of radical
>> >> relativism doesn't apply and there's nothing that dialogue informed by
>> >> explanatory critique can't in principle resolve. This is not to deny
>> >> that there are in the world examples of your kind of regress, e.g.
>women
>> >> who wear the veil in some Muslim societies experience the veil of the
>> >> commodity-form worn by many women in the west as their own unfreedom,
>> >> and vice versa. The logic of universalizability would tend to dispense
>> >> with both practices as manifestations of oppressive social forms in
>> >> favour of dress (or non-dress -- the Naked Rambler wouldn't raise an
>> >> eyebrow)  that expressed our own rich individuality.
>> >>
>> >> Mervyn
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >> >The point of the question is the conceptual ambiguity of condition as
>> >> >necessity in the theoretical system allowing analytical problems to
>> >arise -
>> >> >modalities of (un)known, (non)caused extensions to the notion of
>> >condition
>> >> >implying that if it is necessary then freedom may be impossible and if
>it
>> >> >isn't necessary what is its status as ontology:
>> >> >
>> >> >a) the possibility that one can never be free because there is always
>the
>> >> >known possibility that there is an unknown entity that is not free
>> >> >somewhere. This may sound silly but since the original argument for
>> >ethical
>> >> >imperatives is made in SRHE in the form of analytical philosophy and
>> >> >conditional necessities or imperatives - the very form of argument
>> >entails
>> >> >its own counterargument in this form. A problem that is extended by
>the
>> >MR
>> >> >thesis. Call it the permamenent psychic turbulence principle of
>> >incomplete
>> >> >knowledge of a complete totality of connections.
>> >> >b) the possibility that one cannot be free because others do not
>> >recognize
>> >> >your concept of freedom but experience themselves as free - since one
>> >aspect
>> >> >of the full argument for ethical imperatives and emancipation is that
>> >others
>> >> >must recognise and work on their own oppression  it becomes possible
>that
>> >> >cultural relativism becomes a significant argument - if some aspect of
>> >> >culture y is considered oppresive by culture x but not culture y
>members
>> >of
>> >> >culture x cannot be free whilst members of culture y exist - even if
>> >members
>> >> >of culture y think of themselves as free - you would thus have the
>> >paradox
>> >> >of x designating y as unfree and thus experiencing their own unfreedom
>at
>> >> >the same time as y experiences themselves as free if they do not hold
>as
>> >a
>> >> >conditon of their own freedom the ful flourishing of culture x (which
>is
>> >not
>> >> >free because it feels Y as unfree) Or if Y also is subject tot he
>> >unfreedom
>> >> >condition then Y would simultaneously hold themsleves to be free on
>the
>> >> >basis of their own beleif int heir own culture but simultaneously feel
>> >> >unferee on the basis that X thinks of Y as unfree and is thus itself
>> >unfree
>> >> >on the basis of that beleif - an infinite regress of mutual sense of a
>> >> >cultures own freedom but unfreedom on the basis of other perspectives.
>> >This
>> >> >is possible if ethics can vary yet still all entail flourishing at the
>> >same
>> >> >time as knowledge is partial and from some standpoint - includign the
>> >ethics
>> >> >of ethics. It is resolvable by dialogue but niot necessarily so since
>its
>> >> >perpetuation is conceivable
>> >> >
>> >> >Jamie
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >----- Original Message -----
>> >> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >> >Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 11:43 AM
>> >> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >> Hi Jamie,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Interesting questions, but a little disappointing not to have the
>whiff
>> >> >> of an answer.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Is the free flourishing of all really a CONDITION of the free
>> >flourishing
>> >> >of
>> >> >> >each as an ontological imperative to ethical action conditioned by
>the
>> >> >> >nature of reality?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I'd say so. The arguments for dialectical universalizability in DPF
>> >flow
>> >> >> from the nature of human intentionality (action and the judgement
>> >form).
>> >> >> I can't see anything wrong with them. They of course assume a core
>> >> >> universal human nature and are informed by knowledge of the
>increasing
>> >> >> objective interconnection of the species globally.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >1. Is it the condition because another's oppression occurs or
>because
>> >> >> >another's oppression is known?
>> >> >> >2. Is it a condition because another's oppression is caused by the
>> >> >society
>> >> >> >in which another who may feel 'free' lives?
>> >> >> >3. Are 1 & 2 both important (causation and knowledge)?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> It is a condition regardless of whether oppression occurs, but given
>> >> >> that it occurs, there is a conatus to inform ourselves about  and
>> >> >> abolish it.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >4. If MR is RB's current positiion and there is a fundamental level
>of
>> >> >> >connecitivity does MR imply that:
>> >> >> >a) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of
>all
>> >> >> >sentient creatures joined by the 'cosmic envelope'? Am I free if
>> >martians
>> >> >> >are bound?
>> >> >> >b) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of
>all
>> >> >> >matter-energy - sticks and stones and bones and bunnies?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >What is the status of a basic ontological drive towards freedom
>> >expressed
>> >> >> >beyond the self?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This is not just a meta-Reality position. Marx spoke of nature as
>our
>> >> >> 'inorganic body' and that is a position endorsed in DPF, and must I
>> >> >> think be at the heart of any sustainable sustainability. Because we
>> >> >> emerged from and are fundamentally dependent upon and connected to
>our
>> >> >> inorganic body (and indeed, as Shakespeare reminds us, 'this
>sensible
>> >> >> warm motion' of all of us eventually 'become[s] a kneaded clod'),
>the
>> >> >> subsumption of having and getting, dominating and controlling, under
>> >> >> being and doing entails an ethic of world care (I got this from
>Kathryn
>> >> >> Dean who got it  from Arendt, I think) and a recognition of the
>value
>> >of
>> >> >> Being and a yearning to see it unfold which is at the heart of the
>> >> >> spirituality of the later Bhaskar. If there are Martians then a
>drive
>> >to
>> >> >> free flourishing according to their natures obviously applies there
>> >too,
>> >> >> and unless it interferes with our own flourishing could only be a
>> >source
>> >> >> of joy and possibly wonder to us.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Is there a 'beyond the self'? Are we not fundamentally connected,
>from
>> >> >> quivering strings to self-consciousness, to Totality?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Mervyn
>> >> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>
>
>
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