Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2003 18:26:27 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.


Well, no, I think Bhaskar is arguing in the second half of DPF, and I 
agree, that the pulse of (conatus towards) freedom necessarily obtains 
at the level of the real, given human nature and intentionality and 
generative separation. Of course, like any other tendency it might be 
offset, set back, muffled, unactualized etc, but it will still be there, 
beating on.  Mervyn

jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>I don't dispute this reading Mervyn I'm simply noting that this doesn't make
>it a condition as an ontological imperatiive built into social reality - the
>human - it makes it somethign far more loose a desirable rather than
>necessary aspect. It is grounded ins ome aspect of ebing human but this
>doesnn't make freedom a function of (all) others as a deep ontological
>condition. This seems to me a semantic slide in what philosophy justifies -
>and no I'm not endosring a fact-value division or humean guilotine by
>default in thinking that.
>
>jamie
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 9:04 AM
>Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
>
>
>> Hi Jamie,
>>
>> Seems to me you're taking the free development slogan in a Humean,
>> abstractly universalist way whereas for both Marx and Bhaskar (in DPF,
>> not just MR) it's in the mode of dialectical universality whose pulse of
>> freedom moves as a real geo-historical tendency, given generative
>> separation and generalized master-slave-type relations, from the
>> concretely singular towards the concretely universal. A constant
>> conjunction between my flourishing and that of others is not being
>> asserted; any exception to it does not negate the real tendency nor
>> gainsay real progess made towards its actualization, though there is a
>> sense in which my freedom is not *fully* complete until that of everyone
>> else is known to be (a not in principle impossible condition in an
>> interconnected world).
>>
>> I'm aware that Bhaskar has spoken of himself as working 'from within the
>> analytic tradition'. However, the contrast in the context (entry on
>> ontology in Outhwaite ed. the Dictionary of Modern Social Theory) is
>> with Heidegger and continental philosophy; he's also spoken of all his
>> early work as 'implicitly dialectical'; and note the 'from' (he doesn't
>> just say 'within')--'from within' it to a dialectical account, I would
>> suggest, and this is what is going on in SRHE I think: he explicitly
>> raises the dialectical flag on a number of occasions eg 156 'we need to
>> be able to think the simultaneity of distinctions and connections'.
>>
>> As for cultural relativism, the short answer is that I reject it.
>> Dialectical universalizability is premised precisely on non-acceptance
>> of cultural or historico-specific reductionism. The arguments for it
>> take their departure from human intentionality as such, and it
>> recognizes other universal human powers and needs; in virtue of our
>> common biology and our practical, embodied encounter across history and
>> cultures with the same laws of nature, all people have in common basic
>> potentials (powers), liabilities and needs (hence rights), including the
>> need  for autonomy and free flourishing, however these get culturally
>> construed and mediated in myriad ways. That they are necessarily
>> culturally mediated in no way entails that they are not real or only
>> empty abstractions. If this is so, an infinite regress of radical
>> relativism doesn't apply and there's nothing that dialogue informed by
>> explanatory critique can't in principle resolve. This is not to deny
>> that there are in the world examples of your kind of regress, e.g. women
>> who wear the veil in some Muslim societies experience the veil of the
>> commodity-form worn by many women in the west as their own unfreedom,
>> and vice versa. The logic of universalizability would tend to dispense
>> with both practices as manifestations of oppressive social forms in
>> favour of dress (or non-dress -- the Naked Rambler wouldn't raise an
>> eyebrow)  that expressed our own rich individuality.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >The point of the question is the conceptual ambiguity of condition as
>> >necessity in the theoretical system allowing analytical problems to
>arise -
>> >modalities of (un)known, (non)caused extensions to the notion of
>condition
>> >implying that if it is necessary then freedom may be impossible and if it
>> >isn't necessary what is its status as ontology:
>> >
>> >a) the possibility that one can never be free because there is always the
>> >known possibility that there is an unknown entity that is not free
>> >somewhere. This may sound silly but since the original argument for
>ethical
>> >imperatives is made in SRHE in the form of analytical philosophy and
>> >conditional necessities or imperatives - the very form of argument
>entails
>> >its own counterargument in this form. A problem that is extended by the
>MR
>> >thesis. Call it the permamenent psychic turbulence principle of
>incomplete
>> >knowledge of a complete totality of connections.
>> >b) the possibility that one cannot be free because others do not
>recognize
>> >your concept of freedom but experience themselves as free - since one
>aspect
>> >of the full argument for ethical imperatives and emancipation is that
>others
>> >must recognise and work on their own oppression  it becomes possible that
>> >cultural relativism becomes a significant argument - if some aspect of
>> >culture y is considered oppresive by culture x but not culture y members
>of
>> >culture x cannot be free whilst members of culture y exist - even if
>members
>> >of culture y think of themselves as free - you would thus have the
>paradox
>> >of x designating y as unfree and thus experiencing their own unfreedom at
>> >the same time as y experiences themselves as free if they do not hold as
>a
>> >conditon of their own freedom the ful flourishing of culture x (which is
>not
>> >free because it feels Y as unfree) Or if Y also is subject tot he
>unfreedom
>> >condition then Y would simultaneously hold themsleves to be free on the
>> >basis of their own beleif int heir own culture but simultaneously feel
>> >unferee on the basis that X thinks of Y as unfree and is thus itself
>unfree
>> >on the basis of that beleif - an infinite regress of mutual sense of a
>> >cultures own freedom but unfreedom on the basis of other perspectives.
>This
>> >is possible if ethics can vary yet still all entail flourishing at the
>same
>> >time as knowledge is partial and from some standpoint - includign the
>ethics
>> >of ethics. It is resolvable by dialogue but niot necessarily so since its
>> >perpetuation is conceivable
>> >
>> >Jamie
>> >
>> >
>> >----- Original Message -----
>> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 11:43 AM
>> >Subject: Re: BHA: Flourishing, Aristotle, etc.
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hi Jamie,
>> >>
>> >> Interesting questions, but a little disappointing not to have the whiff
>> >> of an answer.
>> >>
>> >> >Is the free flourishing of all really a CONDITION of the free
>flourishing
>> >of
>> >> >each as an ontological imperative to ethical action conditioned by the
>> >> >nature of reality?
>> >>
>> >> I'd say so. The arguments for dialectical universalizability in DPF
>flow
>> >> from the nature of human intentionality (action and the judgement
>form).
>> >> I can't see anything wrong with them. They of course assume a core
>> >> universal human nature and are informed by knowledge of the increasing
>> >> objective interconnection of the species globally.
>> >>
>> >> >1. Is it the condition because another's oppression occurs or because
>> >> >another's oppression is known?
>> >> >2. Is it a condition because another's oppression is caused by the
>> >society
>> >> >in which another who may feel 'free' lives?
>> >> >3. Are 1 & 2 both important (causation and knowledge)?
>> >>
>> >> It is a condition regardless of whether oppression occurs, but given
>> >> that it occurs, there is a conatus to inform ourselves about  and
>> >> abolish it.
>> >>
>> >> >4. If MR is RB's current positiion and there is a fundamental level of
>> >> >connecitivity does MR imply that:
>> >> >a) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of all
>> >> >sentient creatures joined by the 'cosmic envelope'? Am I free if
>martians
>> >> >are bound?
>> >> >b) my free flourishing is conditioned on the free flourishing of all
>> >> >matter-energy - sticks and stones and bones and bunnies?
>> >> >
>> >> >What is the status of a basic ontological drive towards freedom
>expressed
>> >> >beyond the self?
>> >>
>> >> This is not just a meta-Reality position. Marx spoke of nature as our
>> >> 'inorganic body' and that is a position endorsed in DPF, and must I
>> >> think be at the heart of any sustainable sustainability. Because we
>> >> emerged from and are fundamentally dependent upon and connected to our
>> >> inorganic body (and indeed, as Shakespeare reminds us, 'this sensible
>> >> warm motion' of all of us eventually 'become[s] a kneaded clod'), the
>> >> subsumption of having and getting, dominating and controlling, under
>> >> being and doing entails an ethic of world care (I got this from Kathryn
>> >> Dean who got it  from Arendt, I think) and a recognition of the value
>of
>> >> Being and a yearning to see it unfold which is at the heart of the
>> >> spirituality of the later Bhaskar. If there are Martians then a drive
>to
>> >> free flourishing according to their natures obviously applies there
>too,
>> >> and unless it interferes with our own flourishing could only be a
>source
>> >> of joy and possibly wonder to us.
>> >>
>> >> Is there a 'beyond the self'? Are we not fundamentally connected, from
>> >> quivering strings to self-consciousness, to Totality?
>> >>
>> >> Mervyn
>> >>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
>
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