Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2003 12:49:16 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,


Ruth/all

Perhaps after reading through this and the subsequent half a dozen 
emails you can clarify how your position can be thought of as a 
'realism'.  I would rather that we kept the clarification specific to 
the discussion around scientific realism as the slippage into discussing 
whether 'capitalist social relations are a truth' is not particularly 
interesting,  (it reminds me of the Deleuze statement on heidegger 'Is 
he a bit of a Nazi (obviously, obviously)').

I originally quoted Putnam rather than my usual sources because I have a 
sense that this list is happier using anglo-american philosophical 
sources than my more usual continental ones - this was used as an 
attempt to arrive at a common understanding of 'scienctific realism', 
that is a common understanding of the claim usually made by scientists 
that 'science is a realism' - given that you have attempted to drive a 
stake through the heart of this I would personally like to understand 
how you would define this. It is not clear to me how the below four 
points can be asserted as being a defence of the statement that 'science 
is a realism', rather they are vague enough to enable a  non-realist to 
be quite content to accept the general arguments, is this intended.

Note the emphasis on scientists - a scientist, at least one descended 
from the original agreement/bargin that Max Planck and his descendents 
agreed with the political establishment(s) that allowed science to be an 
active participant in the regulation of the social - such a scientist 
would insist on the necessity of the truth of point 1. Without this the 
following three points are meaningless explanatory sub-categories. Is 
then the definition of 'scientific realism' you are proposing acceptable 
to a Planckian scientist ?

regards
steve

Groff, Ruth wrote:

>Hey guys,
>
>Thanks to people who responded to my test message.  It seems that I am able to post again.
>
>I am way behind in everything, and so can't respond to the current thread in the way that I'd like to at all.  But I wanted to say that the mainstream move of defining ontological realism in terms of a theory about what is meant by the concept of truth and/or in terms of an attendant claim about the truth-value of scientific theory, is a really unhelpful category error.
>
>I like to keep the following issues separate (and for what it's worth it is consistent with a realist position to do so):
>
>1. Ontological realism.  A claim about the independent existence of specified objects ("scientific realism" being a claim about the independent existence of the objects of scientific theories specifically).  
>
>2. The correspondence theory of truth.  One account of what the concept of truth does or must mean.
>
>3. Justification criteria.   Epistemic criteria according to which we judge a theory to be true (*however* we happen to define the term "true").  
>
>4. The epistemic status of scientific theory.  The ascribed truth-value (however we define the concept of "truth" and whatever we point to as justification criteria) of scientific claims.   
>
>r.
>
>
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