Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism, transcdental realism and respose to James
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 02:32:32 -0500


Hi Steve,

Let me say again that I have only dropped in on a conversation and therefore
don't really follow a number of things you have said and may well
misunderstand.

I'll move backwards through your argument because if I understand correctly,
your real concern is with science as a "construct."  I assume "social
construct" is meant here.

1)    There are two possibilities:  (i) you believe that what counts as real
is socially constructed in the sense that the world is what we make it by
how we think of it or agree it should be -- what counts as real is a matter
of philosophical or linguistic or social convention;  alternatively you mean
(ii) that science is a historically situated activity that is socially and
politically determined in what it is, what it does and what it achieves.

If you mean the first, then your position is inconsistent with scientific
realism and we have a disagreement.  We do not make causal structures and
relations (except insofar as we function as causal phenomena ourselves, and
then only to the extent that we do -- we make a dam; we do not make the
force that pulls water over it).

If you mean that the way we understand the world is a product of social,
ideological and political structures, then this is fully consistent with
scientific realism today.  There is nothing in the realist argument that
would bar the proposition that a historically specific mode of production
sets limits to what science can know.   Aristotle, for example, could not
know the equality of social labor produced by exchange because of slavery
and it seems quite likely that there will be no flowering of the social
sciences comparable to what has happened to the natural sciences over the
last three or four hundred years as long as social life is dominated by
capitalist relations of exploitation.

But there are two separate issues here.  Assuming social structures block or
facilitate what may be known, still within those limits investigators may
identify causal structures of nature or society that actually operate and
they may do so accurately enough so that we can learn to accommodate our
conceptual, disciplinary and everyday practices to them.

2)    You argue that any philosophy of science asserts  that what best
explains the empirical success of science is that the relevant theories are
approximately true.

This is not true.  Logical empiricism denied the truth of unobservables.
Forms of instrumentalism are agnostic about truth.  Hermeneutic approaches
look for the most meaningful interpretations, not those that are true, and
so on.

3)    You argue that your own best understanding of science is that "science
aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and acceptance of a
scientific theory is merely that it is empirically adequate."

But as I said in my last post, this just re-asks the question most of us
would like answered:  what is it about empirically adequate theories that
accounts for their success?

4)  Notice that "the realist argument that science must be engaged in
identifying what is 'real' because it works and is approximately true"
sounds more like a pragmatist's argument than a realist one.

The realist argument is abductive:  We have the fact that when we did a, b
and c, result R was produced.  How is this to be best explained?  Well, if
theory T correctly identified how causal process X behaves, according to T
when we do a, b and c, R is produced.  It must be the case, therefore, that
T correctly identified causal process X and how it behaves.  But the
abduction is a result of the global success of science, of course, not this
or that isolated example.

5)    You say that accepting a scientific theory means believing in its
truth.  If you mean believing in the whole truth of it, then this is not
entailed by realism -- the point of the example I gave in my last post
regarding the luminiferous ether was to show that scientists can be quite
skeptical about a whole bunch of the substance of their theories.  A
scientist could believe that she had correctly represented the propagation
of light by a wave equation without believing that the carrier medium was an
elastic solid, even though this idea figured in the way she worked out the
equation.

6)    Finally, your introductory paragraph subtly shifts from the position
that realists think they do accurately represent the way the world is to the
quite different position that realism claims to present a "literally" true
story of what the world is like.  "Literally" is the word that makes your
ideological point but is not essenhtial to realism's argument or even fully
coherent in context.  We know our senses don't exhaust the range of sensible
phenomena.  We're not even sure that extension plus time exhaust the world's
dimensions.  The question is not whether we've given a photo-literal
depiction, but whether allow us to accommodate our practices to the world's
causal structures.

best,

Howard







----- Original Message ----- 
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose to
James


> Hilary Putnam gives a nice formulation of scientific realism which I
> believes derives from Dummett. "A realist (with respect to a given
> discourse or theory) holds that sentences of a theory are true or false.
> And that what makes them true or false is something external - that is
> to say it is not (in general) our sense data, actual or potential, or
> the structure of our minds or our language etc..." This is followed
> later by "...in mature scientific theories typically refer to the
> understanding that the theories accepted are typically accepted in a
> mature science as being approximately true, and that the same term can
> refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories -
> these statements are regarded by a scientific realist as part of an
> adequate scientific description of science and its relations to its
> objects..." I am not proposing these as definitions but they do show
> that the truth must play a defining part of a theory of the basic
> scientific realist position. In addition it should also show that the
> issue of what it is to hold that science is a realism does raise the
> question of what it is to accept that a theory is literally a true
> representation of reality - even when it is plain that it is not and
> that what is being proposed is a theoretical construct that derives it's
> truth from a a given social system. My own basic understanding of
> scientific realism is that: "Science aims to give us, in its theories
> and results a literally true story of what the world is like, as such
> then the acceptance of of a scientific theory involves the belief that
> such a theory is true... " To clarify where a simple and naïve statement
> states that 'science tells a true story' the above statement merely says
> that science intends to do so - and that whilst an individual scientist
> can have individual, ideologically created motives this is not to be
> confused with the aim of science as a whole. The use of the term 'aim'
> does not deny that there are other lessor aims, predictability,
> informativeness explanation etc but that rather the most important
> intention is to supply us with a true explanation of what the world is
> like. Epistemologically speaking the acceptance of a scientific theory
> is to have a belief in its truth. It does not mean then that anyone is
> behaving in a rational fashion in forming such a belief. However I raise
> this because a scientific realist would be unlikely to accept this
> position - i suppose it's possible though.
>
> A realist will propose a theory and begin by asserting it is 'true' but
> an anti-realist would respond to a the theory by accepting that the
> scientific theory is not presented as true, rather a theory is proposed
> which has certain values. These values may not be provable as true, but
> it may have empirical adequacy, it may work. These will need to be
> documented and explained and the boundaries of a given theory
> understood. I would myself argue that science is best understood through
> the understanding that.. Science aims to give us theories that are
> empirically adequate; and acceptance of a scientific theory is merely
> that it is empirically adequate. To clarify this then for a theory to be
> adequate what it says about the entities and events in the world is
> understandable as true. (of course any kind of nonsense can be made to
> fit within the notion of 'true' in relation to science but this is true
> of science in general so it hardly affects the proposal...) To accept a
> theory as an attempt to realistically describe the world does not seem
> to answer my problem with the ideological aspect of scientific realism.
> Indeed your long reply does not address this issue - rather it follows
> the realist argument that science must be engaged in identifying what is
> 'real' because it works and is approximately true - however it should be
> clear that this is not necessary to explain the workings of science,
> rather it accepts the internal understandings of most scientists and
> technologists.
>
> "Scientific Realism asserts that what best explains this success is that
> the theories are approximately true..."  Any philosophy of science
> asserts this and not just realism.
>
> What concerns me is the similarity of position between philosophy of
> science (realism) and the majority of science and technologists and you
> have failed to convince me that you are prepared to address the extent
> that reality is a construct and that science addresses the 'Real'
> through the construct.
>
> Do I need to respond to the rhetorical questions in the paragraph about
> science/technology and the 'exponential success of the sciences of nature'
?
>
> regards
> steve
>
> Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
>
> >Hi Steve,
> >
> >I have not followed this thread so I apologize in advance if I seem to be
> >dropping in on the middle of a conversation without understanding its
> >context.
> >
> >I was interested in your comment about adequacy to the real because it
> >seemed to me that you were assuming that contemporary scientific realism
was
> >of the mimetic kind, sort of like providing photorealistic snapshots of
the
> >real.  I don't think that does justice to how realism is argued today.
> >
> >We agree, I assume, that all science is theory laden.  If that is the
case,
> >then the relationship between the real and our representation of it is
> >mediated.  It doesn't follow however that we can't identify the way the
> >causal structures of the world work with enough approximate accuracy to
be
> >able to accommodate our practices, everyday and scientific, to them.  I
> >mean, my idea that the door won't open unless I push it is theory laden,
and
> >while the details may have become more sophisticated, our idea that we
have
> >a pretty accurate representation of the way the world is as a guide to
> >practice has not been abandoned for literally thousands of years -- we
> >figure the door imposes some kind of resistance that has to be overcome
by
> >pushing rather than by, say, waving, jumping or spinning around three
times.
> >
> >You can't just say empirical adequacy is all that matters.  Literally any
> >kind of speculation masquerading as theory can be made to fit the facts.
> >The number of conformable theories is infinite.  So is your argument that
> >the one we choose from among them doesn't matter -- any kind of
> >interpretation of the forces of nature will get a plane off the ground?
> >Pardon me if I don't follow you into the next down elevator.  Essentially
> >you rely on the pessimistic induction that since mistaken theories from
the
> >past have had empirical success, those we work with now can claim no
better
> >status and are better thought of as inventions of our imagination.  I
speak
> >to the pessimistic induction below.  But if we're going to use induction
at
> >all, then the propositions that we build airplanes any old way we like
and
> >that theory choice doesn't enter in don't strike me as ones that will
show a
> >notable record of success.  Why bother with theories that undergird
> >aereonautical engineering?
> >
> >You make empirical adequacy your criteria of I'm not sure what, but seem
to
> >say this doesn't need to be explained, and, in fact consistent
> >instrumentalism is anti-explanationist.  Truth is redundant -- it can't
be
> >given any kind of Cartesian certainty anyway.  Instead, all that counts
is
> >the disposition of engineering practice to produce empirically adequate
> >results.
> >
> >But this just asks the question we want to answer.  What is it about
> >engineering practice that accounts for the disposition to produce correct
> >results?  One good answer is that the theories which form the background,
> >guide the choices, and shape the design and methodology of engineering
> >practice have been approximately accurate in the causal structures they
have
> >identified.  They have represented them accurately enough to allow us to
> >work with them in ways we expect or understand, and often in novel ways
that
> >would have mystified us if our theories had not rendered those structures
> >intelligible.
> >
> >Or, said a little differently, scientists, such as aereonautical
engineers,
> >use theories to form expectations, to design experiments, to devise
> >instruments, calibrate them, test and assess evidence, and so on.  Some
of
> >the theories chosen tend to lead to correct predictions and experimental
> >success.  How is this to be explained? Scientific realism asserts that
what
> >best explains this success is that the theories are approximately true.
> >
> >After all, what explains the exponential success of the scienes of nature
> >over the last three or four hundred years?  The fact that you and I
> >communicate by computer?   If theories and explanations don't matter, why
> >wasn't there an explosion of instrumental success say in the ancient
> >African, Asian, Arab or Mediterranean worlds?  Something special about
> >Europe maybe?  An alternative explanation is that the development of the
> >modern sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. to maturity meant
> >getting it right enough about the way the world is to make a difference.
It
> >seems to make a difference to what you can accomplish chemically if you
give
> >an account of the molecular structure of antimony trichloride rather than
> >treating it, because it has a soft, malleable consistency, as "antimony
> >butter," the way the alchemists did.
> >
> >But -- so the challenge goes -- empirical successes, while the criteria
of
> >(?) don't tell us anything about the way the world is because so many of
> >those successes were based on theories we now consider profoundly
mistaken.
> >We have to infer that future historians will look back on our own
mistakes
> >as equally bizarre.  We can think of the phlogiston theory of chemistry,
for
> >example, or the caloric theory of heat, or theories of the luminiferous
> >ether, etc.
> >
> >But this paints with too broad a brush.  Take phlogiston.  This theory
> >claimed that the core *causal* property of phlogiston was that it was a
> >substance released in the process of combustion.  Now Priestly, relying
on
> >this understanding, actually produced oxygen -- dephlogisticated air.
> >Arguably Lavoissier never did experimentally do this.  Still you cannot
say
> >that it was Priestly's understanding of the causal properties of
phlogiston
> >that accounted for his empirical success because there were no such
causal
> >properties.  Oxygen is something taken up in combustion, not something
> >released.  Priestly's theory did not refer.  So some abandoned theories,
> >unlike our theory about pushing a door, don't tell us anything about the
way
> >the world is at all.  Nor, for the same reason, do those theories figure
in
> >the historical successes of a science's development.
> >
> >By contrast, though scientists have abandoned 19th century conceptions of
> >the luminiferous ether, there were aspects of what 19th century physcists
> >did -- not the whole of it, but aspects -- which can be understood to
refer
> >to properties of the electromagnetic field and to tell us something about
> >the world.  Scientists conceived of the ether as a medium for carrying
light
> >waves.   They knew quite well they did not understand its physical
> >constitution.  Green, for example, developed a model of the ether as an
> >elastic solid.  He treated this, however, as a model useful because some
of
> >the dynamics of elastic solids corresponded to the way light was
propagated.
> >It was heuristically helpful, not a mimetic representation of the medium
> >that carried light.  As theory advanced to an understanding of the
> >electromagnetic field, it was an understanding of the energy properties
of
> >the ether that was carried forward, not particular models of its internal
> >constitution.  That is, realism does not entail the proposition that
every
> >detail asserted at any point in time by an empirically successful theory
is
> >true, even approximately, of the way the world is.  Aspects of a theory
get
> >abandoned -- and mostly those features that were  not supported by the
> >evidence and that were not in any way generative of the theory's
empirical
> >success.
> >
> >Stathis  Psillos's book, Scientific Realism:  How Science Tracks Truth,
from
> >which many of the arguments above are taken, helps avoid underestimating
the
> >arguments of realism in science as they have developed over the last 40
> >years.
> >
> >
> >Howard
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >---- Original Message ----- 
> >From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> >Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 1:48 PM
> >Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose to
> >James
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>Howard
> >>
> >>Richard Dawkins on a radio programme argued that science was a realism
> >>because 'we' know that an aeroplane will stay up in the sky whilst it's
> >>machinary was functioning correctly. However this is a matter of
> >>engineering practice - at my last count there are five different
> >>scientific theories of why a plane can fly. All five theories are in
> >>contradicition and none can be said to be adequate...  This is actually
> >>a trivial  example (as the planes fly  and are  all quite horrible to be
> >>in)  unless you are arguing that  science is a realism. In which case
> >>there is a flaw in the argument - the naive version of realism argues
> >>that science gives us a true picture of the world, faithful in its
> >>details and that the entities science postulates as existing do really
> >>exist. In other words the advances and discoveries that science makes
> >>actually exist. (The naivity of the statement is to propose or accept
> >>some notion that today's theories are correct and that is not the
> >>intent.)  In reality we can be sure that majority of the entities do not
> >>exist and that the scientific theories inadequately define both the
> >>entities and discoveries. Anyway the naive version has the right basic
> >>feel to it: because it suggest two issues, that scientific realism
> >>characterises a scientific theory as a story about what there really is,
> >>and secondly that science is an enterprise of discovery rather than one
> >>of invention.  As such then to answer your question (assuming it is the
> >>right question) I'd suggest that science should aim to give us a theory
> >>that is empirically adequate, and that the acceptance of a theory as
> >>adequate merely invoves a belief  that it is empirically adequate.
> >>
> >>(sorry that sounds so dreadfully empiricist....)
> >>
> >>Does this answer the question as you pose it and what is your own answer
> >>to your question ?
> >>
> >>regards
> >>sdv
> >>
> >>Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>Hi Steve,
> >>>
> >>>In terms of "adequately represent the 'real'" what would be criteria
for
> >>>adequacy?
> >>>
> >>>Howard
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>----- Original Message ----- 
> >>>From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> >>>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> >>>Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 6:39 AM
> >>>Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose
to
> >>>James
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>James/All
> >>>>I have no desire or even interest in defending Popper from charges
that
> >>>>as a social-democrat he was broadly in favor of liberalism and
> >>>>social-democracy and proposed these ideological positions as
preferable
> >>>>to Western Marxism, Eastern Marxisms and and of course Stalinism.
These
> >>>>are givens consequently as a result your response is missing the
point.
> >>>>I also notice that his argument that Scientists must be more
responsible
> >>>>and accountable for their decisions about what they research is
ignored.
> >>>>What is interesting with Popper is whether his understanding of
> >>>>knowledge, science and the idea of testability gives us a better set
of
> >>>>tools than the dominant understandings of scientific knowledge
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >generation.
> >
> >
> >>>>To get to the more interesting discussion that is possible about
science
> >>>>and knowledge - It is worth noting that in the 1979 book 'The
> >>>>Possibility of Naturalism' Bhaskar spends a great deal of time
> >>>>critiquing Popper but next to no time critiquing Kuhn, who by this
time
> >>>>had arguably become the most important philosopher of science. Why did
> >>>>Bhaskar, in his 'Transcendental Realism' arguments and proposal miss
the
> >>>>important target ? Even by 1979 it was obvious, to the lay person that
> >>>>Kuhn was by far the most most important figure in the philosophy of
> >>>>science and that a realist must address Kuhn's neo-conventionalist
> >>>>approach to knowledge generation. I would argue for instance that
> >>>>Lyotard's classic text The Postmodern Condition could not have been
> >>>>written without the underpinning that Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
> >>>>Revolutions provides. It's not until much later (I think around
1989/90)
> >>>>that Bhaskar lumps together Kuhn and Popper as 'super-idealists' and
> >>>>seems to smooth out all the differences to generate what appears to be
a
> >>>>'target' against which CR can be generated. Perhaps the underlying
> >>>>question that is worrying me is whether a 'scientific realism' and
thus
> >>>>a 'transcendtal realism' is both possible and acceptable given that
> >>>>within the sciences it is clear that scientific knowledge is socially
> >>>>constructed out of competing theories in ways which practically
> >>>>guarantee that the dominant theory will not adequately represent how
> >>>>things work. How then can we justify the argument that 'science is a
> >>>>realism'  (which is how it was originally presented to me) when it can
> >>>>never adequately represent the 'real'.
> >>>>
> >>>>A simple example - the dominant theories of genetics state that each
> >>>>individual human subject has a single DNA structure,  it can be
changed
> >>>>but on the whole it is singular - this is not true nor is it even an
> >>>>adequate phantasy of the complexities of DNA/RNA in 'life'.  To
clarify
> >>>>it is known that human subjects can exist with multiple DNA
structures,
> >>>>the implications of which are multiple but two immediately spring to
the
> >>>>forground: 1) the faith placed in DNA as a means of recognising and
> >>>>managing a single human subject is misplaced and 2) The claims that
DNA
> >>>>has been realistically represented or even understood are false.
> >>>>
> >>>>It does however support Dawkins much abused and misunderstood view
that
> >>>>"living beings are the means for the reproduction of DNA..." (laughs).
> >>>>
> >>>>regards
> >>>>steve
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>James Daly wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>Hi Steve
> >>>>>
> >>>>>"a social-democrat like Popper could hardly be expected to agree with
> >>>>>Marx and Hegel" -- in fact they were prepared to annihilate the
planet
> >>>>>to to defend capitalism and save the world from communism. Perhaps he
> >>>>>should have called for social democrats "to adopt a version of the
> >>>>>Hippocratic Oath to restrain their propensity for harm."
> >>>>>
> >>>>>One example of Popper's dishonest "scholarship" is his misquoting
Marx
> >>>>>on a crucial issue as saying he wished to discover the "laws of
> >>>>>society", whereas Marx said "the laws of modern society", i.e.
> >>>>>capitalism.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>One can be a Cold Warrior without being paid for it, but acquiring
the
> >>>>>status of a Cold War manual certainly helps a book's sales, as it did
> >>>>>Isaiah Berlin's.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>" '... to make science game-like and democratic as possible...' ".
> >>>>>Science is not game like or democratic: games theory is just
bourgeois
> >>>>>ideology; "democracy" is capitalism.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>"Popper's version of science is essentially dialectical...". Popper
> >>>>>was always ferociously anti-dialectical, and his denial of being a
> >>>>>positivist turned mainly on the philosophically minor grounds of
being
> >>>>>a falsificationist instead of a verificationist, though in addition
he
> >>>>>also implausibly said metaphysical statements could become testable
> >>>>>hypotheses.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>"... pitting one hypothesis/theory against another over a disputed
> >>>>>issue. This goes back to Athens, the model being Socrates model of
> >>>>>questioning, constructed in the 18th/19th [this should presumably be
> >>>>>12th/13th] centuries as the 'academic practice of scholarly
> >>>>>disputation' ". This is a frequently repeated but unconvincing
> >>>>>ontogenesis of dialectic, which I think began with Plato's
Parmenidean
> >>>>>and Heraclides inheritance, and his practice of hierarchical
> >>>>>classification.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>All the best
> >>>>>
> >>>>>James
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>----- Original Message ----- 
> >>>>>From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> >>>>>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> >>>>>Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 9:36 AM
> >>>>>Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Re: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other
> >>>>>fun stuff
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>Mervyn
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Within the philosophy of science perhaps the biggest argument of the
> >>>>>>century is between Kuhn notable 'The structure of`scientific
> >>>>>>revolutions' and Popper -  like most  people on the left I also
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>assumed
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>that the below rationale was broadly correct - Fuller has done a
> >>>>>>remarkably good job of throwing this presumption into question.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>I am not concerned to defend Popper regarding the Open Society or
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>Poverty of Historicism, after all a social-democrat like Popper
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>could
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>hardly be expected to agree with Marx and Hegel,  rather the
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>interest I
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>have is in Fuller's attempt to recover the philosophy of 'science'
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>and
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>'knowledge' from the predominance of the relativist Kuhn's paradigm
> >>>>>>shifts, 'where knowledge is adequate to its objects'. The argument
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>goes
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>that Popper '...took seriously both that science aspires to
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>universal
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>knowledge and that scientists - our representatives in this project
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>are
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>inherently flawed and biased agents. The result was to make  science
> >>>>>>game-like and democratic as possible...' But to clarify this
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>Popper's
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>version of science is essentially dialectical pitting one
> >>>>>>hypothesis/theory against another over a disputed issue. This goes
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>back
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>to Athens, the model being Socrates model of questioning,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>constructed in
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>the 18th/19th centuries as the 'academic practice of scholarly
> >>>>>>disputation', from this derives the German dialectical tradition and
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>of
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>course Hegel and Marx.  An example of this dispute in a non-science
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>area
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>is the Popper/Adorno dispute over positivism which when looked at
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>shows
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>perhaps rather typically that they are remarkably similar... both
> >>>>>>anti-positivists, both dialectical thinkers, one a marxist the other
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>social-democratic liberal.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>A single issue it seems to me throws the outright rejection into
> >>>>>>question:  "At the height of the Vietnam War, Karl Popper called for
> >>>>>>scientists to adopt a version of the Hippocratic Oath to restrain
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>their
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>propensity for harm."
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>regards
> >>>>>>sdv
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>I don't know about Kuhn, but anybody of intellectual integrity with
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>a
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>reasonable familiarity with Hegel and Marx who reads The Open
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>Society
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>and its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism could scarcely doubt
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>that
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>Popper was a cold war warrior. He is not only sly, he is dishonest,
> >>>>>>>deliberately suppressing key words and omitting context in quotes
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>to
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>suit his cold warrior distortions and travesties. His
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>characteristic
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>method is to set up a scarecrow and demolish it as if it were the
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>real
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>thing. To spring to his defence on this issue in the current
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>context can
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>only mean to defend the totalitarian commercialism (Collier) that
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>Popper
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>himself promoted and which is now being imposed on the world by all
> >>>>>>>force necessary. (The very skies over London have been emptied for
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>god of totalitarian commercialism to arrive as I type this...)
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>Mervyn
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk writes
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>James
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>The fifties cold warrior labelling of Popper has been challenged
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>in very
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>interesting ways by Steve Fuller just recently in his book Kuhn vs
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>Popper.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>As Fuller points out it is Kuhn who is in the pay of the coldwar
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>warriors...
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>(this is not to disagree or comment on the thrust of the below -
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>merely to
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>spring to the defence of popper...)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>regards
> >>>>>>>>sdv
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Hi Carroll
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Your punchline was strong -- that the purpose of reading Plato's
> >>>>>>>>>Republic was to understand The Enemy.  But, only one? Why is his
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>name
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>on Lenin's tomb?  Your approach calls to mind the Fifties cold
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>warrior
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Sir Karl Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies*, after which
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>George
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Soros named his foundation. Slyly, Sir Karl manages to suggest
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>that
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Plato's target is workers who must be kept in their place,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>whereas his
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>real target (see the Gorgias) is the unscrupulous Nietzschean
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>rich who
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>want to exploit and rule.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>It is nearly always forgotten that the society of Plato's first
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>choice
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>is a communist one, and that the rest of the argument is about a
> >>>>>>>>>second-best society. And even the second-best society is not a
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>class
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>society in Marx's sense, in that the philosopher rulers do not
> >>>>>>>>>appropriate the surplus, but live a frugal life.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>I suppose the jury is out on whether Plato meant by "gennaion
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>pseudos"
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>Big or Noble Lie, or both, but the myth of noble and base metals
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>in the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>soul is an answer to the problem of legitimising the rule of
> >>>>>>>>>reason, and defending it against the power of wealth. Lenin had
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>same problem. It's quite a problem!
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>James
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>--
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>  --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>--- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed --- 
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> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list.
> >>>>>>
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> >>>>>>text/html
> >>>>>>---
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>   --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>   --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>--- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed --- 
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> >>>>---
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> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>    --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>--- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed --- 
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> >>
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> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
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> >
> >
> >
>
>
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