Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose to James
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2003 19:45:21 -0500


Hi Steve,

I have not followed this thread so I apologize in advance if I seem to be
dropping in on the middle of a conversation without understanding its
context.

I was interested in your comment about adequacy to the real because it
seemed to me that you were assuming that contemporary scientific realism was
of the mimetic kind, sort of like providing photorealistic snapshots of the
real.  I don't think that does justice to how realism is argued today.

We agree, I assume, that all science is theory laden.  If that is the case,
then the relationship between the real and our representation of it is
mediated.  It doesn't follow however that we can't identify the way the
causal structures of the world work with enough approximate accuracy to be
able to accommodate our practices, everyday and scientific, to them.  I
mean, my idea that the door won't open unless I push it is theory laden, and
while the details may have become more sophisticated, our idea that we have
a pretty accurate representation of the way the world is as a guide to
practice has not been abandoned for literally thousands of years -- we
figure the door imposes some kind of resistance that has to be overcome by
pushing rather than by, say, waving, jumping or spinning around three times.

You can't just say empirical adequacy is all that matters.  Literally any
kind of speculation masquerading as theory can be made to fit the facts.
The number of conformable theories is infinite.  So is your argument that
the one we choose from among them doesn't matter -- any kind of
interpretation of the forces of nature will get a plane off the ground?
Pardon me if I don't follow you into the next down elevator.  Essentially
you rely on the pessimistic induction that since mistaken theories from the
past have had empirical success, those we work with now can claim no better
status and are better thought of as inventions of our imagination.  I speak
to the pessimistic induction below.  But if we're going to use induction at
all, then the propositions that we build airplanes any old way we like and
that theory choice doesn't enter in don't strike me as ones that will show a
notable record of success.  Why bother with theories that undergird
aereonautical engineering?

You make empirical adequacy your criteria of I'm not sure what, but seem to
say this doesn't need to be explained, and, in fact consistent
instrumentalism is anti-explanationist.  Truth is redundant -- it can't be
given any kind of Cartesian certainty anyway.  Instead, all that counts is
the disposition of engineering practice to produce empirically adequate
results.

But this just asks the question we want to answer.  What is it about
engineering practice that accounts for the disposition to produce correct
results?  One good answer is that the theories which form the background,
guide the choices, and shape the design and methodology of engineering
practice have been approximately accurate in the causal structures they have
identified.  They have represented them accurately enough to allow us to
work with them in ways we expect or understand, and often in novel ways that
would have mystified us if our theories had not rendered those structures
intelligible.

Or, said a little differently, scientists, such as aereonautical engineers,
use theories to form expectations, to design experiments, to devise
instruments, calibrate them, test and assess evidence, and so on.  Some of
the theories chosen tend to lead to correct predictions and experimental
success.  How is this to be explained? Scientific realism asserts that what
best explains this success is that the theories are approximately true.

After all, what explains the exponential success of the scienes of nature
over the last three or four hundred years?  The fact that you and I
communicate by computer?   If theories and explanations don't matter, why
wasn't there an explosion of instrumental success say in the ancient
African, Asian, Arab or Mediterranean worlds?  Something special about
Europe maybe?  An alternative explanation is that the development of the
modern sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. to maturity meant
getting it right enough about the way the world is to make a difference.  It
seems to make a difference to what you can accomplish chemically if you give
an account of the molecular structure of antimony trichloride rather than
treating it, because it has a soft, malleable consistency, as "antimony
butter," the way the alchemists did.

But -- so the challenge goes -- empirical successes, while the criteria of
(?) don't tell us anything about the way the world is because so many of
those successes were based on theories we now consider profoundly mistaken.
We have to infer that future historians will look back on our own mistakes
as equally bizarre.  We can think of the phlogiston theory of chemistry, for
example, or the caloric theory of heat, or theories of the luminiferous
ether, etc.

But this paints with too broad a brush.  Take phlogiston.  This theory
claimed that the core *causal* property of phlogiston was that it was a
substance released in the process of combustion.  Now Priestly, relying on
this understanding, actually produced oxygen -- dephlogisticated air.
Arguably Lavoissier never did experimentally do this.  Still you cannot say
that it was Priestly's understanding of the causal properties of phlogiston
that accounted for his empirical success because there were no such causal
properties.  Oxygen is something taken up in combustion, not something
released.  Priestly's theory did not refer.  So some abandoned theories,
unlike our theory about pushing a door, don't tell us anything about the way
the world is at all.  Nor, for the same reason, do those theories figure in
the historical successes of a science's development.

By contrast, though scientists have abandoned 19th century conceptions of
the luminiferous ether, there were aspects of what 19th century physcists
did -- not the whole of it, but aspects -- which can be understood to refer
to properties of the electromagnetic field and to tell us something about
the world.  Scientists conceived of the ether as a medium for carrying light
waves.   They knew quite well they did not understand its physical
constitution.  Green, for example, developed a model of the ether as an
elastic solid.  He treated this, however, as a model useful because some of
the dynamics of elastic solids corresponded to the way light was propagated.
It was heuristically helpful, not a mimetic representation of the medium
that carried light.  As theory advanced to an understanding of the
electromagnetic field, it was an understanding of the energy properties of
the ether that was carried forward, not particular models of its internal
constitution.  That is, realism does not entail the proposition that every
detail asserted at any point in time by an empirically successful theory is
true, even approximately, of the way the world is.  Aspects of a theory get
abandoned -- and mostly those features that were  not supported by the
evidence and that were not in any way generative of the theory's empirical
success.

Stathis  Psillos's book, Scientific Realism:  How Science Tracks Truth, from
which many of the arguments above are taken, helps avoid underestimating the
arguments of realism in science as they have developed over the last 40
years.


Howard












---- Original Message ----- 
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 1:48 PM
Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose to
James


> Howard
>
> Richard Dawkins on a radio programme argued that science was a realism
> because 'we' know that an aeroplane will stay up in the sky whilst it's
> machinary was functioning correctly. However this is a matter of
> engineering practice - at my last count there are five different
> scientific theories of why a plane can fly. All five theories are in
> contradicition and none can be said to be adequate...  This is actually
> a trivial  example (as the planes fly  and are  all quite horrible to be
> in)  unless you are arguing that  science is a realism. In which case
> there is a flaw in the argument - the naive version of realism argues
> that science gives us a true picture of the world, faithful in its
> details and that the entities science postulates as existing do really
> exist. In other words the advances and discoveries that science makes
> actually exist. (The naivity of the statement is to propose or accept
> some notion that today's theories are correct and that is not the
> intent.)  In reality we can be sure that majority of the entities do not
> exist and that the scientific theories inadequately define both the
> entities and discoveries. Anyway the naive version has the right basic
> feel to it: because it suggest two issues, that scientific realism
> characterises a scientific theory as a story about what there really is,
> and secondly that science is an enterprise of discovery rather than one
> of invention.  As such then to answer your question (assuming it is the
> right question) I'd suggest that science should aim to give us a theory
> that is empirically adequate, and that the acceptance of a theory as
> adequate merely invoves a belief  that it is empirically adequate.
>
> (sorry that sounds so dreadfully empiricist....)
>
> Does this answer the question as you pose it and what is your own answer
> to your question ?
>
> regards
> sdv
>
> Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
>
> >Hi Steve,
> >
> >In terms of "adequately represent the 'real'" what would be criteria for
> >adequacy?
> >
> >Howard
> >
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message ----- 
> >From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> >Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 6:39 AM
> >Subject: Re: BHA: sceintific realism, transcdental realism and respose to
> >James
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>James/All
> >>I have no desire or even interest in defending Popper from charges that
> >>as a social-democrat he was broadly in favor of liberalism and
> >>social-democracy and proposed these ideological positions as preferable
> >>to Western Marxism, Eastern Marxisms and and of course Stalinism.  These
> >>are givens consequently as a result your response is missing the point.
> >>I also notice that his argument that Scientists must be more responsible
> >>and accountable for their decisions about what they research is ignored.
> >>What is interesting with Popper is whether his understanding of
> >>knowledge, science and the idea of testability gives us a better set of
> >>tools than the dominant understandings of scientific knowledge
generation.
> >>
> >>To get to the more interesting discussion that is possible about science
> >>and knowledge - It is worth noting that in the 1979 book 'The
> >>Possibility of Naturalism' Bhaskar spends a great deal of time
> >>critiquing Popper but next to no time critiquing Kuhn, who by this time
> >>had arguably become the most important philosopher of science. Why did
> >>Bhaskar, in his 'Transcendental Realism' arguments and proposal miss the
> >>important target ? Even by 1979 it was obvious, to the lay person that
> >>Kuhn was by far the most most important figure in the philosophy of
> >>science and that a realist must address Kuhn's neo-conventionalist
> >>approach to knowledge generation. I would argue for instance that
> >>Lyotard's classic text The Postmodern Condition could not have been
> >>written without the underpinning that Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
> >>Revolutions provides. It's not until much later (I think around 1989/90)
> >>that Bhaskar lumps together Kuhn and Popper as 'super-idealists' and
> >>seems to smooth out all the differences to generate what appears to be a
> >>'target' against which CR can be generated. Perhaps the underlying
> >>question that is worrying me is whether a 'scientific realism' and thus
> >>a 'transcendtal realism' is both possible and acceptable given that
> >>within the sciences it is clear that scientific knowledge is socially
> >>constructed out of competing theories in ways which practically
> >>guarantee that the dominant theory will not adequately represent how
> >>things work. How then can we justify the argument that 'science is a
> >>realism'  (which is how it was originally presented to me) when it can
> >>never adequately represent the 'real'.
> >>
> >>A simple example - the dominant theories of genetics state that each
> >>individual human subject has a single DNA structure,  it can be changed
> >>but on the whole it is singular - this is not true nor is it even an
> >>adequate phantasy of the complexities of DNA/RNA in 'life'.  To clarify
> >>it is known that human subjects can exist with multiple DNA structures,
> >>the implications of which are multiple but two immediately spring to the
> >>forground: 1) the faith placed in DNA as a means of recognising and
> >>managing a single human subject is misplaced and 2) The claims that DNA
> >>has been realistically represented or even understood are false.
> >>
> >>It does however support Dawkins much abused and misunderstood view that
> >>"living beings are the means for the reproduction of DNA..." (laughs).
> >>
> >>regards
> >>steve
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>James Daly wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>Hi Steve
> >>>
> >>>"a social-democrat like Popper could hardly be expected to agree with
> >>>Marx and Hegel" -- in fact they were prepared to annihilate the planet
> >>>to to defend capitalism and save the world from communism. Perhaps he
> >>>should have called for social democrats "to adopt a version of the
> >>>Hippocratic Oath to restrain their propensity for harm."
> >>>
> >>>One example of Popper's dishonest "scholarship" is his misquoting Marx
> >>>on a crucial issue as saying he wished to discover the "laws of
> >>>society", whereas Marx said "the laws of modern society", i.e.
> >>>capitalism.
> >>>
> >>>One can be a Cold Warrior without being paid for it, but acquiring the
> >>>status of a Cold War manual certainly helps a book's sales, as it did
> >>>Isaiah Berlin's.
> >>>
> >>>" '... to make science game-like and democratic as possible...' ".
> >>>Science is not game like or democratic: games theory is just bourgeois
> >>>ideology; "democracy" is capitalism.
> >>>
> >>>"Popper's version of science is essentially dialectical...". Popper
> >>>was always ferociously anti-dialectical, and his denial of being a
> >>>positivist turned mainly on the philosophically minor grounds of being
> >>>a falsificationist instead of a verificationist, though in addition he
> >>>also implausibly said metaphysical statements could become testable
> >>>hypotheses.
> >>>
> >>>"... pitting one hypothesis/theory against another over a disputed
> >>>issue. This goes back to Athens, the model being Socrates model of
> >>>questioning, constructed in the 18th/19th [this should presumably be
> >>>12th/13th] centuries as the 'academic practice of scholarly
> >>>disputation' ". This is a frequently repeated but unconvincing
> >>>ontogenesis of dialectic, which I think began with Plato's Parmenidean
> >>>and Heraclides inheritance, and his practice of hierarchical
> >>>classification.
> >>>
> >>>All the best
> >>>
> >>>James
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>----- Original Message ----- 
> >>>From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> >>>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> >>>Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 9:36 AM
> >>>Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Re: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other
> >>>fun stuff
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Mervyn
> >>>>
> >>>>Within the philosophy of science perhaps the biggest argument of the
> >>>>century is between Kuhn notable 'The structure of`scientific
> >>>>revolutions' and Popper -  like most  people on the left I also
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>assumed
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>that the below rationale was broadly correct - Fuller has done a
> >>>>remarkably good job of throwing this presumption into question.
> >>>>
> >>>>I am not concerned to defend Popper regarding the Open Society or
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>the
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Poverty of Historicism, after all a social-democrat like Popper
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>could
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>hardly be expected to agree with Marx and Hegel,  rather the
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>interest I
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>have is in Fuller's attempt to recover the philosophy of 'science'
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>and
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>'knowledge' from the predominance of the relativist Kuhn's paradigm
> >>>>shifts, 'where knowledge is adequate to its objects'. The argument
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>goes
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>that Popper '...took seriously both that science aspires to
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>universal
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>knowledge and that scientists - our representatives in this project
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>are
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>inherently flawed and biased agents. The result was to make  science
> >>>>game-like and democratic as possible...' But to clarify this
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>Popper's
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>version of science is essentially dialectical pitting one
> >>>>hypothesis/theory against another over a disputed issue. This goes
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>back
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>to Athens, the model being Socrates model of questioning,
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>constructed in
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>the 18th/19th centuries as the 'academic practice of scholarly
> >>>>disputation', from this derives the German dialectical tradition and
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>of
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>course Hegel and Marx.  An example of this dispute in a non-science
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>area
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>is the Popper/Adorno dispute over positivism which when looked at
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>shows
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>perhaps rather typically that they are remarkably similar... both
> >>>>anti-positivists, both dialectical thinkers, one a marxist the other
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>a
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>social-democratic liberal.
> >>>>
> >>>>A single issue it seems to me throws the outright rejection into
> >>>>question:  "At the height of the Vietnam War, Karl Popper called for
> >>>>scientists to adopt a version of the Hippocratic Oath to restrain
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>their
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>propensity for harm."
> >>>>
> >>>>regards
> >>>>sdv
> >>>>
> >>>>Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>I don't know about Kuhn, but anybody of intellectual integrity with
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>a
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>reasonable familiarity with Hegel and Marx who reads The Open
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>Society
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>and its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism could scarcely doubt
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>that
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>Popper was a cold war warrior. He is not only sly, he is dishonest,
> >>>>>deliberately suppressing key words and omitting context in quotes
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>to
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>suit his cold warrior distortions and travesties. His
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>characteristic
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>method is to set up a scarecrow and demolish it as if it were the
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>real
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>thing. To spring to his defence on this issue in the current
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>context can
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>only mean to defend the totalitarian commercialism (Collier) that
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>Popper
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>himself promoted and which is now being imposed on the world by all
> >>>>>force necessary. (The very skies over London have been emptied for
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>the
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>god of totalitarian commercialism to arrive as I type this...)
> >>>>>
> >>>>>Mervyn
> >>>>>
> >>>>>steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk writes
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>James
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>The fifties cold warrior labelling of Popper has been challenged
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>in very
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>interesting ways by Steve Fuller just recently in his book Kuhn vs
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>Popper.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>As Fuller points out it is Kuhn who is in the pay of the coldwar
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>warriors...
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>(this is not to disagree or comment on the thrust of the below -
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>merely to
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>spring to the defence of popper...)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>regards
> >>>>>>sdv
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>Hi Carroll
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>Your punchline was strong -- that the purpose of reading Plato's
> >>>>>>>Republic was to understand The Enemy.  But, only one? Why is his
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>name
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>on Lenin's tomb?  Your approach calls to mind the Fifties cold
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>warrior
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>Sir Karl Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies*, after which
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>George
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>Soros named his foundation. Slyly, Sir Karl manages to suggest
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>that
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>Plato's target is workers who must be kept in their place,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>whereas his
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>real target (see the Gorgias) is the unscrupulous Nietzschean
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>rich who
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>want to exploit and rule.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>It is nearly always forgotten that the society of Plato's first
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>choice
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>is a communist one, and that the rest of the argument is about a
> >>>>>>>second-best society. And even the second-best society is not a
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>class
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>society in Marx's sense, in that the philosopher rulers do not
> >>>>>>>appropriate the surplus, but live a frugal life.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>I suppose the jury is out on whether Plato meant by "gennaion
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>pseudos"
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>Big or Noble Lie, or both, but the myth of noble and base metals
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>in the
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>soul is an answer to the problem of legitimising the rule of
> >>>>>>>reason, and defending it against the power of wealth. Lenin had
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>the
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>>>same problem. It's quite a problem!
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>James
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>--
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>   --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
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> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
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> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
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