Subject: BHA: Re: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other fun stuff
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2003 23:41:01 -0000


Oops!

Hi Tobin

Thanks for your reply. You have pointed out a lack of clarity in
something I wrote, but it was not an equivocation. When I used the
phrase "Everything happens for a reason" (a) it was for
*illustration*, not something I stand over -- in principle I would
never personally use the phrase. (b) I didn't mean "cause" -- I meant
whatever people who (according to Hollywood at any rate) use that
phrase mean: it is something more like a purpose, or at least a
"meaning", in something thought more humanly satisfying than the
physical description and explanation, of e.g. a plane crash. Thornton
Wilder's "Bridge of San Luis Rey", in which all who die have just
arrived at true love, is an example of that outlook. I think that
outlook (even in Wilder's illustration) is anthropocentric, and even
egocentric.

I think Mervyn spoke very well for me when he said (about my not very
well thought out phrase):

if reason is 'a trust that the universe of being is responsive to
human values' this could be because, as you remind us, everything
human is an emergent part of being.

What I meant was precisely the opposite of Carrol's phrase -- "a
universe indifferent to humans". Floods, droughts etc.kill. But the
human mind is the cosmos come to consciousness of itself, and our
consciousness is our way of transcending our lifespan and location.
And our natural finitude (a pinprick in astronomical space and time),
and our death, do not invalidate e.g. "natural justice" as a human
value.

You say in what seems like a defence of Sophism:

For example, sometimes lying is the right thing to do. here's a
situation in which the worser argument, the one for the merits of
lying, is (and I think should be) the stronger. I suspect that some of
you are a little shocked by this argument -- and by the fact that you
know it's true! But lying can be good ...

(a) I am not shocked. (b) if white lies are right and good (as anyone
who had not come under the baleful influence of Kant would agree),
then the argument for the merits of lying is not the worse argument -- 
in other words that is no defence of Sophism.

All the best

James

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net>
To: "Bhaskar list" <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2003 7:47 PM
Subject: BHA: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other fun stuff


> Hi Mervyn, James and Phil--
>
> Shoot, you've given me some interesting but hard nuts to crack, and
at the
> moment I have neither time nor tongs nor tongue to open them
further.  But
> I'll give it a valiant effort as briefly as I can (and I promise not
to go
> on another alliterative binge -- fun as it was, it also took lots of
work!).
>
> I think I'll start with Phil's points (hey, Phil, that choice of
"Pragma"
> and "Metaphysic" was a kick!).  I'm afraid I can't give a strong
reply to
> your comments on Hegel, who I haven't read and probably never will,
being
> little more than an educated dog myself (sorry, I'm alluding to a
joke that
> perhaps only Howard will remember, though come to think of it, it
should
> also bring a wry smile to anyone who knows the history of the word
"cynic").
> In any case, I agree that reason is crucial to the improvement of
human
> affairs, although as that annoying Mr Marx once said, thinking about
the
> world is ducky but you also gotta change it.  I'll also agree that
Marx
> sometimes slid toward a pragmatic view of truth.  My point however
lies
> elsewhere: and that is, reason doesn't come out of nowhere, ex
nihilo (but
> Mervyn, I'll get to your question about nihilo vs novo).  Reason
*emerges*
> from practical (bodily) engagements with the world, starting with
our most
> basic interactions like crawling from point A to point B, putting
things
> into boxes and pulling them out again, and playing peek-a-boo.  I
have to
> both agree and disagree with your argument that cooking involves
theories.
> Our embodied interactions with the material world lead us to
*develop*
> categories (cats are distinguishable from mats), which involve
theories
> (cats are more like rats than they are like mats in that they're
both
> *alive*).  However, on the one hand, I don't believe categories
exist
> outside semiosis, or if you like, outside consciousness (that would
be the
> epistemic fallacy -- powers, relationships and events do, but not
> categories).  And on the other hand, beyond categorization I'm
skeptical
> that noticing phenomena (e.g., fermentation or antibiosis) or asking
a
> question ("I wonder what'll happens if I mix an egg into the
flour?")
> demands a theory or even a hypothesis; on the contrary, they both
depend on
> a *lack* of prior knowledge or theory.  So it's from those two
perspectives
> (embodied activity and the absence of knowledge) that I maintain the
primacy
> of practice.  In fact, for embodied activity to yield knowledge it
must
> start from ignorance and error, so ultimately it depends on absences
too.
>
> I hope it's clear that the primacy of practice thesis does not -- or
at
> least need not -- devolve into simple pragmatism.  As for Peirce, he
> objected to William James's verson of pragmatism (and in response
renamed
> his own view the intentionally ugly "pragmaticism").  His eventual
concept
> of truth was a type of consensus theory, but with a crucial
qualification:
> truth is what the community of minds determines it to be over the
entire
> course of history, *including the future*.  In other words, the
> understanding of reality which we've attained in the present is
always
> fallible and subject to later correction.
>
> To respond quickly to Mervyn's inquiry about my view of "de novo" vs
"ex
> nihilo," my answer is "Yes."  Put less flippantly, my understanding
of
> emergence (including intrastructural emergence) is that it depends
upon
> pre-existing materials and conditions, and so in that sense is not
"ex
> nihilo."  However, since the emergent power or relationship is
contingent
> and cannot be directly derived from or reduced to the level from whi
ch it
> arose, it is both new _and_ "from nothing/nowhere."  I think this
view
> coheres with my comment about the dependence of knowledge upon
absences.
> (Re RB, I think *From East to West* is a mess, but I haven't gotten
to any
> subsequent works yet.  I intend to, however.)
>
> Mervyn, I wish I were as confident as you that James's statement was
not
> anthropocentric.  But he can speak for himself.
>
> Be that as it may, I think both you and James oversimplify the
Sophists a
> bit -- there was quite a variety among them, and Plato had an axe to
grind
> when he vilified them in contrast to his hero.  Not all Sophists
were
> market-oriented, and some were politically subversive.  Some were
anthropic,
> but some were naturalistic.  And some were of a scientific bent.
But
> evidently what both of you really have in mind are the rhetoricians.
Let me
> quote James:
>
> > The Sophists [...] did not teach logic or science, but
> > rhetoric, the art of persuasion, i.e. demagoguery and sales
technique,
> > which Gorgias said was superior to science; the physician could
tell
> > you what would cure you, but could not make you take it, whereas
the
> > rhetorician, although ignorant of medicine, could.
>
> I don't identify with or endorse the rhetorician Sophists, but I
don't
> simply condemn them either.  Clearly, if the patient won't take the
> medicine, you'll have one very sick and possibly dead patient.  We'd
be
> fools not to acknowledge that.  But this is not to say that
persuasion is
> "superior" to science, only that it has its role, and an important
one.  I'm
> sure it'll surprise no-one that I'm deeply interested in language
and
> representation (and delight in them as well), and that I'm convinced
of
> their cultural, social and political power.  However, precisely
because
> they're powerful, I see them as having a crucial ethical aspect.
(At the
> risk of re-opening the argument, this is a key reason why I complain
about
> RB's writing: I think there's an ethical dimension to *everyone's*
use of
> language, and that RB undercuts the social power of his ideas by not
> communicating them well.)
>
> But ethics is a complicated matter.  For example, sometimes lying is
the
> right thing to do.  Consider politeness: it is really necessary to
tell
> sweet aged Aunt Betsy that her coffee makes you gag?  So even if we
prize
> truth and truthfulness, here's a situation in which the worser
argument, the
> one for the merits of lying, is (and I think should be) the
stronger.  I
> suspect that some of you are a little shocked by this argument -- 
and by the
> fact that you know it's true!  But lying can be good because it can
sustain
> a deeper truth, one concerning our humanity: sustaining the bonds of
> sociability, friendship and love is generally more vital to us as
people
> than is an absolute allegiance to honesty.  In short, virtually all
of
> civility requires accepting the situational propriety of lying.
(Let me
> emphasize *situational*, since I'm not at all advocating lying as a
> universal good -- far from it.)
>
> The ethics of language is complex in another direction as well.
Here's
> James again:
>
> > Faith for Kierkegaard meant something like "trust" -- Abraham is
his
> > model. Faith is akin to hope, but not hope for something finite.
It is
> > more like what is expressed in the phrase "Everything has a
reason".
> > Reason after all is the highest and defining human faculty.
>
> James plays on words in order to advance his argument: he first uses
the
> term "reason" in the sense of "cause," and then uses it in the sense
of
> "reasoning."  Now, I disagree with him when he connects the two
senses this
> way -- reasons are (or can be) causes, but not all causes come from
> reasoning, unless one presupposes a God directing everything's
existence.
> Nevertheless I don't think playing on words this way is necessarily
> unethical.  On the contrary, it can be vital to the imagination and
creative
> thinking.  Consequently, if we strictly obeyed distinctions in
meaning, we
> would gravely impoverish our ability to wonder about the world; and
that, I
> think, *would* be woefully unethical.
>
> Cripes, I've spent way more time than I meant to, so I'm going to
split.
>
> Thanks,
>
> T.
>
> ---
> Tobin Nellhaus
> nellhaus-AT-mail.com
> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S.
Peirce
>
>
>
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