Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1997 04:19:59 -0400 (EDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: BHA: Science, theology and witchcraft


In a message dated 16/08/97 16:16:49 GMT, Ruth writes:

<< Hi all,
 
 I'm so excited about this discussion!  I had actually decided against 
 the Adorno/Bhaskar comparison for the purposes of the dissertation, but 
 jeeze... with you guys as my committee, I can practially see the 
 chapters!  Hmmm.
 
 I wanted to add one thing.  Michael wrote:
  
 "Adorno's line is that the priority of the object depends upon the 
 subject recognising the truth that we can at least imagine the existence 
 of an object without the continued presence of a subjectivity to be 
 conscious of its presence, but we cannot even imagine a subjectivity 
 which is not already `consciousness of an object'."
 
 This, kind of Kantian take of the discussion of the priority, or 
 primacy, of the object seems fine to me, but I think I would have ended 
 the sentence "...but we cannot even imagine a subjectivity which is not 
 already itself an object."  This more from "Subject and Object" than 
 from ND.  Michael?
 
 Also, do you have the publisher for *Against Epistemology*?  I haven't 
 been able to find it here in Canada.
 
 R.
  >>
I'd agree with the idea that Subject and Object (whose version, from memory
you paraphrase really well) is the more relevant and incidentally perhaps the
more rigorous; it thinks through the implications of the fact that the
discussion of the relative priority is one of - and for - the experience of
consciousness of objects, rather than of unmediated objects/subjects
simpliciter.

The publisher of AE is Basil Blackwell Oxford 1982, although some parts
appeared previously in various jnls. 

This book - along with ND - has been discussed on the Frankfurt School list a
bit.

I can think of all sorts of good reasons why a comparative Adorno/Bhaskar
thesis would be problematic but also a real feat if it all came together

Michael


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---