Date: Wed, 8 Jan 1997 08:49:15 -0700
Subject: BHA: hans e's critique


>>>>> On Sun, 5 Jan 1997 21:43:53 -0800 (PST), Howard Engelskirchen wrote:


> 1.   The most important point is that I have to leave to the
> devil's representatives all manner of discussions of "natural
> states."  It's normal for the devil to see his own condition as a
> refraction of what he supposes to be "natural," but that's the
> devil's problem. I don't anywhere refer to any "natural state" or
> make use of any such benchmark implicitly or otherwise.  If you can
> locate where I do I will correct the text instanter!


I apologize for using all the wrong words.  I did not have much time
and tried to do it on the quick.  When I wrote "natural state" I did
not mean to imply that the capitalist condition is the natural
condition (although it seems that I myself was misled afterwards by my
sloppy use of words).  I used the word "natural state" for the absence
which I think is lurking behind some of Howard's positive statements.
For instance if Howard writes "exchange requires a volitional
relinquishment of autonomy" then this implies a two-fold absence:
there is autonomy before the exchange, and exchange is not forced but
"volitional."  I am taking issue with both.

The autonomy which the act of exchange denies is not true autonomy,
but it is a forced isolation.  This isolation on the one hand and its
flip side, the fact that property laws unconditionally override any
other human need, are the two poles of the contradiction between
bourgeois and citizen.  As bourgeois, i.e., as self-interested
economic agent, the individual has the license to pretend he or she is
alone in the world; but he has to pay for this license by his
unconditional subjugation to the laws of private property.

Therefore the "volitional" only goes skin deep.  Capitalism depends on
private initiative and therefore individual motivation is very
important to it, and it may seem as if the individual was respected.
But this is not the case.  The individual is manipulated.  The
principle of consideration points the finger at the individual and
says: you wanted something for it, didn't you, you scumbag!  Repent
and subjugate yourself to the iron laws of private property: you know
there is no free lunch!  It uses the guilt feelings about one's own
needs (which flow from the bourgeois/citizen split) as a de-motivator
which numbs people sufficiently so that they allow themselves to be
treated as objects and subordinated to objects.  I don't think Howard
sees this when he writes sentences like "If a persons's promises are
to be performed or the harm caused by nonperformance redressed, the
promisor will sooner or later have to be compelled to comply."  The
example Howard gives is a *crop failure* caused by drought!  Commodity
exchange indeed makes an individual pay for crop failure instead of
treating it as a damage to everyone which has to be redressed
socially.  Someone who wonders why capitalist prisons are so full
should stop here and point this out instead of continuing as if
nothing had happened.



> We are definitely together on the proposition that what I deal with
> is an outgrowth of commodity relations of production.  In fact, I
> specifically announce that the foundation of my analysis rests on
> the analysis of autonomy and the social division of labor brought to
> fruition by Marx.

You say several times that commodity exchange presupposes and
reinforces division of labor, but I did not see any reference to the
other aspect of Marx's theory, that it also presupposes and enforces
the equality of human labors.

> Anyway, the foundation of my analysis, the social relation I label
> "interdependent autonomy," I acknowledge to be the same social
> relation Marx uses to ground his analysis of value.  This social
> relation, which is in no sense natural, is a particular disposition
> of the agents of production with respect to the means and forces of
> production.  The essential element of this disposition is a
> contradictory form of autonomy, namely an autonomy which is
> separate, but not self-sufficient.  Thus (1) each produces and
> reproduces his or her existence separately and independently from
> every other;  but (2) on the other hand, none is self sufficient;
> instead each produces, as a component part of the social division
> of labor, a specialized product not useful to them.  Because no one
> produces self-sufficiently to meet the totality of their needs, all
> must have recourse to exchange.

This is not sufficient to derive exchange.  They exchange because
their labors are socially equal.

> (By contrast, the patriarchal household in the Germanic form of
> production as described by Marx in PreCapitalist Economic
> Formations was both autonomous and self-sufficient.  As a
> consequence market exchange was not developed and the community
> existed only for the sake of defense of territory against others.)

> Again, the foundation of my analysis is the couple "autonomy\social
> division of labor."  This autonomy is characterized not just by
> independence, but also by an absence, viz. the lack of self-
> sufficiency.  If such an autonomy is to exist in actuality it must
> be coupled with a social division of labor.  This is in no way
> "natural."  

To say it again: My hunch is that this couple is not specific enough
to derive commodity exchange.  The contradiction between autonomous
individual wills and social connectedness is present in all societies.
 
> Moreover I do not say that "in a market economy individuals are
> subjectively independent and self-interested, but objectively
> interdependent."

Ok, I grant you, I used the wrong words again.
I should have said "individually" and "socially"
instead of "subjectively" and "objectively".

[rest of paragraph snipped.]
 
> 2.   There are a number of important methodological questions
> raised by your comments.  You argue that consideration "is one of
> the mechanisms through which capitalist society through the state
> forces individuals to relate to each other as isolated self-
> interested commodity exchangers, i.e., I think that in order to
> understand consideration one has to start with the assumption that
> society has a very specific purpose which it forces on the
> individuals: namely, society is interested in commodities (perhaps
> more specifically in the accumulation of capital) and it forces
> individuals to act as the character masks of the commodities."
 
> In legal writing the personification of society as having
> "purposes," as "being interested in," and "forcing individuals to,"
> etc. is endemic.

This is a point I was wondering about after posting my message.
Was I reifying society?  With respect to the economic dimension, Marx
never says: "capitalism does such and such," but he often says
"capital does such and such."  Capital indeed has a purpose, namely,
self-valorization.  Marx calls it an "automatic subject".  Capital
differs from individuals in that it has no awareness of this purpose
and does not monitor itself (i.e., it will not stop itself even if it
causes an ecological catastrophe which with the end of humankind also
means the end of capital), but even a blind purpose is a purpose.

Now what about the political sphere, the sphere of wills?  People
think they depend on capital for their livelihood, and therefore they
consciously create the conditions under which this blind and primitive
animal, capital, can survive.  This is what I meant when I wrote
"society forces individuals to act as the character masks of the
commodities."   To some extent it was meant metaphorically: the
mechanisms need to be studied much better.  Some of the individuals in
power are aware of what they are doing, but many are not, etc.

Instead of saying "society forces the individuals" I should perhapos
have said: capital forces the individuals, either directly through the
dull compulsion of economic constraints, or indirectly through the
political and legal institutions which are put in place so that
capital, this beloved social pet, can go about its business.

You have a too passive view of the irreducible social forces
when you write:

> In consequence for me Bhaskar's ontological distinction between
> people who "purpose" and "force" and are "interested in" and society
> which is *reproduced* or *transformed* (but does not *purpose* or
> *intend*) represents a real analytical advance.


Now let us go on:

> At least as fundamentally, I think the causal relationship is the
> other way around.  Individuals are forced to relate to one another
> as isolated self-interested commodity exchangists by the social
> relationship in which they find themselves (this point is made very
> powerfully in the Grundrisse section you refer to [one of the truly
> great discussions in Marx for understanding law]) -- they are
> driven to exchange because they are independent but not self-
> sufficient.  Law has nothing to do with it.  BECAUSE self-
> interested individuals are forced to relate to one another through
> exchange, state institutions of coercion become essential if social
> reproduction in this form is to be continued.  


I say, society forces individuals and uses laws as means of coercion,
and you say individuals are forced by the social relations and
therefore welcome the laws.  I see no contradiction here; we are
looking at the same thing from two different directions.  But you are
velvet-gloving the capitalist social relations too much.  There is a
taboo against recognizing the damage the capitalist state inflicts on
the individuals, and you do not seem quite immune to this taboo.


Thank you for the clarifications in the rest of your posting.
I see no disagreement there.  Therefore I will stop.
If what I wrote above was frustrating to you I apologize.
It was meant in a comradely way.

Hans.


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