Date: Sun, 5 Jan 1997 02:20:16 -0700 (MST)
Subject: Re: BHA: WHITHER CRITICAL REALISM?


Howie, 

your comments are quite interesting.  In the main i believe that we agree 
in our conclusions.  

When you say that the "causal force of individual action can never be 
reduced [without residue] to the material", i agree that these are CR's 
commitments with respect to TMSA, and further they are post-structualist 
(PS) gains.  PS is a reaction to positivism and (Marxian) 
economic-determinism, viz. the base-superstructure metaphor (which would 
also include Althusserian un-humanism and un-ideological "scientific 
Marxism").  i take these to be points in common (or shared critiques) 
between PS and CR thought.  

The important moment of difference (in this context) is that i beleive CR 
to be much more careful and conscious not to *absent* the material 
factors which influence (and in part determine) our cultural production, 
reproduction and transformations (Bhaskar social-cube is especially 
useful in this context).

Of course some PS are better then others, i beleive Foucault and Derrida 
can be given (quasi-)realist interpretations which would not 
(necessarily absent the material factors, while Baudrillard and Rorty  
may be *real* irrealist.

But even the latter are not developing in a vacuum, they are (merely) 
"mirrors" of their own cultural conditions (even if they don't accept 
this).  i mean irrealism itself is a product of curtural and socio-economic 
conditions (which is how i understand Bhaskar's comments offered recently 
by Doug).

When the (absent of the) "public-sphere" is such that it is merely a 
product of commercial mass-media "images" and other (political) manipulation 
techniques there is not only an ambiguity between truth and falsehood, 
but a complete absence of a distinction.  In this sense, Rorty and 
especially Baudrillard are (un-consciously or un-reflectively) on to 
something very important (i mean to explain the existence or emergence of 
these specific irrealism and anti-materialism is to understand the 
conditions in which their are ideas are [cultural] embedded, and in fact 
depend).  

It is in this sense that we need a type of materialism, but one that is 
much more flexible (so not to fall prey to the PS critiques) then those 
that have come to be representive of the base-superstructure metaphor 
(which can be argued to be pre-1883).  And i believe this to be the 
(contemporary) CR moment.

However, to rekindle comments from the RM conference, exchanged with Tobin 
and others, the base-superstucture metaphor retains important lessons 
which should be lost.  Namely the material moments are the most important 
for the possibility of science, and historical explanations of cultural 
and socio-economic production.  In this sense, we cannot be as hasty as 
PS in overthrowing economic-determinism or material driven philosophies.  
We still need, and in fact there is a(n) (ontological) dialectical 
necessity for the base-superstructure model categories of forces and 
relations production, real foundations, material causality, (and their 
negations) ideology, false consciousness, etc.  But withoug losing the idea
(and PS gain), (to repeat Howie)the "causal force of individual action 
can never be reduced to the material".
 
>From the above, i believe (like Howie) the relation between CR and PS *not* 
to be one of complete opposition, or negation of the negation.  But one of 
ambivalence, whereby we (CR) need to be and should be "persuaded [...] to 
take post-structuralism more seriously" (Bhaskar 1993:xiv) (which is meant to 
rekindle comments exchanged on this list, with especially Colin).

Hence, it seems to me we are gradually getting at original moments, or 
solutions which are specifically and uniquely Bhaskarian and Critical 
Realist.


hans d.


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