Date: Thu, 2 Jan 1997 13:53:45 GMT-700
Subject: Re: BHA: WHITHER CRITICAL REALISM?
Hi Ralph, maybe it is not me who should answer our post, i mean you know
my arguments. However, let me say a little.
Bhaskar's work is especially timely, empiricism "lies shattered", and
science itself is on the defensive against skepticism, relativism,
hyper-subjectivity, and self-doubt. In these "post-modern" times a
strong metaphysical realism is important for us to push on (toward making
the world a little better).
And, yes i realize that this is not your issue with (or against)
critical realism. But it does help us begin to understand what is
Bhaskar's *contribution* (even in the "absence" of originality).
Personally, i am not too concerned with what is original in Bhaskar,
especially as one familarizes herself with issues of philosophy of
science, the first two books seem quite humble, a type of (needed)
synthesis of contemproary philosophy of science. And in his more
dialectical work, those aquainted with Hegelian and Marxian philosophy my
be quite confrontable with Dialectical Critical Realism. But of course,
Bhaskar seems to bring in more (post-)modern ideas also, for example
*absence*.
i would suggest the newness in Bhaskar comes as a totality. For example
his critique of empiricism in RTS is nothing new, but that it is said all
together and offers an explicit ontological view which seems quite
original. But certainly we would not say the notion of "deepth"
realism is new.
More specifically i believe that his TMSA is quite original, although
many others have struggled with similar problems. It helps address some
of the materialist problems that we face with metaphors like
base-superstructure. Moreover, critical realism very much helps us
understand Marx (for example), along with many other thinkers who where
trying to overcome idealism (1900 century) and empiricism (late 2000
century).
Hence, my answer to what is new in Bhaskar would begin by pointing out we
must answer this in the actual material conditions which he is
writing, the intellectual eclipse which he confronts, and the post-
modern consciousness of self-doubt in which we live. Next we must
assess his work as a type of totality, its time and place, along
with its "truth".
But, i would very much be willing to pursue the idea that Bhaskar has
been very successful in demonstrating that the gains of contemproary
philosophy of science are quite in phase with the answers that Hegel and
Marx where on to (as an example). And it helps demonstrate the
impoverished philosophical commitments of analytical philosophy and
relativistic philosophies.
And finally before leaving the issue of originality, Einstein once said
something like, 'I had only one original idea in my entire lifetime'.
Originality is not really much of a concern, espeically if we have
historical materialist (dialectical) explanations for the emergence or
(dialectical) necessity of the direction consciosness takes.
Your more interesting questions where the other three questions:
>
> What do you think critical realism ought to accomplish? Is there
> some useful purpose to be served by promoting a school of thought?
> What is there that is new and original that this school has to
> offer? What intellectual results has it produced? I'm getting a
> bit skeptical.
The first two, and forth question are quite important. But they are not
easy, nor do i believe that we would agree on the answers. Let me offer
very brief responses. Beginning with the second question: especially
Bhaskar pre-1990 was to defend against intellectual skepticism
and relativism. The (somewhat humble) task here is to offer a bit of
intellectual strength to grap onto. This is actually quite important for
the education one is likely to receive in a Western (especially U.S.)
educational system. As Hans Ehrbar is fond of saying, critical
realism should be taught in high school. It is simple, and brillant.
More importantly it may help alleviate the hypochondria and deep
"alienation" which afflicts this MTV generation. And of course
offering an alternative to the the post-modern relativism and hyper-
reactionary analytical commitments.
Now turning to the forth question, the intellectual results may
come by way of philosophcial suggests: that is CR suggests what
we should look for in our scientific work, and what we should guard
against. For example, TMSA, tells that we must investigate structures,
for they are necessitied for agency. It warns against reductionism,
methodological individualism, and structuralism alike. This issue is
especially important in economics, for we first must confront the
neo-classical (and many other) methodological individualist who have
absented the notion of structure, along with the skepticism of
post-structualist political economy. Whereas, the former believe we can
come to know something about economics by reducing "appearances" to
"fundamental" behavior (e.g. the prusuit of pleasure and avoidance of
pain). While the latter negate universality altogether (at least in
its most important aspects.
i won't attempt to answer the first question. But believe it to be
the most important. Rather, i would suggest that in *Reclaiming
Reality* the first and last articles are concerned with such issues.
Also, in the misty pages of the *Dialectic* there are some brillant
moments. Two sections in particular address your first question.
(a) 2.10, pp. 173-203; with pp. 198-203 as the most relevant.
(b) 3.11, pp. 299-307. i would be willing to type these sections in
(suspecting you do not have your copy of *Dialectic* in hand).
i am not always in agreement with Bhaskar's suggested direction, nor
does it seem that he is always very sure himself (which we should
expect with a[n] [ontological] commitment to openness). But the
implications themselves are of the utmost important. For example, CR
is at least in opition to the hyper-doubt of Hayek, or the "surface"
response of the New Right etc.
hans d.
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