Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 10:36:20 +0000
Subject: Re: BHA: Transitive & intransitive


I've already sent this post once, but for some reason didn't get it myself.
Just in case no one else received it I have reposted it to the list, my
apologies for any duplication. 

Michael,

Thanks for taking the time to reply. Of course, you have a point but not a
completely accurate one in my opinion. The social sciences, for Bhaskar,
take intransitive objects. Philosophies of science represent transitive
objects which attempt to present what scientists do - science, an
intransitive object to philosophers of science . In this sense positivism is
a set of transitive objects which misdescribed its intransitive object,
science - or better, the actual practices of scientists. Without a concept
of an intransitive object which a particular science studies no such science
would be possible, I take it you agree upon this. The fact that science is
itself a social product does not mean that a putative observer could not be
in a position to (mis)describe this intransitive object. Without this
ability no science of science could be possible and Bhaskar's whole project
would be negated. Thus your sentence:

>Hence, in my view (and I think
>>in Bhaskar's), science can never be an intransitive object; only
>>that which science attempts to describe (reality) can be.

Is (actually not _is_ but _must_ (be)) wrong in order for a science of
science, namely Bhaskar's theory of science to be valid. If science as a set
of social practices is not intransitive to given descriptions of it then
what is Bhaskar's Realist Theory of Science about?

Hence, I refute that I conflated my epistemology with my ontology. What is
ontological can change relative to the standpoint of the observer. This must
be the case for realism to apply in the social science. For clearly,
realism, if defined as a mind-independent reality, would not be applicable
to the social sciences. The TMSA makes this clear, no people no social
objects. All of my points are made clear in your last sentence when you note.

 In my experience, most scientists
>talk like positivists when they pronounce on the nature of their
>practice, although their practice is anything but positivist.

Exactly, and Bhaskar's theory-of-science (td) is a better theory than
positivism (td) of science (id). Hope this clarifies my point. Perhaps I
could have phrased it better in my earlier post but I think you must agree
that for social science to be possible there must be intransitive social
objects.


By the way on the Zizek thing what can one say to these people? 

Thanks,

P.S. to Howard, in your post you raised many issue related to
incommensurability and cross-paradigm communication. I've just had an
article published in Millennium, Journal of International Relations entitled 

'Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International
Relations Theory: What's the Frequency Kenneth?'. 

It's not brilliant, I was under much pressure to get it published, but you
might find it useful.
>

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Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA

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