Subject: re: can postmodernism survive
Date: Thu, 18 May 2000 12:44:35 +0200


David Schenk writes:

[begin Schenk quotation]
Actually, it is entirely unclear to me that any such thing is possible.
As I understand it, the limits of rationality are the limits of
intelligibility and the limits of logical possibility.  To violate them is
to abandon the very business of sense-making, to say nothing of
truth-tracking.  Therefore, to "transgress" rationality is just to utter
either:

(1)  supervacuous (and ultimately meaningless) rubbish, or;
(2)  a demonstrably false set of propositions (i.e. propositions
     that are either logically false or else mutually
     contradictory)
[end quotation from Schenk]

Mr. Schenk goes on to plead for clarity on why postmodernism wishes to
transgress rationality, and assures readers he does not want to start a
fight, only understand how postmodernism can maintain the strange kinds of
things it does.

But the answer to Mr. Schenk's dilemma is very simple. Nowhere does any of
the thinkers he mentions say anything about wanting to 'transgress'
rationality. Thus it seems to me that he has violated the principle of
charity he mentions near the end of his note -- and I commend him for
bringing up that principle, as I think it is crucial to respect it when
evaluating anyone's thought, or any trend of thought. But asking, 'why does
postmodernism want to be irrational?' is like the very old joke about the
lawyer asking the defendant on the stand, 'when did you stop beating your
wife?'

Now, what I imagine Schenk would do now is say, 'what do you mean
postmodernists don't say they want to transgress rationality?' And he will --
in my scenario -- produce a quotation from someone saying something nasty
about rationality. But the discussion can't even get going with these kinds
of errors. Because obviously there are different kinds of referents for the
term 'rationality.'

To be rational is to adjust means to ends. If I want a coke from a vending
machine, and I insert the appropriate coins and all other things being equal,
I get a coke. I've acted rationally. If I go up to the coke machine and
instead of putting in the coins I argue with the coke machine to give me a
coke, or bang my head against the machine thinking that is the appropriate
way to get a coke, then I've acted irrationally.

But there's a huge difference between 'rationality' writ large as above and
the *uses* rationality is put to; the strategies it is harnessed to; the
wills-to-power it is placed in the service of. Thus when Foucault writes
about rationally organized hospitals in _DP_, or about how the
plague-infested city is organized, he's not saying that these things are
horrible because they are rationalistic 'dispositifs' -- indeed, he's not
saying they're horrible at all. Nor is he saying we should let plague victims
do whatever they want or that hospitals should be unorganized or organized in
some non-rational way.

To sum up, this is the mistake that David Schenk is making: confusing
particular exercises of power that employ rationality with rationality 'tout
court.' This accounts, I believe, for the unwise truck with uncharitable
figures such as Sokal.

-- John Ransom