Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2001 12:52:55 -0500 (EST) From: walter a davis <davis.65-AT-osu.edu> Subject: Re: The Sublime Reg, One last notion. When you speak of the aestheticization of terror I assume you are aware that this was Walter Benjamin's definition of fascism in his essay on art. (My point re. Kant--and again I'm collapsing here what I take over 100 pages to demonstrate--is that in his thought on the sublime he projects and denies the disorders of his psyche--that psyche being the ratio in its desperate effort to realize its desires while calling them something else.) walter At 04:15 PM 11/11/01 +0000, you wrote: >Reg/Walter/Eric > >1) Whilst I disagree with Walters' hyperbole, simply because so much >philosophy has wilfully refused to understand the issues that are raised >by science - the clearest moment being the Darwin event. There is a >sound point in the below related to the comprehensive industrialisation >of the media, which derives its power from the comprehensive aesthetics >of terror, which can be understood through the invocation of the >'sublime' - Lyotard invokes the sublime in relation to the aesthetic not >to the social itself - in the sections of the inhuman where he addresses >the social he invokes the notion of 'development' which is a heavily >overcoded version of capital. But this is insufficient given that this >does not help in producing an analysis and understanding of the miseries >and slavery of a society that at present has extended its domination >over the whole planet - this is to re-state, that this is the society >of the spectacle in which we all, the humans and animals on this planet >live. > >2) Because we live in the society of the spectacle, and let us remember >that the spectacle is 'the social relationship between people that is >mediated by images', images that dominate and degrade any notion of the >sublime. In effect it denies any possibility of the 'sublime' having >purchase in this society - for the space of the sublime has been, as >Lyotard hints in the inhuman, industrialised to the extent that >'judgements on the beautiful' seem absurdly out of place. (Lyotards much >loved Avant-Garde has become merely a traditional subset of the >industrialised spectacle). An inevitable beyond of the society of >spectacle is the rise of post or inhuman forms, a blurring of the lines >between humans and machines, which need to be understood as going well >beyond the current medical protheses. The InHuman argues for the >spectacular reassessment of the significance of the human and the >realignment of the relationship between the human/animal and technology >(which I approve of). This is what the late Lyotard, for all of his >anti-humanisn, was so terrified of and which he wrote against in his >later writing.... But to write against the relationship has to start >from the spectacle (Debord) and commodity fetishism (Marx), and not from >an approval of the fetishism of the avant-garde. What can be more >fetishistic than Lyotard writing on avant-garde painting where he argues >-that it enters into the sublime because of its concerns with form and >its revealing the invisible through its concerns with the visual? > Whereas the spectacle announces that these are primarily commodities - >possibly best understood through the falling rate of use value... The >avant-garde was a 19th and 20th C pre-post-modern concern - it does not >exist anymore... > >3) Perhaps then, for us, the sublime is simply the spectacle written >large across our, into our imaginaries - and nothing else. > >4) Eric - the point at issue with the Kantian and Hegelian differences >is that early 21st Century radical critiques of the European >Philosophical kind are all descended in some sense from the Hegelian >line... Lyotard's Lessons on 'the analytic of the sublime' - makes a >very poor improper weapon for the fugitive to pick up and insert hastily >inside their jacket - to usea rather wonderful image from Deleuze... >Whereas the Debord's texts make are rather wonderful weapons... > >5) Perhaps the return of the sublime as a useful liberatory concept can >never be achieved - what cannot be commodified? Were my responses to my >daughter's birth sublime or codified responses of capitals last >metamorphsis? The metamorphosis of capital has achieved the position of > completely eclipsing use-value and has managed to achieve the status of >absolute and irresponsible over all known life, having falisifed the >entirety of social production. > >6) The understanding of the 'aestheticisation of terror' has two >starting points - the first seems an adequate point for the impact of >Kant's sublime on literature and society - the second is the point >where the radical critique and refusal of the sublime, of the >aestheticisation starts from - 1) the romantics - with the fetishism of > the post-Kantian concept of philosophy 2) Marx and the chapter in >Capital on Commodity Fetishism. From the latter standpoint Hiroshima can >be instantiated as a sublime effect - just as Auschwitz is rendered as a >sublime effect by hollywood... > >regards >steve > >Reg Mifflin wrote: > >>Walter, >> >>Are you jesting? If you are serious then I couldn't agree less. >>The sublime is not terror, it is the aestheticisation of terror, there's a >>big difference. >>If actual terror/violence etc. is conflated with the sublime then we have >>just lost a useful idea in philosophy. >>To call Hiroshima a sublime affect, apart from being plain wrong, says more >>about the 'affected' person than the aesthetic term. >> >>Reg >> >>At 09:37 AM 11/10/01 -0500, you wrote: >> >>>The issue is, indeed, the sublime and maybe after 9-11 we're finally ready >>>to see that Kant on the sublime is really a call for the development and the >>>use of the atomic bomb. I know it sounds preposterous but so much was >>>slumbering in the great acts of a priori rationality. And thus we can begin >>>to see the psyche hiding behind the ratio--in Kant and all who continue to >>>draw on him both for their hyper-rational superstructures and the covert >>>prosecution of their deepest desires. Because yes, the horror of 9-11 was >>>that at one register of the psyche it was experienced as a sublime image. >>>And thus shocking the need of so many to moralistically deny this and attack >>>all who want to understand it. For the understand is perhaps this: a >>>sublime affect can only be replaced by another sublime affect. As on 8-6-45 >>>and 8-9-45 and on .....??? >>>When traumatic events happen historicity within the psyche turns on the >>>sublime register. >>>I have tried to discuss these matters---and Kant on the sublime at >>>length--in Walter A. Davis, DERACINATION; HISTORICITY, HIROSHIMA, AND THE >>>TRAGIC IMPERATIVE (Albany: SUNY P, 2001). >>> >>> >>>At 06:03 AM 11/10/01 -0600, you wrote: >>> >>>>All, >>>> >>>>I want to deal with some of these other issues in another post, when I >>>>have a little more time. >>>> >>>>But, first of all, there is clearly a difference between interest and >>>>the ethical, certainly within both the Aristotlean and the Kantian >>>>traditions. >>>> >>>>Kant clearly distinguishes between duty and interest and says that >>>>ethics is only concerned with the former and not the latter. I realize >>>>the word duty is not a popular one today. Put in its place something >>>>like 'the right thing' or justice and what Kant says makes more sense. >>>> >>>>It is also interesting that Kant make a similar distinction between >>>>interest and beauty, but I digress... >>>> >>>>Also, there is a clear concept of the sublime that can be described in >>>>both Burke and Kant and it is something that is very different from the >>>>ineffable. My next post will deal with sublime in greater detail. >>>> >>>>I also think, contrary to Steve, that there is a Kantian side to Badiou >>>>and not merely a Hegelian paternity. >>>> >>>>More later.... >>>> >>>> >>>>eric >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > ><html> ><head> ></head> ><body> >Reg/Walter/Eric<br> ><br> >1) Whilst I disagree with Walters' hyperbole, simply because so much philosophy >has wilfully refused to understand the issues that are raised by science >- the clearest moment being the Darwin event. There is a sound point in the >below related to the comprehensive industrialisation of the media, which >derives its power from the comprehensive aesthetics of terror, which can >be understood through the invocation of the 'sublime' - Lyotard invokes the >sublime in relation to the aesthetic not to the social itself - in the sections >of the inhuman where he addresses the social he invokes the notion of 'development' >which is a heavily overcoded version of capital. But this is insufficient >given that this does not help in producing an analysis and understanding >of the miseries and slavery of a society that at present has extended its >domination over the whole planet - this is to re-state, that this is the >society of the spectacle in which we all, the humans and animals on this >planet live. <br> ><br> >2) Because we live in the society of the spectacle, and let us remember that >the spectacle is 'the social relationship between people that is mediated >by images', images that dominate and degrade any notion of the sublime. >In effect it denies any possibility of the 'sublime' having purchase in this >society - for the space of the sublime has been, as Lyotard hints in the >inhuman, industrialised to the extent that 'judgements on the beautiful' >seem absurdly out of place. (Lyotards much loved Avant-Garde has become merely >a traditional subset of the industrialised spectacle). An inevitable beyond >of the society of spectacle is the rise of post or inhuman forms, a blurring >of the lines between humans and machines, which need to be understood as >going well beyond the current medical protheses. The InHuman argues for the >spectacular reassessment of the significance of the human and the realignment >of the relationship between the human/animal and technology (which I approve >of). This is what the late Lyotard, for all of his anti-humanisn, was so >terrified of and which he wrote against in his later writing.... But to write >against the relationship has to start from the spectacle (Debord) and commodity >fetishism (Marx), and not from an approval of the fetishism of the avant-garde. >What can be more fetishistic than Lyotard writing on avant-garde painting >where he argues -that it enters into the sublime because of its concerns >with form and its revealing the invisible through its concerns with the visual? > Whereas the spectacle announces that these are primarily commodities - possibly >best understood through the falling rate of use value... The avant-garde >was a 19th and 20th C pre-post-modern concern - it does not exist anymore... ><br> ><br> >3) Perhaps then, for us, the sublime is simply the spectacle written large >across our, into our imaginaries - and nothing else. <br> ><br> >4) Eric - the point at issue with the Kantian and Hegelian differences is >that early 21st Century radical critiques of the European Philosophical kind >are all descended in some sense from the Hegelian line... Lyotard's Lessons >on 'the analytic of the sublime' - makes a very poor improper weapon for >the fugitive to pick up and insert hastily inside their jacket - to usea >rather wonderful image from Deleuze... Whereas the Debord's texts make are >rather wonderful weapons... <br> ><br> >5) Perhaps the return of the sublime as a useful liberatory concept can never >be achieved - what cannot be commodified? Were my responses to my daughter's >birth sublime or codified responses of capitals last metamorphsis? The metamorphosis >of capital has achieved the position of completely eclipsing use-value and >has managed to achieve the status of absolute and irresponsible over all >known life, having falisifed the entirety of social production. <br> ><br> >6) The understanding of the 'aestheticisation of terror' has two starting >points - the first seems an adequate point for the impact of Kant's sublime >on literature and society - the second is the point where the radical critique >and refusal of the sublime, of the aestheticisation starts from - 1) the >romantics - with the fetishism of the post-Kantian concept of philosophy > 2) Marx and the chapter in Capital on Commodity Fetishism. From the latter >standpoint Hiroshima can be instantiated as a sublime effect - just as Auschwitz >is rendered as a sublime effect by hollywood...<br> ><br> >regards<br> >steve<br> ><br> >Reg Mifflin wrote:<br> ><blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:3.0.5.32.20011111110553.0091d140-AT-mail.space.net.au"> > <pre wrap="">Walter,<br><br>Are you jesting? If you are serious then I couldn't agree less.<br>The sublime is not terror, it is the aestheticisation of terror, there's a<br>big difference.<br>If actual terror/violence etc. is conflated with the sublime then we have<br>just lost a useful idea in philosophy.<br>To call Hiroshima a sublime affect, apart from being plain wrong, says more<br>about the 'affected' person than the aesthetic term.<br><br>Reg<br><br>At 09:37 AM 11/10/01 -0500, you wrote:<br></pre> > <blockquote type="cite"> > <pre wrap="">The issue is, indeed, the sublime and maybe after 9-11 we're finally ready<br>to see that Kant on the sublime is really a call for the development and the<br>use of the atomic bomb. I know it sounds preposterous but so much was<br>slumbering in the great acts of a priori rationality. And thus we can begin<br>to see the psyche hiding behind the ratio--in Kant and all who continue to<br>draw on him both for their hyper-rational superstructures and the covert<br>prosecution of their deepest desires. Because yes, the horror of 9-11 was<br>that at one register of the psyche it was experienced as a sublime image.<br>And thus shocking the need of so many to moralistically deny this and attack<br>all who want to understand it. For the understand is perhaps this: a<br>sublime affect can only be replaced by another sublime affect. As on 8-6-45<br>and 8-9-45 and on .....???<br>When traumatic events happen historicity within the psyche turns on the<br>sublime regis >ter.<br>I have tried to discuss these matters---and Kant on the sublime at<br>length--in Walter A. Davis, DERACINATION; HISTORICITY, HIROSHIMA, AND THE<br>TRAGIC IMPERATIVE (Albany: SUNY P, 2001). <br><br><br>At 06:03 AM 11/10/01 -0600, you wrote:<br></pre> > <blockquote type="cite"> > <pre wrap="">All,<br><br>I want to deal with some of these other issues in another post, when I<br>have a little more time.<br><br>But, first of all, there is clearly a difference between interest and<br>the ethical, certainly within both the Aristotlean and the Kantian<br>traditions. <br><br>Kant clearly distinguishes between duty and interest and says that<br>ethics is only concerned with the former and not the latter. I realize<br>the word duty is not a popular one today. Put in its place something<br>like 'the right thing' or justice and what Kant says makes more sense.<br><br>It is also interesting that Kant make a similar distinction between<br>interest and beauty, but I digress...<br><br>Also, there is a clear concept of the sublime that can be described in<br>both Burke and Kant and it is something that is very different from the<br>ineffable. My next post will deal with sublime in greater detail. <br><br>I also think, contrary to Steve, that there is a Kant >ian side to Badiou<br>and not merely a Hegelian paternity.<br><br>More later....<br><br><br>eric<br><br><br><br></pre> > </blockquote> > <pre wrap=""><br><br></pre> > </blockquote> > <pre wrap=""><!----><br><br></pre> > </blockquote> > <br> > </body> > </html> >
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