Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2001 19:00:17 +0000 From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com> Subject: re: libidinal ethics - Zizek Eric/All I have been reading, and still am, Zizek's new book "Did somebody say something about Totalitarianism?" - which is especially relevant to the turn that this discussion is taking - at least in relation to the question of ethics and the human/subject. The section most directly relevant is 'Melancholy and the act...' p141 - 190. ( I recommend it highly) I am not going to attempt to précis the argument for I think that such an act of gross summarisation is beyond the scope of this email - rather I'm going to touch on, and probably misrepresent the discussion on the 'ethical act'. I think like everyone else I've come across the standard misreading of the Kantian ethical act which as Zizek states is that 'the sole criteria of the ethical character of the act is the pure interiority of subjective intent' where the difference between the true ethical act and a normal legel act is related to the subject's (see other email on 'subject') 'inner attitude'. To follow the law on account of the pathological considerations of the fear of punishment for trangression, the normalising nature of the legality etc as Zizek suggests this same act can be a moral act if you carry it out in 'respect for duty' assuming that this is the sole reason for doing it. But it cannot be an 'ethical act' for the ethical act can only be a transgression of the legal norm - such a trangression does not solely trangress the legel norm but redefines or aims to redefine what a legal norm is or should be. The law as such, and Zizek is writing of the moral law when he discusses this (which might encompass legalisation of abortion, the refusal of the EC to deport the relevant criminals to countries that have the death penalty, the arrest of Pinochet and so on) the law as such does not follow notions of the Good, 'it generates a new shape of what counts as the Good'. (This draws on Zupancic).... This leads us inexorably towards: legal norms changing due to the pressures of ethical and non-ethical actions. Legal norms are, as Zizek says treated in a utilitarian way however he is quite wrong in suggesting that rigid legal formalism 'one should adhere to the letter of the law' and utilitarian opportunism 'legal norms are flexibleand bendable' end up with a common presupposition 'they both exclude the notion of transgressing the norm as an ethical act, accomplished forn the sake of duty....' (For utilitarian ethics state that this behavior is ethically correct behaviour). Perhaps the next most interesting argument is that "... the traditional Kantian heirachy of forms of evil should be reversed. The worst thing that can happen is external legality, compliance with the law for pathological reasons; then comes a simple violation of the law.... finally there is the symmetrical opposite of 'doing the right ethical thing for the wrong pathological reasons, doing the wrong thing for the right reasons.... the violation of ethical norms for no 'pathological' reasons, but just for the sake of it...." (P172) My take on this is that the underlying logic behind this is contrary to the Kantian theses, for it returns the scope of the ethical from the universal to the 'practical ethics'. What is especially interesting here is that in its pragmatism it opens up the space for the inclusion of the non-human as the 'Other'. It does this because the ethical act (i.e. Animal rights campaigners, 'take back the night', poll-tax campaigners etc) in addition to being carried out due to duty and ideology also has actual effects, it intervenes and changes what constitutes reality.... regards (oh and happy new year...) steve
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