Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2001 19:00:17 +0000
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com>
Subject: re: libidinal ethics - Zizek




Eric/All

I have been reading, and still am,  Zizek's new book "Did somebody say 
something about Totalitarianism?"  - which is especially relevant to the 
turn that this discussion is taking - at least in relation to the 
question of ethics and the human/subject. The section most directly 
relevant is 'Melancholy and the act...' p141 - 190. ( I recommend it highly)

I am not going to attempt to précis the argument for I think that such 
an act of gross summarisation is beyond the scope of this email - rather 
I'm going to touch on, and probably misrepresent the discussion on the 
'ethical act'.

I think like everyone else I've come across the standard misreading of 
the Kantian ethical act which as Zizek states is that 'the sole criteria 
of the  ethical character of the act is the pure interiority of 
subjective intent' where the difference between the true ethical act and 
a normal legel act is related to the subject's (see other email on 
'subject') 'inner attitude'. To follow the law on account of  the 
pathological considerations of the fear of punishment for trangression, 
the normalising nature of the legality etc as Zizek suggests this same 
act can be a moral act if you carry it out in 'respect for duty' 
assuming that this is the sole reason for doing it. But it cannot be an 
'ethical act'  for the ethical act can only be a transgression of the 
legal norm - such a trangression  does not solely trangress the legel 
norm but redefines or aims to redefine  what a legal norm is or should 
be. The law as such, and Zizek is writing of the moral law when he 
discusses this (which might encompass legalisation of abortion, the 
refusal of the EC to deport the relevant criminals to countries that 
have the death penalty, the arrest of Pinochet and so on) the law as 
such does not follow notions of the Good, 'it generates a new shape of 
what counts as the Good'. (This draws on Zupancic)....

This leads us inexorably towards: legal norms changing due to the 
pressures of ethical and non-ethical actions. Legal norms are, as Zizek 
says treated in a utilitarian way however he is quite wrong in 
suggesting that rigid legal formalism 'one should adhere to the letter 
of the law' and utilitarian opportunism 'legal norms are flexibleand 
bendable' end up with a common presupposition 'they both exclude the 
notion of transgressing the norm as an ethical act, accomplished forn 
the sake of duty....' (For utilitarian ethics state that this behavior 
is ethically correct behaviour).

Perhaps the next most interesting argument is that "... the traditional 
Kantian heirachy of forms of evil should be reversed. The worst thing 
that can happen is external legality, compliance with the law for 
pathological reasons; then comes a simple violation of the law.... 
finally there is the symmetrical opposite of 'doing the right ethical 
thing for the wrong pathological reasons, doing the wrong thing for the 
right reasons.... the violation of ethical norms for no 'pathological' 
reasons, but just for the sake of it...." (P172)

My take on this is that the underlying logic behind this is contrary to 
the Kantian theses, for it returns the scope of the ethical from the 
universal to the 'practical ethics'. What is especially interesting here 
is that in its pragmatism it opens up the space for the inclusion of the 
non-human as the 'Other'. It does this because the ethical act (i.e. 
Animal rights campaigners, 'take back the night', poll-tax campaigners 
 etc) in addition to being carried out due to duty and ideology also has 
actual effects, it intervenes and changes what constitutes reality....

regards (oh and happy new year...)
steve

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